J  X 


'IE  RELATION  OF  BRITISH  POLICY 
TO  THE  DECLARATION  OF  THE 
MONROE  DOCTRINE 


UC-NRLF 


ED    EflE 


KY 

t  KONARD  AXilL   LAWSON,  A.  M. 

/'•'./"••-> ••••  o    lfif-"f'  in  JH-thdrt  L'-'ik'.f 


PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  REQIHREMENTS 
T)iJTREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
IN  THE 

vULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 
1922 


THE  RELATION  OF  BRITISH  POLICY 

TO  THE  DECLARATION  OF  THE 

MONROE  DOCTRINE 


BY 

LEONARD  AXEL  LAWSON,  A.  M. 

Professor  of  History  in  Hobart  College 


SUBMITTED  IN  PARTIAL  FULFILMENT  OF  THE  REQUIREMENTS 

FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF  DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 

IN  THE 

FACULTY  OF  POLITICAL  SCIENCE 
COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY 


NEW  YORK 
1922 


PREFACE 

IT  is  a  matter  of  common  knowledge  that  both  the  United 
States  and  England  pursued  a  policy  of  opposition  to 
European  intervention  in  Latin  America  in  1823.  It  is 
also  well  known  that  England's  policy  of  opposition  was 
based  chiefly  upon  economic  motives,  and  that  of  the 
United  States  upon  political  motives.  But  a  further  in- 
quiry into  the  relation  of  British  policy  to  that  of  the 
United  States  will  reveal  the  interesting  fact  that  upon  the 
firmness  of  British  opposition  to  intervention  depended  the 
success  of  the  policy  of  the  United  States  as  formally  ex- 
pressed in  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Such  an  inquiry  is  the 
purpose  of  the  present  treatise.  The  author  hopes  that  the 
results  of  his  investigations  may  constitute,  in  some  degree, 
a  contribution  to  the  history  of  Anglo-American  relations 
during  the  past  century. 

In  the  preparation  of  this  treatise  liberal  use  has  been 
made  of  the  sources  relating  to  the  subject.  In  addition 
to  an  investigation  of  the  sources  available  in  the  United 
States,  a  search  was  made  in  the  British  Foreign  Office 
Records,  Public  Record  Office,  London,  which  yieldtd  an 
abundance  of  valuable  information. 

The  author  takes  this  occasion  to  acknowledge  his  in- 
debtedness to  the  members  of  the  Faculty  of  Political 
Science  in  Columbia  University,  under  whom  he  pursued 
his  graduate  studies,  for  their  guidance  and  inspiring  in- 
terest. Especially  to  Professor  Carlton  J.  H.  Hayes,  under 
whose  direction  this  treatise  was  begun  and  completed  and 
who  has  read  both  the  manuscript  and  the  proof,  and  to 
51  5 


6  PREFACE  [6 

Professor  R.  L.  Schuyler  who  also  has  read  the  manuscript, 
does  he  desire  to  recognize  his  debt  of  gratitude  for  their 
valuable  criticism  and  many  helpful  suggestions.  To  his 
wife,  Edith  Carla  Lawson,  whose  interest  has  been  a  con- 
stant source  of  inspiration,  he  is  indebted  for  her  help  in 
the  preparation  of  the  manuscript  in  its  final  form. 

LEONARD  A.  LAWSON. 
GENEVA,  N.  Y.,  MARCH,  1922. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


PAC« 

INTRODUCTION 9 

CHAPTER  I 
THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY n 

CHAPTER  II 
GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 30 

CHAPTER  III 
INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN 51 

CHAPTER  IV 
BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA 76 

CHAPTER  V 
THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE   .  .  . 104 

CHAPTER  VI 
THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 125 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 147 

INDEX 151 

7]  7 


INTRODUCTION 

THE  Monroe  Doctrine,  since  its  proclamation  in  1823, 
has  occupied  a  prominent  position  in  the  history  of  the 
foreign  relations  of  the  United  States.1  Indeed,  the 
character  of  these  relations  has  often  been  determined 
largely  by  our  interpretation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in  its 
application  to  new  problems  and  events  as  they  have 
emerged  in  the  course  of  the  century.  Our  diplomatic 
negotiations  with  Great  Britain  have  often  related  to  the 
application  of  its  principles.  Appeals  to  these  principles 
have  been  made  whenever  the  commercial  interests  and 
territorial  claims  of  England  have  come  into  conflict  with 
the  political  interests  of  the  United  States  in  the  western 
hemisphere. 

That  an  American  policy  such  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
would  ultimately  operate  to  the  disadvantage  of  Great 
Britain  must  have  been  foreseen  by  the  British  statesmen 
of  the  first  quarter  of  the  iQth  century.  Yet  the  interests 
of  their  country  and  its  relations  with  the  continental 
powers  of  Europe  were  such  as  to  produce  conditions 
especially  favorable  for  its  proclamation. 

It  is  an  interesting  fact  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  nations — 
the  United  States  and  Great  Britain — -both  regarded  the 
proposed  intervention  in  Latin  America  as  a  source  of 
danger.  Both  countries  were  opposed  to  it.  The  question 

^Beer  (G.  L.),  The  English-Speaking  Peoples,  (New  York,  1918), 
P-  75;  Colby  (N.  C),  "Present  Status  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine," 
Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  vol. 
Kv,  p.  20;  Moore  (J.  B.),  The  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  (New 
York,  1918),  p.  261. 

9]  9 


I0  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [IQ 

whether  their  motives  for  opposition  were  identical  may 
conveniently  be  left  for  later  consideration;  but  the  fact 
remains  that  they  manifested  an  interest  in  a  joint  policyj 
in  order  to  prevent  the  intervention  that  was  threatened  by 
the  representatives  of  the  "  European  System." 

This  Anglo-American  harmony  invites  an  inquiry  into 
the  extent  to  which  British  statesmanship  contributed  to  the 
formulation  and  promulgation  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  in 
1823.  That  there  was  such  a  contribution  is  undeniable. 
Whether  it  was  merely  supplementary  in  its  influence,  or 
a  determining  factor,  is  a  question  which  may  not  be  so 
easily  answered. 

Although  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  originally  proclaimed 
to  the  world,  was  in  harmony  with  the  geographical  position, 
the  political  experiences,  and  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States  prior  to  1823,  it  seems  very  doubtful  that 
President  Monroe  would  have  taken  the  bold  step  of  pro- 
claiming its  principles  so  early  in  our  history  had  it  not 
been  for  the  knowledge  of  England's  attitude  relative  to  the 
Spanish- American  question.  Considering,  therefore,  the 
time  when  it  was  proclaimed,  the  weakness  of  the  United 
States  compared  with  an  embattled  alliance  of  Old- World 
powers  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  the  political 
and  economic  interests  of  England,  her  relations  with  the 
Quadruple  Alliance,1  her  attitude  toward  the  Spanish- Ameri- 
can question  as  expressed  in  her  diplomatic  correspondence, 
and  her  recognized  naval  power,  it  is  difficult  to  escape  the 
conclusion  that  England's  contribution  to  the  promulgation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  was  decisive  in  the  extent  of  its 
influence.  ^ 

1  The  Quadruple  Alliance  is  frequently,  but  incorrectly,  referred  to 
as  the  "Holy  Alliance."  After  the  admission  of  France  in  1818  the 
term  "  Quintuple  Alliance "  is  sometimes  used.  In  this  treatise  the 
term  "Quadruple  Alliance"  is  used  in  its  original  meaning.  (See  pp. 
32-35- 


CHAPTER  I 
THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY 

NOTWITHSTANDING  the  American  Revolution  and  the 
War  of  1812,  the  United  States  and  England  had  each 
pursued  independently  of  the  other  a  course  of  action,  main- 
tained certain  interests,  and  developed  principles  of  foreign 
policy  which  invited  cooperation  in  the  presence  of  common 
danger. 

The  eighteenth  century,  which  was  so  productive  of 
changes  in  the  economic  and  political  institutions  of  the 
world,  and  especially  western  Europe,  gave  direction  to  the 
foreign  policy  of  Great  Britain.  That  is  no  less  true  of 
her  relations  with  France  than  of  her  relations  with  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  after  the  Congress  of  Vienna.  In  the 
case  of  the  former,  England  had  already  in  the  War  of 
the  Spanish  Succession,  and  in  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  fol- 
lowing the  conclusion  of  the  war,  shown  herself  emphat- 
ically opposed  to  any  attempt  of  France  to  establish  French 
influence  over  Spain  and  the  Spanish  possessions  beyond 
the  seas.1  England's  opposition  in  that  instance  to  the  de- 
signs of  Louis  XIV  was  grounded  not  only  upon  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  balance  of  power,  but  also  upon  the  commercial 
advantages  that  would  be  derived  from  the  separate  ex- 
istence of  the  colonial  empires  of  France  and  Spain.  A 
union  of  the  two  colonial  empires  would  have  been  ex- 
tremely disastrous  to  the  commercial  interests  of  England. 

1  Hill  (D.  J.),  A  History  of  European  Diplomacy,  (,New  York,  1914), 
vol.  iii,  p.  317. 

"I  II 


12  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [J2 

The  Treaty  of  Utrecht,  though  favorable  to  both  the 
principle  of  the  balance  of  power  and  to  the  colonial  and 
commercial  interests  of  England,  was  not  the  end  of  Anglo- 
French  rivalry.1  It  could  be  little  more  than  a  truce  so 
long  as  the  old  colonial  system  prevailed  with  its  numerous 
restrictions  imposed  by  one  nation  upon  the  commerce  of 
another.2  In  these  artificial  restrictions  which  weighed 
heavily  upon  the  world's  trade  lay  the  germs  of  further  con- 
flict. When  war  broke  out  again  it  assumed  larger  pro- 
portions, embracing  within  its  scope  not  only  America  but 
India.  By  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  1763  the  might  of  Eng- 
land had  won  a  decisive  victory  over  France;  and  by  the 
terms  of  that  treaty  England  added,  with  insignificant  ex- 
ceptions, the  French  colonies  to  her  own  possessions. 
From  this  addition  of  territory  England  derived  great  com- 
mercial advantages,3  which,  coupled  with  the  Industrial 
Revolution,  made  England  the  greatest  commercial  power 
in  Europe.4  It  was  natural  that  in  the  wars  of  France  and 
England  in  America  each  should  have  the  cooperation  of 
its  own  colonists.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  unity 
of  purpose  engendered  a  unity  of  feeling  which,  though 
strained  by  the  Revolution,  was  bound  to  revive  under  the 
influence  of  changed  circumstances. 

Though  the  memory  of  common  victory  was  not  suffi- 
ciently strong  to  prevent  the  revolt  of  the  American  colonies 
against  England  under  the  pressure  of  serious  economic 
grievances,  the  independence  of  the  thirteen  colonies,  once 
recognized,  paved  the  way  for  future  cooperation  of  the 

1  Cambridge  Modern  History,  (New  York,  1902-1910),  vol.  vi,  pp. 
411  et  seq.  \ 

*lbid.f  p.  414. 

•Ogg    (F.    A.),    The   Economic   Development    of   Modern   Europe, 
(New  York,  1917),  p.  80. 
*  Ibid. 


j  3]      THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY        1 3 

two  English-speaking  peoples,  should  circumstances  suggest 
it.  The  fact  of  sovereign  independence  enabled  the  United 
States  to  shape  its  foreign  policy  in  harmony  with  its 
geographic  position,  political  experiences,  and  economic  in- 
terests. In  the  character  and  aims  of  these  policies  are 
found  the  possibilities  and  the  advantages  of  Anglo-Ameri- 
can cooperation. 

Meanwhile  England  was  mightily  affected  by  gigantic 
changes  in  her  own  economic  life  and  by  the  political  up- 
heaval on  the  European  continent.  The  Industrial  Revo- 
lution and  the  French  Revolution  did  not  give  a  new  direc- 
tion to  the  foreign  policy  of  England:  they  intensified  and 
made  more  pronounced  a  policy  which  England  had  pursued 
for  more  than  a  century.  It  was  a  policy  opposed  to  the 
aggrandizement  of  France. 

The  underlying  motives  of  this  policy  may  be  found  in 
the  rapid  development  of  English  industry  and  commerce 
which  resulted  from  the  growth  of  empire  and  from  the 
Industrial  Revolution.1  In  the  course  of  the  eighteenth 
century  British  exports  increased  from  an  annual  value  2  of 
£1,505,285  3  in  1701  to  £12,142,000*  in  1763,  to  £22,- 
095,000 5  in  1792,  and  to  £41, 717,000 6  in  1801.  The 
growth  of  colonial  possessions,  coupled  with  the  develop- 

1  Abbott  (W.C.),  The  Expansion  of  Europe,  (New  York,  1918),  vol. 
»,  PP.  347  et  seq. 
1  The  average  annual  value  for  the  period  1698-1701. 

*  Marshall  (J.),  Digest  of  the  Accounts  diffused  through  600  volumes 
of  Journals,  Reports,  and  Papers  presented  to  Parliament  since  1779, 
(London,  1833),  pt.  3,  PP-  71-75- 

*Levi  ('Leone),  The  History  of  British  Commerce,  (London,  1880), 
p,  36. 

*lbid.,  p.  64. 
4  tbid.,  p.  146. 


!4  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [14 

ment  of  British  sea  power,  caused  much  of  this  trade  to 
shift  from  the  continent  of  Europe  to  the  colonies.1 

France  also  experienced  an  increase  in  the  volume  of  her 
exports  despite  the  disastrous  consequences  of  her  wars; 
ibut  French  trade  was  confined  for  the  most  part  to  the 
continent  of  Europe.  This  continental  direction  of  French 
exports  was  owing  to  the  nature  of  the  goods  exported — 
mostly  fancy  goods  and  luxuries;  while  British  exports 
were  staple  goods  for  which  the  relatively  backward  popula- 
tions of  undeveloped  countries  afforded  the  greatest  demand.2 
Thus  the  colonial  trade  of  England  was  growing  relatively 
more  important  than  that  of  France.  It  was  natural  that 
under  these  circumstances  the  foreign  policy  of  England 
would  be  given  a  balance  of  emphasis  consistent  with  the 
changing  current  of  her  economic  interests.3 

It  was  also  likely  that  these  new  developments  would  in- 
fluence the  international  relations  of  England.  Her  diplo- 
macy turned  its  attention  more  and  more  to  the  questions 
touching  the  fortunes  of  the  western  hemisphere,  parti- 
cularly where  and  when  her  interests  were  concerned.  In 
the  course  of  that  deflection  of  her  diplomacy  England's 
relations  with  some  of  the  continental  countries  of  Europe 
became  more  delicate,  in  view  of  which  the  support  that 
the  United  States  might  give  would  be  a  distinct  advantage 
to  the  realization  of  her  aims  and  the  success  of  her  policy. 
This  change  in  England's  foreign  policy  took  the  form  of 
opposition  to  the  policy  of  intervention  pursued  by  the 
continental  Allies,  and  the  substitution  for  it  of  an  under- 
standing with  the  United  States  designed  to  conteract  the 
machinations  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 

The  real  motives  and  effects  of  that  change  will  be  left 

1  Marshall,  op.  cit.,  pp.  74-75 ;  cf.  infra,  pp.  77-86. 

"Day  (Clive),  A  History  of  Commerce,  (New  York,  1917),  p.  216. 

3  Infra,  pp.  77-86. 


! 5 ]      THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY        1 5 

for  later  consideration.  For  the  present  it  will  suffice  to 
point  out  certain  factors  that  appear  to  have  been  funda- 
mental to  a  common  Anglo-American  policy,  such  as  was 
suggested  by  Canning  in  1823. 

In  the  first  place,  in  spite  of  the  distance  which  separates 
the  United  States  and  England,  the  geographical  situations 
of  these  two  countries  relative  to  the  European  continent 
have  something  in  common :  but  are  separated  from  it  by 
bodies  of  water.  In  the  case  of  England  her  geographical 
separation  from  the  continent  had  made  her  inhabitants  a 
maritime  people  with  real  interest  in  commercial  enterprise.1 
The  Ocean  was  their  highway  by  which  distant  lands 
could  be  reached.  In  the  course  of  their  commercial  pur- 
suits territorial  acquisitions  were  made,  and  England's 
economic  interests  struck  deep  roots  also  in  soil  that  was 
not  English.  England,  by  reason  of  the  world-wide  reach 
of  her  commercial  interests,  would,  more  than  any  other 
nation,  need  to  watch  carefully  the  current  of  world  politics. 
The  need  for  such  vigilance  was  especially  great  when  there 
was  danger  of  a  conflict  between  two  opposing  political 
principles  that  would  probably  have  the  most  harmful  re- 
sults for  British  commerce  and  trade.  The  geographic 
fact  of  her  insular  position,  then,  made  England  a  maritime 
and  commercial  power,  and  as  such  the  fate  of  the  Spanish 
colonies  in  America  was  a  matter  of  deep  concern  to  her. 
Similarly,  the  geographical  situation  of  the  United  States 
constitutes  the  basis  upon  which  the  structure  of  our  for- 
eign policy  has  been  reared.2  Geographical  separation  sug- 
gested a  policy  of  political  isolation.  Distance  from  the 

1  Semple  (E.  C),  Influences  of  Geographic  Environment,  (New  York, 
JQH),  P-  15;  Mahan  (A.  T.),  The  Influence  of  Sea  Power  upon- 
History,  (Boston,  1893),  pp.  29  et  seq. 

'Hart  (A.  B.),  The  Monroe  Doctrine:  An  Interpretation,  (Boston, 
,  PP-  2  et  seq. 


j6  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

Old  World  invited  a  policy  of  non-interference  by  America 
in  European  politics.1  Though  the  interest  which  England 
showed  in  the  fate  of  the  Spanish- American  colonies  was 
principally  economic,  and  the  motives  which  prompted  the 
declaration  of  the  great  national  principle  —  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  —  by  the  United  States  were  chiefly  political; 
nevertheless,  they  were  bottomed  upon  the  fundamental  fact 
of  the  geographical  situation  of  each  of  those  countries. 

In  the  second  place,  England  as  well  as  the  United  States, 
was  an  American  power  by  virtue  of  her  possession  of 
Canada.  Both  possessed  territory  on  the  continent  of 
North  America,  much  of  which  was  not  settled,  and 
abounding  in  natural  resources.  They  had  a  common  in- 
terest in  the  preservation  of  these  territories  against  pos- 
sible attacks  by  other  powers. 

Thirdly,  there  was  the  feeling  of  a  common  heritage. 
The  people  of  the  United  States  had,  after  all,  a  British 
back-ground,  a  set  of  experiences  and  traditions  which 
determined  in  a  large  measure  the  course  of  American 
civilization  and  American  policies.  In  spite  of  the  Revo- 
lution, in  which  the  colonists  fought  for  their  rights  as 
Englishmen,  the  fact  that  the  background  of  the  social  and 
political  life  of  the  United  States  was  British  has  never 
been  disputed.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  reason  for  think- 
ing that  the  bitterness  engendered  by  the  Revolution  has 
been  very  much  exaggerated.  In  fact,  the  Revolution  was 
not  directed  so  much  against  the  English  people  as  against 
their  government.2  Many  Englishmen,  realizing  at  the 
time  that  their  own  hope  of  political  emancipation  was  akin 
to  that  of  the  colonists  for  independence,  refused  to  fight 
against  the  revolutionists.3 

1  Semple,  op.  cit.,  p.  236. 

5  Johnson  (W.  F.),  America's  Foreign  Relations,  (New  York,  1916), 
vol.  i,  p.  64. 
•Johnson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  58-59. 


j^]      THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY        ^ 

A  feeling  of  animosity  there  certainly  was,1  but  no  greater 
in  intensity  and  duration  than  that  which  any  similar  event 
may  produce  as  a  natural  consequence  of  long-standing 
grievances  for  which  the  frailty  of  human  nature  can  find 
redress  only  in  the  clash  of  arms.  At  any  rate,  the  feeling 
of  animosity  easily  yielded  to  a  better  relationship  when  it 
became  evident  that  the  current  of  European  politics  car- 
ried in  its  course  an  element  of  danger  common  alike  to  the 
aims  and  interests  of  the  two  English-speaking  peoples. 
When  that  danger  presented  itself  in  the  form  of  a  proposal 
for  continental  European  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  the 
western  hemisphere,  it  was  more  natural  for  the  United 
States  and  England  to  unite  their  forces  against  interven- 
tion than  it  would  have  been  for  either  of  them  to  side  with 
the  continental  Allies. 

But  irrespective  of  any  hatred  of  England  that  might 
still  have  lingered  in  the  hearts  of  the  triumphant  revolu- 
tionists long  after  the  smoke  of  battle  had  disappeared,  the 
people  of  the  United  States  were  in  the  eighteenth  and  early 
nineteenth  centuries  developing  a  real  aversion  to  any  sug- 
gestion of  an  alliance  with  European  countries.  This 
attitude  was  the  product  partly  of  their  experiences  as 
colonists  and  nation  builders,  and  partly  of  their  knowledge 
of  the  devious  ways  of  European  diplomacy  and  politics. 
They  looked  back,  too,  upon  a  century  of  European  history, 
and  they  found  there  little  but  the  story  of  wars — wars 
bound  up  with  and  produced  by  dynastic  ambitions  and 
interests.  It  is  not  surprising  that  as  a  free  people  they 
would  have  as  little  as  possible  to  do  with  the  crowned 
autocrats  of  Europe,  who  showed  so  little  concern  for  the 
rights  and  welfare  of  the  common  people.  Above  all,  they 

1  Channing  (E.),  A  History  of  the  United  States,  (New  York,  1912-  ), 
vol.  iv,  p.  124. 


jg  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [18 

would  preserve  their  new-found  liberty,  and  they  discerned 
for  that  purpose  an  invaluable  asset  in  their  geographical 
isolation.1 

The  policy  of  isolation,  of  which  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  the  emphatic  announcement,  had  its  roots  in  the 
eighteenth  century.  It  was  grounded  in  the  belief  that  the 
United  States  represented  ideals  and  principles  different 
from  those  of  the  European  countries ;  and  that  national  de- 
velopment in  conformity  with  those  ideals  and  principles 
might  be  checked  and  stultified  by  European  entanglement.2 
It  seemed  to  the  Americans  of  those  days  that  not  only 
would  such  entanglements  involve  the  expenditure  of  re- 
sources that  might  better  be  used  for  their  national  develop- 
ment, but  they  were  looked  upon  as  a  distinct  danger.3  So 
strong  was  the  sentiment  in  favor  of  isolation  that  it  could 
be  only  a  question  of  time  before  it  should  be  publicly  de- 
clared as  the  policy  of  this  nation.4  The  European  policy 
of  intervention  only  furnished  a  favorable  occasion.5  The 
American  fear  of  the  possible  consequences  of  too  close  re- 
lations with  Europe  was  paralleled  by  European  fear  of 
republican  institutions.  The  danger  seemed  to  be  mutual, 
and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  Doctrine  of  Intervention 
were  expressive  of  two  contradictory  political  systems 
which  circumstances  suddenly  brought  into  conflict. 

President  Monroe  but  expressed  officially  and  formally 
a  national  policy  which  had  long  been  shaping  in  the  minds 
of  American  statesmen.8  Even  before  he  became  President, 

1  Semple,  op.  cit.,  pp.  236-237. 

'McLaughlin   (A.  C),  America  and  Britain,   (New  York,   1919),  p. 
99- 

*  North  American  Review,  vol.  clxxvi,  p.  186. 

*  Moore  (J.  B.),  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  pp.  258-259. 

•  Ibid. 

•  Johnson,  t>p,  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  329. 


I9]      THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY        Io, 

Washington  spoke  his  opinion  of  what  should  be  the  rela- 
tions between  this  country  and  Europe.  In  a  letter  to  Jef- 
ferson, i  January,  1788,  Washington  pointed  out  the  great 
need  of  a  stronger  central  government  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  the  separate  states  from  "  forming  ....  con- 
nection with  the  European  Powers.  .  .  .  For  our  situation 
is  such,  as  makes  it  not  only  unnecessary,  but  extremely 
imprudent,  for  us  to  take  a  part  in  their  quarrels."  When 
war  broke  out  between  France  and  England  in  1793, 
President  Washington  gave  an  official  character  to  that 
policy  by  issuing  the  Neutrality  Proclamation  on  22  April 
of  the  same  year.2  It  signified  the  withdrawal  of  the 
United  States  from  European  politics ; 8  and  it  was  a 
powerful  reminder  to  the  statesmen  of  the  Old  World  that 
the  United  States  was  now  an  independent  nation,  and  was 
no  longer  to  be  involved  in  their  quarrels.4  Washington's 
foreign  policy  became  an  American  heritage.  Consistent 
with  his  earlier  attitude  and  with  the  Neutrality  Proclama- 
tion, Washington  bequeathed  it  to  posterity  in  his  Farewell 
Address.  Said  the  retiring  President: 

The  rule  of  conduct  for  us  in  regard  to  foreign  nations  is  in 
extending  our  commercial  relations  to  have  with  them  as  little 
political  connection  as  possible.  So  far  as  we  have  already 
formed  engagements  let  them  be  fulfilled  with  perfect  good 
faith.  Here  let  us  stop. 

Europe  has  a  set  of  primary  interests  which  to  us  have  none 
or  a  very  remote  relation.  Hence  she  must  be  engaged  in 
frequent  controversies,  the  causes  of  which  are  essentially 

1  Sparks  (Jared),  The  Writings  Of  George  Washington,  (Boston, 
1839),  vol.  xi,  p.  294,  Washington  to  Jefferson,  i  January,  1788. 

*  Richardson,  fj.  D.),  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  (Wash- 
ington, 1896),  vol.  i,  pp.  156-157. 

*  Channing,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iv,  p.  116. 

*  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  174  ct  seq. 


20  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [2o 

foreign  to  our  concerns.  Hence,  therefore,  it  must  be  unwise 
in  us  to  implicate  ourselves  by  artificial  ties  in  the  ordinary 
vicissitudes  of  her  politics  or  the  ordinary  combinations  and 
collisions  of  her  friendships  or  enmities. 

It  is  our  true  policy  to  steer  clear  of  permanent  alliances 
with  any  portion  of  the  foreign  world,  so  far,  I  mean,  as  we 
are  now  at  liberty  to  do  it ;  .  .  .x 

Following  this  policy  laid  down  by  the  first  President, 
John  Adams  in  a  special  Message,  16  May,  1797,  warned 
against  "  involving  ourselves  in  the  political  system  of 
Europe.  .  .  .  It  would  not  only  be  against  our  interests, 
but  it  would  be  doing  wrong  to  one  half  of  Europe,  at  least, 
if  we  should  voluntarily  throw  ourselves  into  either  scale. "  2 
Probably  this  is  the  first  official  reference  to  the  "  political 
system  "  of  Europe  by  an  American  statesman.3 

The  use  of  that  phrase  by  President  Adams  in  179^ 
shows  an  early  tendency  to  draw  a  distinction  between  the 
political  organization  of  Europe  and  that  of  the  United 
States.  It  was  a  suggestion  that  the  very  nature  of  the 
difference  between  the  political  organization  of  the  Old 
World  and  that  of  the  United  States  was  a  valid  reason  for 
pursuing  a  policy  of  isolation. 

Thomas  Jefferson  also  made  some  statements  in  harmony 
with  the  policy  of  isolation  before  he  became  President: 
"  With  respect  to  their  government,  or  policy,  as  concern- 
ing themselves  or  other  nations,  we  wish  not  to  intermeddle 
in  word  or  deed,  and  that  it  be  not  understood  that  our 
government  permits  itself  to  entertain  either  a  will  or  opinion 
on  the  subject."  4  He  expressed  the  same  attitude  in  his 

1  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  222-223. 
1  Ibid.,  p.  238. 
*  Hart,  op.  cit.,  p.  13. 

4  Ford  (P.  L.),  The  Works  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  (New  York,  1904), 
vol.  vii,  p.  105,  Jefferson  to  Pinckney,  n  June,  1/92. 


2i ]      THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY       2I 

First  Inaugural  Address :  "  Kindly  separated  by  nature  and 
a  wide  Ocean  from  the  exterminating  havoc  of  one  quarter 
of  the  globe;  too  high-minded  to  endure  the  degradations 
of  the  others;  possessing  a  chosen  country,  with  room 
enough  for  our  descendants  to  the  thousandth  and  thous- 
andth generation."  *  The  same  view  was  expressed  in  a 
letter  to  Thomas  Paine,  written  a  few  days  later.2  And  in 
his  Message  to  Congress,  17  October,  1803,  Jefferson  again 
referred  to  the  part  which  nature  had  played  in  determin- 
ing our  relations  with  Europe : 

Separated  by  a  wide  Ocean  from  the  nations  of  Europe  and 
from  the  political  interests  which  entangle  them  together,  with 
productions  and  wants  which  render  our  commerce  and  friend- 
ship useful  to  them  and  their's  to  us,  it  cannot  be  the  interest 
of  any  to  assail  us,  nor  our's  to  disturb  them.3 

The  principle  of  isolation  which  had  guided  Washington 
and  Jefferson  in  their  foreign  policy  was  destined  to  ac- 
quire additional  meaning  during  the  administrations  of 
President  Madison.  Its  new  meaning  consisted  in  a  pro- 
hibition against  the  transfer  of  American  territory  from 
one  European  power  to  another.  The  immediate  occasion 
for  this  extension  of  its  meaning  was  furnished  by  the  dis- 
turbed conditions  in  Europe  during  the  Napoleonic  wars. 
In  the  state  of  confusion  which  prevailed  there,  the  fate  of 
the  Latin-American  colonies  hung  in  the  balance.  There 
was  grave  danger  that  they  might  fall  into  the  hands  of  a 
power  whose  strength  and  influence  would  be  too  great  for 
pleasant  neighborliness.  Moreover,  the  colonies  themselves 

1  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  323. 

1  Ford,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ix,  pp.  212-213,  Jefferson 'to  Paine,  18  March,  1801 ; 
Adams  (Henry),  History  of  the  United  States,  (New  York,  1891),  vol. 
i,  p.  214. 

1  Richardson,  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  vol.  i,  p.  361. 


22  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [22 

soon  took  advantage  of  the  conditions  prevailing  in  the 
Spanish  peninsula  to  revolt,  not  against  their  rightful  king, 
but  against  the  French  domination  of  Spain.1  Chile  de- 
clared its  independence  in  1810,  and  was  followed  in  this 
step  by  Paraguay  (1811),  Argentine  Confederation  and 
Buenos  Ay  res  (1816),  Great  Colombia  (1819),  Guatamala, 
Mexico  and  Peru  (1821),  and  Great  Bolivia  (1825). 
Brazil  declared  its  independence  of  Portugal  in  1822  and 
was  constituted  an  empire.  The  danger  of  having  a  strong 
European  neighbor  was  thus  to  some  extent  rendered  less 
probable  by  the  act  of  the  colonies.  To  the  government  of 
the  United  States  the  moment  seemed  opportune  for  de- 
claring itself  opposed  to  any  change  of  ownership  of  colonial 
possessions  in  America.  On  3  January,  1811,  President 
Madison  recommended  "  to  the  consideration  of  Congress 
the  reasonableness  of  a  declaration  that  the  United  States 
could  not  see  without  serious  inquietude  any  part  of  the 
neighboring  territory  in  which  they  have  in  different  re- 
spects so  deep  and  so  just  a  concern  pass  from  the  hands 
of  Spain  into  those  of  any  other  foreign  Power. "  2 

On  3  March  of  the  same  year  Congress  passed  a  resolu- 
tion in  accordance  with  the  President's  recommendation.* 
The  principle  of  that  resolution  became  afterwards  an 
essential  part  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine;  so  that,  while  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  such  was  never  sanctioned  by  an  act 
of  Congress,  a  part  of  it  had  already  passed  Congress  in 
the  form  of  a  resolution  twelve  years  before  President 
Monroe  sent  to  Congress  his  memorable  Message  of  21 
December,  1823.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  the  United 

'Shepherd  (William  R.),  The  Hispanic  Nations  of  ihc  New  World, 
(New  Haven,  1920),  p.  17. 

'Richardson,  op.  cit.,  p.  488;  Hart,  op.  cit.,  pp.  27-28;  Reddaway 
(W.  R),  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  (New  York,  1505),  p.  9. 

•  Annals  of  Congress,  nth  Congress,  3rd  Sess.,  p.  1251. 


23]      THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY       23 

States  acted  entirely  on  motives  of  self-preservation;  be- 
cause the  resolution  of  Congress  on  3  March  was  passed 
also  in  response  to  a  desire  for  the  eventual  annexation  of 
West  Florida.1  Nor  would  it  be  convenient  for  the  United 
States  to  have  Florida  assume  the  status  of  an  independent 
state.2 

The  revolutionary  movement  in  the  South  American 
colonies  of  Spain  appealed  to  the  republican  sympathies  of 
the  United  States.  If  successful  it  would  defeat  any  de- 
signs which  European  powers  might  cherish  for  the  trans- 
fer of  South  American  territory  in  Old- World  style.  The 
independence  of  the  South  American  colonies  would  thus 
remove  a  great  source  of  danger  to  the  institutions  and 
prosperity  of  the  United  States.  The  republican  tendencies 
of  the  revolutionary  movement  also  inspired  the  hope  of 
i-aving  the  western  hemisphere  from  the  clutches  of  the 
reactionary  political  system  of  Europe.  The  American 
people  beheld  with  boundless  enthusiasm  the  Spanish- 
American  colonies  establish  political  institutions  modeled 
upon  their  own.8 

The  situation  thus  produced  by  the  events  in  South 
America  forced  the  government  of  the  United  States  to 
give  further  thought  to  its  Latin  American  policy.*  Prob- 
ably the  first  evidence  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  expected  any  new  states  to  arise  in  South  America 
is  furnished  in  President  Madison's  Message  to  Congress 
in  December,  1811 : 

In  contemplating  the  scenes  which  distinguish  this  moment" 

1  Reddaway,  op.  cit.t  p.  9. 

aFish  (C.  R.),  American  Diplomacy,  (New  York,  1916),  pp.  208- 
209. 

*lbid.,  p.  206;  Hart,  op.  cit.,  p.  32. 
4  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  320. 


24  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [24 

ous  epoch,  and  estimating  their  claims  to  our  attention,  it  is 
impossible  to  overlook  those  developing  themselves  among  the 
great  communities  which  occupy  the  southern  portion  of  our 
neighborhood.  An  enlarged  philanthropy  and  an  enlightened 
forecast  concur  in  imposing  on  the  national  councils  an  obliga- 
tion to  take  a  deep  interest  in  their  destinies,  to  cherish  reci- 
procal sentiments  of  good  will,  to  regard  the  progress  of 
events,  and  not  to  be  unprepared  for  whatever  order  of  things 
may  be  ultimately  established.1 

A  few  days  later,  10  December,  a  joint  resolution  was  in- 
troduced in  Congress  stating  that  the  United  States  beheld 
"  with  friendly  interest  the  establishment  of  independent 
sovereignties  by  the  Spanish  provinces  in  America,  conse- 
quent upon  the  actual  state  of  the  monarchy  to  which  they 
'belonged/*  and  that  when  they  had  "  attained  the  condition 
of  nations  "  the  United  States  would  establish  with  them 
"  as  sovereign  and  independent  states,  .  .  .  amicable  re- 
lations and  commercial  intercourse."  *  Although  no  action 
was  taken  on  this  resolution,3  it  expressed  not  only  a  grow- 
ing interest  in  the  affairs  of  South  America,  but  it  also 
suggested  the  character  of  our  Latin  American  policy:  it 
held  out  the  hope  of  success  for  the  independence  movement 
and  the  subsequent  recognition  by  the  United  States. 

A  number  of  reasons  compelled  the  exercise  of  caution 
in  extending  recognition  to  the  nascent  states  of  Latin 
America.  In  the  first  place,  the  government  of  the  United 
States  was  not  certain  that  the  new  states  possessed  the 
qualities  necessary  for  self-government.4  Secondly,  the 
government  was  of  the  opinion  that  hasty  action  or  too  open 

1  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  494. 

1  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  Hi,  p.  538. 

•Johnson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  321. 

4  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  324. 


25]      THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY       2$ 

a  manifestation  of  sympathy  would  impede  the  negotiations 
with  Spain  for  the  acquisition  of  Florida.1  Thirdly,  the 
European  war,  which  was  to  affect  our  relations  with  Eng- 
land, was  still  going  on.  Fourthly,  the  Doctrine  of  Inter- 
vention had  not  yet  caused  a  rift  in  the  relations  of  England 
and  her  allies.  Under  such  circumstances  caution  was 
wisdom. 

Meanwhile,  a  policy  of  neutrality  seemed  to  recommend 
itself  to  our  government.  In  December,  1815,  President 
Madison  issued  a  proclamation  to  that  effect.2  By  that  act 
the  belligerency  of  the  new  states  was  recognized  3  before 
their  independence  had  been  fully  established.4  Despite  the 
President's  proclamation  of  neutrality,  many  American 
citizens  insisted  upon  extending  aid  to  the  South  American 
republics.  That  fact  necessitated  the  strengthening  of  our 
neutrality  by  acts  of  Congress  in  1817  and  i8i8.5  English 
subjects,  on  the  other  hand,  were  openly,  though  unofficially, 
aiding  the  revolutionists.'  The  knowledge  of  English  aid 
must  have  convinced  the  American  government  of  the  posi- 
tion of  England  in  the  South  American  question.  John 
Quincy  Adams,  Secretary  of  State,  desirous  of  British  sup- 
port,7 was  quick  to  grasp  the  significance  of  that  position. 

1  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  p.  208. 

1  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  561-562. 

•Wilson  (G.  G.)  and  Tucker  (G.  F.),  International  Law,  (Boston, 
1915),  p.  66;  Smith  (Sir  Frederick),  International  Law,  (London,  1918), 
p.  192. 

4  Hart,  op.  cit.,  p.  33. 

5  Annals  of  Congress,  I5th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  vol.  i,  p.  519;  Fish,  off. 
cit.,  p.  207;  Lafane   (J.  H.),  The   United  States  and  Latin  America, 
(Garden  City,  1920),  pp.  49-5O. 

•Phillips  (W.  A.),  The  Confederation  of  Europe,  (New  York,  1914), 
p.  260. 

'Fish,  op.  cit.,  p.  208;  Schurz  (C),  Henry  Clay,  (Boston,  1887),  p. 
148;  Castlereagh,  Correspondence,  (London,  1853),  vol.  xi,  p.  405. 


26  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [26 

In  March,  1818,  he  declared  in  a  Cabinet  meeting  that  in 
his  opinion  England  was  in  sympathy  with  the  position  of 
the  United  States.1  Though  Adams  was  opposed  to  the 
recognition  of  the  South  American  republics  until  after  the 
ratification  of  the  Florida  treaty,  he  was  sure  that  ultimately 
our  government  would  extend  recognition  to  the  new 
states.2  About  the  same  time  he  gave  the  British  Minister 
to  understand  that  the  United  States  would  cooperate  with 
E) 'gland  in  preserving  their  independence,  though  he  would 
not  promise  to  enter  into  any  formal  alliance  with  England 
for  that  purpose.3  Indeed,  in  August,  1818,  a  proposal 
was  made  to  the  British  government  for  a  concerted  recog- 
nition of  the  republic  of  Buenos  Ayres  whose  independence 
was  then  an  accomplished  fact ; 4  but  England  declined  on 
the  ground  that  recognition  of  Buenos  Ayres  at  that  time 
would  not  be  in  harmony  with  her  policy.  The  differences 
between  England  and  her  continental  allies  had  not  yet  de- 
veloped to  the  breaking-point ;  and  so  long  as  there  was  no 
immediate  danger  of  interference  with  either  British  trade 
in  South  America  or  with  the  independence  of  the  new 
republics,  England  had  little  reason  for  immediate  action. 
It  was  possible  that  the  course  of  events  would  turn  so 
decisively  in  favor  of  the  South  American  states  as  to  call 
for  no  special  exertion  in  their  behalf  on  the  part  of  Eng- 
land; and  in  that  way  she  would  be  spared  the  danger  of 
diplomatic  complications,  while  at  the  same  time  she  would 
enjoy  the  advantages  of  her  South  American  trade. 

Moreover,  it  was  unlikely  that  the  United  States  would 

1  Fish,  op.  cit.,  p.  208. 

9  Ibid. 

*  Castlereagh,  Correspondence,  vol.  xi,  p.  405,  Bagot  to  Castlereagh, 
8  February,  1818;  ibid.,  Bagot  to  Castlereagh,  29  June,  1818;  ibid.f  vol. 
xii,  pp.  99  et  seq.,  Bagot  to  Castlereagh,  4  January,  1819. 

4  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  325. 


27]      THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY       27 

alone  extend  recognition  to  the  new  states  for  some  time. 
Thus  the  possibility  of  a  political  and  commercial  ascend- 
ancy of  the  United  States  in  the  western  hemisphere  was 
still  remote.  England  could  well  afford  to  delay  recogni- 
tion and  await  developments.  Nevertheless,  there  is  signi- 
ficance in  the  fact  that  the  governments  of  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  had  conversed  on  the  expediency  of  con- 
current action  relative  to  the  situation  in  South  America. 
The  knowledge  which  these  countries  possessed  of  one 
another's  interest  in  that  region  of  the  world  soon  sug- 
gested another  attempt  at  joint  action;  but  this  time  the 
proposal  came  from  England,  and  it  came  only  after  the 
government  of  the  United  States  had  extended  recognition 
to  the  new  republics  of  the  South,  and  when  England's 
own  interests  were  jeopardized  by  the  policies  of  the  Quad- 
ruple Alliance.1 

While  the  administration  was  pursuing  a  policy  of 
cautious  delay  in  view  of  our  relations  with  Spain,  the 
cause  of  recognition  did  not  lack  its  leader  in  Congress. 
His  stern  patriotism,  hatred  of  despotism,  and  his  genuine 
faith  in  the  merits  of  republican  institutions  made  Henry 
Clay  its  stalwart  champion.2  In  the  most  eloquent  terms 
he  pointed  out  the  course  which  the  policy  of  the  United 
States  should  take  in  respect  to  South  America.  It  was  a 
beautiful  country,  rich  in  natural  resources,  whose  inhabit- 
ants were  struggling  to  break  the  shackles  of  despotism. 
It  was  America's  mission  to  encourage  them  in  their  noble 
aims,  and  to  place  herself  at  the  head  of  an  American  system. 
In  South  America  were  "the  loftiest  mountains,  the  most 
majestic  rivers  in  the  world;  the  richest  mines  of  precious 
metals;  and  the  choicest  productions  of  the  earth.  We  be- 

1  Supra,  p.  10,  note. 

2  Annals  of  Congress,  I5th  Cong.,  1st  Sess.,  vol.  ii,  p.  I474J  Schurz, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  148  ct  seq;  Latane,  op.  cit.,  p.  49. 


28  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [28 

hold  there  a  spectacle  still  more  interesting  and  sublime — the 
glorious  spectacle  of  eighteen  millions  of  people  struggling 
to  burst  their  chains  and  be  free."  Clay's  "  American 
system  "  required  that  the  United  States  should  act  inde- 
pendently of  Europe  in  dealing  with  the  South  American 
question.  With  him  the  "  American  system  "  and  coopera- 
tion with  Europe  were  mutually  exclusive :  "  We  look  too 
much  abroad.  Let  us  break  those  commercial  and  political 
fetters;  let  us  no  longer  watch  the  nod  of  any  European 
politician;  let  us  become  real  and  true  Americans,  and  place 
ourselves  at  the  head  of  the  American  System."  2  It  was 
a  courageous  and  patriotic  course  which  Clay  proposed  for 
his  country;  but  a  little  delay  in  recognition  would  produce 
more  practical  results.  Despite  the  power  and  eloquence 
of  his  appeal,  Clay  was  unable  to  convince  his  colleagues  in 
Congress,  who  in  1818,  by  a  vote  of  115  to  45,  defeated  his 
motion  to  recognize  the  South  American  republics.3 

However,  within  a  period  of  three  years  after  Congress 
had  defeated  Clay's  motion,  circumstances  had  changed  in 
favor  of  the  course  which  he  had  recommended:  Metter- 
nich's  Doctrine  of  Intervention  had  served  to  alienate  Eng- 
land from  her  continental  allies,  and  the  Florida  treaty  had 
been  ratified.*  These  were  the  principal  elements  in  the  new1 
diplomatic  situation  which  induced  President  Monroe,  8 
March,  1822,  to  recommend  to  Congress  that  "the  Pro- 
vinces which  have  declared  their  independence  and  are  in 
the  enjoyment  of  it  ought  to  be  recognized."5  Within  a 
month  Congress  had  complied  with  the  President's  recom- 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  isth  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  vol.  ii,  p.  1474. 

•  Ibid.,  i6th  Congress,  ist  Sess.,  vol.  ii,  p.  2727. 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  1 5th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  vol.  i,  p.  1646. 

•  Am.  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  v,  p.  127. 

•  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  1 16  et  seq. 


29]      THE  GENESIS  OF  ANGLO-AMERICAN  HARMONY        29 

mendation  by  recognizing  Colombia,  Argentina,  Chile  and 
Mexico.1 

While  recognition  had  been  accorded  and  a  policy  of 
neutrality  continued  to  be  maintained  by  the  United  States, 
the  permanency  of  the  independence  of  the  new  republics 
might  still  be  endangered  by  the  Metternich  school  of  reac- 
tionary statesmanship.  It  required  the  combined  influence 
of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  to  guarantee  that 
permanency.  The  declaration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and 
the  British  policy  of  non-intervention  2  were  essentially  in 
harmony  so  far  as  they  constituted  a  check  upon  the 
machinations  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 

We  have  now  traced  briefly  the  gradual  development  of 
the  Latin  American  policy  of  the  United  States  through 
its  successive  stages  of  interest,  neutrality  and  recognition. 
It  was  still  to  experience  further  growth  through  the  in- 
fluence of  the  policy  of  isolation.  But,  paradoxical  as  it 
may  seem,  that  stage  in  its  history  was  not  to  be  reached 
until  the  government  of  the  United  States  had  become 
thoroughly  familiar  with  the  Latin  American  policy  of 
Great  Britain,  especially  through  Canning's  overture  to 
Rush  in  the  interest  of  a  joint  Anglo-American  declaration. 

In  the  next  chapter  we  shall  attempt  to  explain  some  of 
the  conditions  which  determined  the  change  in  England's 
relations  to  the  Quadruple  Alliance  with  a  view  to  finding 
therein  some  important  reasons  for  an  Anglo-American 
understanding  in  1823. 

1  Annals  of  Congress,  i7th  Cong.,  ist  Sess.,  vol.  i,  p.  1382. 

2  Infra,  pp.  34-40,  44-48. 


CHAPTER  II 
GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 

THE  European  statesmen  who  met  in  Vienna  in  1814 
and  1815  to  reconstruct  Europe  on  the  bases  of  legitimacy 
and  compensation  were  blind  to  the  new  dynamic  forces 
which  had  been  produced  by  the  intellectual  movement  of 
the  eighteenth  century,  by  the  Industrial  Revolution  and  by 
the  French  Revolution.  It  was  a  combination  of  some  of 
these  forces  which  had  been  responsible  for  the  great  up- 
heaval which  their  countries  had  just  experienced.  But  so 
far  as  they  were  the  "  causes  "  of  the  long  period  of  war 
that  terminated  on  the  field  of  Waterloo  in  1815,  they  were 
essentially  different  from  causes  in  the  ordinary  meaning 
of  the  word.  Their  fundamental  character  was  different. 
It  was  not  a  question  of  a  few  more  miles  of  territory,  or 
of  additional  commercial  advantages.  They  represented 
great  principles  of  human  rights:  individual  liberty,  social 
equality,  national  sovereignty.  These  principles  took  pos- 
session of  the  human  spirit  and  became  the  tenets  of  a 
people's  faith.  They  grew  in  the  strength  of  their  intrinsic 
merits  and  never  failed  to  convince  the  unprivileged  of  the 
justice  of  their  cause.  To  all  who  suffered  from  the  tram- 
mels of  political,  economic,  and  social  restrictions  and  in- 
equalities these  principles  were  the  Gospel  of  freedom  that 
would  widen  immeasurably  the  range  of  opportunity  for 
men,  individually  and  collectively. 

As  the  causes  of  the  European  upheaval  were  so  pro- 
foundly different  from  the  usual,  so  must  be  the  remedy. 
30  [30 


GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES  3I 

In  other  words,  the  statesmen  who  would  undertake  the 
solemn  and  responsible  task  of  reconstructing  Europe  must 
open-mindedly  and  without  prejudice  investigate  the  real 
nature  of  Europe's  "ills."  But,  alas!  the  "ills"  were 
"  new,"  and  the  statesmen  were  of  the  old  school,  who 
shrank  from  the  arduous  task  of  learning  anything  new, 
particularly  when  it  might  endanger  their  own  interests. 
Hence  we  see  the  extraordinary  spectacle  of  a  group  of 
statesmen  vainly  attempting  to  apply  i8th  century  remedies 
' — remedies  of  the  Ancien  Regime — to  iQth  century  condi- 
tions— conditions  which  had  their  origin  in  the  longing  of 
mankind  to  be  free,  a  power  that  proved  irresistible. 

The  very  statesmen  who  concluded  the  Treaties  of  Vienna 
must  after  all  have  experienced  an  inward  feeling  that  they 
were  lacking  in  harmony  with  the  social  and  political  cur- 
rents of  their  time;  for  they  found  it  necessary  to  continue 
in  alliance  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  status  quo 
for  which  the  treaties  provided.  And  through  a  series  of 
congresses  the  Alliance  sought  means  to  combat  all  the 
forces  and  tendencies  calculated  to  disturb  it.  The  men  of 
the  old  order  were  again  in  the  political  saddle,  and  they 
would  ride  roughshod  over  the  princples  represented  by  the 
French  Revolution  and  the  demands  of  the  new  economic 
system. 

There  was  one  European  state  whose  situation,  political 
experience  and  interests  failed  to  harmonize  with  those  of 
its  allies.  That  state  was  Great  Britain.  It  was  Great 
Britain  where  the  new  economic  system  was  first  established ; 
her  government  was  constitutional,  founded  on  revolution ;  * 
and  she  was  geographically  detached  from  her  continental 
allies.  These  circumstances  are  sufficient  to  explain  the 
gradual  defection  of  England  from  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 

1  Moore,  op.  cit.,  p.  239. 


32  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [32 

had  given  her  a  set  of  interests  in  the  pursuit  of 


which  she  had  more  to  gain  by  an  understanding  with  the 
United  States  than  as  a  member  of  the  European  Alliance. 
From  the  first  of  the  congresses,  that  of  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
to  the  last,  the  Congress  of  Verona,  England  stood  op- 
posed to  the  policy  of  intervention.  In  desiring  to  make 
the  opposition  effective  she  sought  an  understanding  with 
the  United  States. 

With  a  view  to  making  clear  England's  contribution  to  the 
declaration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
trace  her  motives  as  they  are  revealed  in  her  relations  with 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  and  in  her  interests  in  Latin 
America.  The  original  Holy  Alliance,1  which  was  the 
product  of  the  Tsar's  religious  nature,  was  but  the  expres- 
sion of  a  pious  hope  to  which  the  sovereigns  of  Europe 
were  invited  to  subscribe.2  It  was  an  attempt  to  capitalize, 
in  the  interest  of  reaction,  a  wave  of  religious  fervor  which 
swept  over  Europe  as  a  result  of  a  long  period  of  suffering 
due  to  violence  and  strife.  At  any  rate,  the  signatories 
to  the  Holy  Alliance  were  convinced  "  of  the  necessity  of 
settling  the  steps  to  be  observed  by  the  Powers,  in  their 
reciprocal  relations,  upon  the  sublime  truths  which  the  Holy 
Religion  of  our  Saviour  teaches."  3  The  English  sovereign 
was  naturally  invited  to  become  a  member  of  this  "  most 
free  and  most  intimate  Union  between  the  Sovereigns 
whom  Divine  Providence  has  placed  over  the  heads  of  the 
Peoples  of  Europe."4  Of  course  it  would  have  been 

1  The  term  "  Holy  Alliance  "  is  here  used  in  its  true  and  original  mean- 
ing. 

*  Hayes  (C.J.  H.),  A  Political  and  Social  History  of  Modern  Europe, 
(New  York,  1916),  vol.  ii,  p.  n. 

'Hertslet  (E.),  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  (London,  1875),  vol. 
i,  PP.  317  el  seq. 

*  Hertslet,  op.  oil.,  vol.  i,  pp.  319-320. 


33]  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES  33 

strange,  if  not  indicative  of  a  want  of  religious  rever^  ce, 
had  not  the  Prince  Regent  declared  his  "  entire  concurrence 
in  the  principles  they  have  laid  down,  and  in  the  declaration 
which  they  have  set  forth,  of  making  the  Divine  Precepts 
of  the  Christian  Religion  the  invariable  rule  of  their  con- 
duct, in  all  their  relations,  social  and  political/'  That 
was  scarcely  more  than  what  any  sovereign  of  a  Christian 
state  might  foe  expected  to  do.  A  treaty  to  that  effect 
would  only  be  superfluous  if  the  spirit  of  Christ  ruled  in 
their  hearts,  and,  if  not,  a  treaty  providing  for  Christian 
conduct  would  fall  quite  short  of  being  effective.  What- 
ever may  have  been  the  other  motives  which  determined 
the  attitude  of  the  British  government  in  this  instance,  at 
least  one  reason  for  its  refusal  to  join  the  Holy  Alliance  is 
made  very  plain  in  the  reply  that  was  sent  by  the  Prince 
Regent :  " ....  the  forms  of  the  British  Constitution, 
which  I  am  called  upon  to  administer  in  the  name  and  in 
the  behalf  of  the  King,  my  father,  preclude  me  from  acced- 
ing formally  to  this  Treaty."  The  Monarchs  of  Russia, 
Austria  and  Prussia  in  the  haste  to  restore  the  old  order 
had  evidently  ignored  the  fact  that  constitutional  limita- 
tions restricted  the  freedom  of  action  of  British  monarchs, 
though  they  were  still  termed  gratia  Dei  reges.  In  actual 
practice  Parliamentary  government  had  taken  the  place  of 
government  by  Divine  Right,  and  the  English  monarch 
could  not,  therefore,  join  in  an  alliance  apparently  bottomed 
on  that  outworn  theory.  Judging  by  Tsar  Alexander's 
own  liberalism,  the  Holy  Alliance  may  not  have  represented 
a  conscious  purpose  of  fastening  upon  Europe  a  system  of 
reaction ; 3  but  the  vague,  indefinite,  and  conservative  tone 

1  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  p.  320. 

*lbid. 

3  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  149. 


34  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [34 

of  the  treaty  gave  to  it  a  character  susceptible  of  such  an 
interpretation    whenever    the     opportunity    might    arise. 

lexander's  immediate  aim  seems  to  have  been  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  union  or  league  of  European  States  for  the 
sake  of  maintaining  peace.1  Upon  the  common  ground  of 
a  desire  for  peace  the  union  might  possibly  be  effected. 
Having  once  secured  the  signatures  of  the  sovereign 
authorities  to  the  treaty  of  the  Holy  Alliance,2  the  building 
of  the  Pan-European  structure  upon  that  foundation  would 
probably  not  be  so  difficult. 

The  system  suggested  by  the  Holy  Alliance  would  soon 
develop  into  a  substitute  for  that  system  which  Napoleon 
had  tried  to  establish,  and  which  Great  Britain  had  exerted 
herself  to  the  limit  to  destroy.  Immediately  suspicious  of 
its  purposes  she  declined  membership  in  the  Holy  Alliance 
on  the  ground  of  constitutional  limitations.3  Against  the 
plan  of  the  Tsar  for  a  Pan-European  union  of  states, 
Great  Britain  took  her  stand  on  the  principle  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  sovereign  states.4  To  England  a  concert  for 
the  enforcement  of  the  Treaties  of  Vienna  was  quite 
necessary  and  practical ;  but  it  was  a  wholly  different  matter 
to  establish  an  international  combination  that  might  in- 
terfere with  the  sovereign  independence  of  a  state,  even 
when  the  exercise  of  that  sovereignty  was  confined  to 
the  solution  of  questions  touching  internal  organization. 
The  unwillingness  of  England  to  accede  to  the  treaty  of  the 
Holy  Alliance,5  coupled  with  the  peculiar  vagueness  and 
dreamy  idealism  of  its  aims  rendered  that  alliance  incapable 

1  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  151. 

2  Supra,  p.  32,  note  i. 

3  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  320. 

4  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  152;  cf.  ibid.,  pp.  30-40. 

5  Supra,  p.  32,  note  i ;  supra,  p.  10,  n.  i. 


35]  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES  35 

of  functioning  from  the  beginning.  But  the  Allies  had  in 
March,  1814,  concluded  the  Treaty  of  Chaumont x  for  the 
double  purpose  of  providing  for  the  vigorous  prosecution 
of  the  war  against  their  common  enemy  and  for  the  main- 
tenance of  peace  in  the  future.  It  was  renewed,  with  some 
modifications,  as  the  Treaty  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  20 
November,  i8i5.2  In  the  popular  mind  the  two  alliances 
became  confused,  the  Quadruple  Alliance  usually  being  re- 
ferred to  as  the  Holy  Alliance.  Justification  for  that  error 
may  be  found  in  the  fact  that  the  aims  of  three  members  of 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  became  essentially  the  same  as  those 
of  the  Holy  Alliance. 

In  the  discussion  at  Paris  which  related  to  the  renewal  of 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  is  revealed  a  divergence  of  opinion 
between  Great  Britain  and  her  allies.3  While  the  latter 
seemed  to  agree  on  the  draft  of  the  treaty  drawn  up  by  Tsar 
Alexander,  which  provided  for  an  inquisitorial  supervision 
over  the  internal  affairs  of  a  state,4  Castlereagh,  representing 
England,  emphatically  opposed  a  treaty  of  that  nature. 
He  was  unable  to  see  how  the  policy  which  they  prescribed 
for  the  safety  of  their  own  countries  made  necessary  any 
interference  with  the  internal  affairs  of  any  state.  Broaden- 
ing out  from  precedent  to  precedent  such  a  policy  would 
lead  to  an  impairment  of  national  sovereignty.5  Continen- 
tal internationalism  came  thus  into  conflict  with  English 
nationalism  in  the  Congress  of  Paris,  and  Castlereagh  was 
able  to  force  a  modification  of  the  treaty. 

1  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  2043. 
*  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  372. 

3  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  153, 

4  At  that  time  it  was  France  that  was  the  special  object  of  suspicion. 

5  F.  O.,  Congress,  Paris,  Castlereagh  to  Liverpool,  15  October,  1815, 
no.  80. 


36  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [36 

The  Treaty  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  as  agreed  upon  by 
the  four  powers,  England,  Russia,  Prussia  and  Austria, 
expressed  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  four  sovereigns  "  to 
draw  closer  the  ties  which  unite  them  for  the  common  in- 
terests of  their  people,"  and  to  resolve  "  to  give  to  the  prin- 
ciples solemnly  laid  down  in  the  Treaties  of  Chaumont  and 
Vienna,  the  application,  the  most  analogous  to  the  present 
state  of  affairs."  l  The  treaty  further  provided  for  con- 
certed action  in  carrying  out  the  second  Treaty  of  Paris, 
and  for  taking  measures  against  such  revolutionary  out- 
breaks as  might  threaten  the  safety  of  their  own  states. 
It  stipulated  that  the  engagements  thus  entered  into  should 
continue  in  force  beyond  the  period  of  temporary  occupa- 
tion of  France.  Lastly,  in  article  vi,  it  provided  for  "  meet- 
ings at  fixed  periods,  either  under  the  immediate  auspices  of 
the  sovereigns  themselves,  or  by  their  respective  Ministers, 
for  the  purpose  of  consulting  upon  their  common  interests, 
and  for  the  consideration  of  the  measures  which  at  each 
of  those  periods  shall  be  considered  the  most  salutary  for 
the  repose  and  prosperity  of  Nations,  and  for  the  mainten- 
ance of  the  peace  of  Europe." 

Such  was  the  basis  upon  which  the  conquerors  of  Napo- 
leon proposed  to  guarantee  the  peace  of  Europe.  But 
article  vi  was  a  compromise  between  English  Realpolitik 
and  the  Tsar's  idealism;  and,  like  so  many  other  compro- 
mises, it  was  sufficiently  vague  to  admit  of  different  inter- 
pretations.3 Therein  lurked  a  danger  to  the  permanent 
success  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance. 

The  first  Congress  of  the  Alliance  assembled  at  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  on  30  September,  1818.  The  sovereigns  of 

1  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  372. 
*Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  375. 
8  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  pp.  155-156. 


GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES  37 

Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia  considered  the  meeting  suffi- 
ciently important  to  require  their  august  presence;  while 
England  was  represented  by  Castlereagh  and  Wellington. 

By  far  the  most  important  question  which  arose  in  the 
Congress  was  the  one  relating  to  the  future  aim  and  activity 
of  the  Quadruple  Alliance.1  Upon  the  answer  to  this  ques- 
tion would  depend  the  position  of  England  in  the  Alliance. 
Upon  it  also  would  depend  the  effectiveness  of  the  Alliance 
itself. 

England  had  already  refused  to  join  the  Holy  Alliance; 2 
and  Castlereagh  had  obtained  a  modification  of  the  draft  of 
the  Treaty  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance.3  At  the  Congress  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle  British  statesmen  again  opposed  any  designs 
of  the  Alliance  to  constitute  itself  a  Pan-European  power. 

A  memorandum,*  embodying  the  views  of  Tsar  Alexander 
on  the  measures  that  should  be  employed  to  protect  Europe 
from  further  outbreaks  of  revolution,  was  presented  to  the 
Congress.  It  pointed  out  that  the  system  of  Europe  was 
an  association  of  powers  founded  upon  the  treaties  of 
Vienna  and  Paris  for  the  purpose  of  preserving  all  recog- 
nized rights.  The  material  support  of  that  association  had 
been  the  army  of  occupation  in  France;  but  now  that  the 
powers  had  decided  to  evacuate  France,  the  European  system 
must  find  compensating  strength  in  the  increase  of  its  moral 
support,  which  the  Tsar  found  in  the  Quadruple  Alliance 
and  the  General  Alliance.5  The  Quadruple  Alliance  was 
to  be  at  the  same  time  the  nucleus  and  the  basis  of  the! 

1  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  pp.  167-168. 

2  Supra,  p.  33- 

$  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  372. 

^  4F.  O.,  Continent,  Aix-la-Chapelle,  September-October,  1818,  Castle- 
reagh to  Balfmrst,  19  October,  1818,  no.  13. 

5  The  Central  Alliance  was  to  consist  of  all  the  powers  signatories  to 
the  Treaties  of  Vienna. 


38  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [38 

General  Alliance.  The  purpose  of  the  entire  organization 
was  to  guarantee  the  territorial  integrity  of  the  states  and 
the  security  of  their  governments.  Here  was  clearly  a  plan 
to  construct  a  political  system  which  would  not  merely  pre- 
serve the  territorial  status  quo  as  created  by  the  peace 
treaties,  but  which  also  foreshadowed  the  policy  of  interven- 
tion. To  such  a  plan  both  the  government  and  public 
opinion  in  England  were  opposed.1  Even  before  the  Rus- 
sian Memorandum  had  been  presented  to  the  Congress,  Lord 
Bathurst  had  written  a  letter  to  Castlereagh,  in  which  he 
expressed  his  objection  to  a  "  succession  of  such  meetings 
being  now  proclaimed  as  a  part  of  a  permanent  system ;  " 
because  "  though  the  mind  might  anticipate  further  circum- 
stances under  which  such  meetings  might  be  productive  of 
many  advantages,  one  may  likewise  contemplate  those 
under  which  they  might  be  likely  to  lead  to  great  embarrass- 
ment." As  for  article  vi  of  the  treaty  of  20  November, 
1815,  Lord  Bathurst  would  prefer  to  leave  it  in  abeyance.3 
In  opposition  to  the  plan  of  universal  union  contained  in  the 
Russian  Memorandum,  Castlereagh  presented  in  turn  a 
Memorandum  in  which  he  defined  the  attitude  of  England.* 
According  to  Castlereagh,  the  provisions  of  the  treaties  con- 
cluding the  Napoleonic  wars  were  for  the  most  part  ter- 
ritorial; no  provision  was  made  for  their  observance,  and 
since  the  treaties  did  not  provide  for  an  alliance,  no  power 
was  under  express  obligation  to  compel  their  observance. 
However,  the  Treaty  of  Chaumont,  renewed  at  Paris  20 
November,  1815,  was  an  alliance  treaty  for  the  protection 

1  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  pp.  173-174. 

*F.     O.}     Continent,     Aix -la-Chap  ell  e,     September-December,     1818, 
Bathurst  to  Castlereagh,  20  October,  1818. 
•  Ibid. 

*Ibid.,  September  and   October,    1818,   Castlereagh  to  Liverpool,   19 
October,  1818,  no.  13. 


39]  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES  39 

of  Europe  against  renewed  danger  from  France;  but  under 
no  circumstances  was  it  intended  to  give  the  Allies  the  right 
to  interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  that  country,  or  any 
other  country,  unless  the  internal  disturbance  was  of  such 
a  nature  as  to  threaten  the  safety  of  other  states.  The 
latter  contingency  would  be  covered  sufficiently  by  the  law5 
of  nations.1  It  was  both  "  immoral  "  and  "  prejudicial  to 
the  character  of  government "  to  lend  support  to  established 
power,  "  without  any  consideration  of  the  extent  to  which 
it  was  abused."  2 

The  emphatic  expression  of  England's  attitude  in  this 
Memorandum  prevented  the  successful  consummation  of  the 
Tsar's  illusory  scheme  of  a  universal  union  of  European 
states.  The  most  that  he  could  hope  for  was  a  compromise 
couched  in  terms  sufficiently  vague  as  to  admit  of  some 
elasticity  of  interpretation.3  The  outcome  of  the  delibera- 
tions at  Aix-la-Ghapelle  was  a  limitation  on  the  operation 
of  article  vi  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  of  20  November,  1815. 
It  was  now  to  be  restricted  to  the  enforcement  of  the 
treaties  that  were  especially  enumerated  in  that  document.* 
Any  new  treaty  of  alliance  failed  to  materialize  because  of 
the  opposition  of  England.5  Future  meetings  of  the 
sovereigns  or  their  representatives  were  to  be  confined  to 
questions  that  might  arise  out  of  these  treaties,  and  the 
meetings  were  to  be  called  only  as  occasion  might  require.6 
Thus  the  authority  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  was  to  be 

1  F.  O.,  op.  cit.,  ibid. 
» Ibid. 

•  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  188. 

*Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  573-574;  F.  O.,  Continent,  September^De- 
cember,  1818,  Castlereagh  to  Bathurst,  5  November,  1818. 

5  Ibid.,  Continent,  Aix-la-Chapelle,  September-December,  1818,  Bathurst 
to  Castlereagh,  13  November,  1818,  no.  6. 

•  Ibid.,  Castlereagh  to  Bathurst,  5  November,  1818. 


40  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [40 

limited  to  questions  that  might  arise  out  of  conditions  and 
circumstances  already  well  known.  It  was  not  to  embrace 
questions  that  might  arise  out  of  circumstances  entirely  un- 
foreseen. In  other  words,  the  Alliance  was  not  to  be  a  uni- 
versal union  for  the  governing  of  Europe, — an  international 
substitute  for  national  sovereignty. 

Not  only  were  the  English  representatives  at  the  Con- 
gress of  Aix-la-Chapelle  opposed  to  the  extension  of  its 
authority  to  questions  growing  out  of  circumstances  then 
unforeseen,1  but  they  were  already  opposed  to  intervention 
in  Spain,2  and  to  any  consideration  of  the  relation  of  Spain 
to  her  American  colonies.3 

One  member  of  the  British  Cabinet  was  opposed  on  prin- 
ciple even  to  the  idea  of  periodic  meetings.4  That  was 
Canning.  He  feared  that  England  would  thereby  become 
too  deeply  involved  in  continental  politics,  "  whereas  our 
true  policy  has  always  been  not  to  interfere  except  in  great 
emergencies,  and  then  with  a  commanding  force."  5 

The  compromise  effected  at  Aix-la-Chapelle  was  clearly 
an  English  diplomatic  victory — a  triumph  for  non-inter-, 
ference.  When  presently  the  fear  of  revolutionary  out- 
breaks led  to  actual  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of 
states,  England  again  rallied  consistently  to  the  defense  of 
this  principle ;  but  the  result,  instead  of  being  a  compromise, 
became  a  breach. 

The  revolutionary  outbreaks  in  Spain,  Naples,  Piedmont 

1  Wellington,  Supplementary  Despatches,  (London,  1858-72),  vol.  xii, 
p.  675. 
s  Wellington,  op.  cit.,  vol.  xii,  p.  665. 

3  Castlereagh,  Correspondence,  vol.  xi,  p.  473,   Cooke  to  Castlereagh, 
28  August,  1818. 

*Temperley  (H.W.V.),  George  Canning,  (London,  1905),  p.  180. 
5  Castlereagh,   op.   cit.,  vol.   xii,  p.   56,   Bathurst   to   Castlereagh,  20 
October,  1818. 


4i  ]  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES  4I 

and  Portugal  in  1820,  conveyed  an  ominous  meaning  to  the 
sovereigns  of  Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia.  Alarmed  by 
these  events,  as  well  as  by  the  lukewarm  enthusiasm  of 
Great  Britain  for  the  Quadruple  Alliance,1  a  call  was  issued 
for  a  meeting  of  the  Alliance  2  to  be  held  at  Troppau.  It 
was  to  become  revitalized  through  active  opposition  to  the 
revolutionary  movement.3  Here  again  the  differences 
between  the  attitude  of  England  and  that  of  her  continental 
allies,  on  the  question  of  authority,  became  conspicuous. 
Despite  the  setback  which  the  Tsar's  plan  for  a  universal 
union  had  received  through  British  influence  at  the  Congress 
of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  he  still  entertained  dreams  of  its  ultimate 
realization.  This  is  shown  in  a  circular  issued  by  the  Rus- 
sian government  19  April,  1820,  containing  expressions 
which  indicate  an  enlargement  of  the  plan :  "  The  Spanish 
Revolution  fixes  the  attention  of  the  two  worlds;  the  in- 
terests to  be  decided  are  those  of  the  universe  ....  and 
involve  the  future  perhaps  of  all  civilized  peoples."  4  The 
world-wide  scope  of  the  plan,  and  the  Tsar's  hope  of  its 
realization,  had  evidently  been  inspired  by  events  in  South 
America.  These  events  showed  that  the  conflict  of  the 
two  political  systems  threatened  to  assume  large  proportions. 
Hence,  the  suggestion  in  the  same  circular  that  the  Ministers 
of  the  allied  nations  should  hold  a  meeting  at  Madrid  pre- 
paratory to  intervention.5  The  circular  also  contained 

1  F.  O.,  Austria,  March-June,  1820,  Stewart  to  Castlereagh,  9  April, 
1820,  no.  43;  ibid.,  Stewart  to  Castlereagh,  4  May,  1820,  no.  55;  ibid., 
Stewart  to  Castlereagh,  23  May,  1820,  no.  57. 

*  F.  O.,  Circular  Despatches,  1815,  1818,  1820,  Austrian  Memoir  on  the 
Revolution  at  Naples,  28  August,  1820. 

SF.  O.,  Austria,  March-June,  1820,  Stewart  to  Castlereagh,  9  April, 
1820,  no.  43. 

4F.  O.,  Austria,  March-June,  1820,  Nesselrode  to  Galowkin,  19  April, 
1820. 

6  Ibid. 


42  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [42 

statements  showing  the  Tsar's  opposition  to  constitutional 
governments.1 

While  the  allied  courts  were  considering  the  Russian  cir- 
cular, and  England  was  showing  herself  most  unsympathe- 
tic,2 a  revolution  broke  out  in  Naples  2  July,  1820.  In 
reply  to  the  Russian  circular  note  which  represented  an 
attempt  to  revive  the  plan  of  a  universal  union,  Castlereagh 
despatched  a  note  to  the  courts  of  Austria,  France,  Prussia 
and  Russia,  saying  that 

it  was  an  union  for  the  reconquest  and  liberation  of  a  great 
proportion  of  the  continent  of  Europe  from  the  military 
domination  of  France;  and  having  subdued  the  conqueror,  it 
took  the  state  of  possession,  as  established  by  the  peace, 
under  the  protection  of  the  Alliance.  It  never  was,  however, 
intended  as  an  union  for  the  Government  of  the  world,  or  for 
the  superintendence  of  the  internal  affairs  of  other  States.3 

The  Neapolitan  movement  was  of  peculiar  interest  to 
Austria,  because  a  political  change  in  that  kingdom  would 
actually  violate  the  secret  treaty  between  Austria  and 
Naples,  dated  12  June,  1815.*  The  government  of  England 
took  the  view  that  it  lay  within  Austria's  right  to  deal  with 
the  Neapolitan  revolution ; 5  but  Castlereagh  refused  to  give 
the  "  moral  support  "  which  Austria  sought  to  obtain,  on 
the  ground  that  England  would  not  interfere  in  the  affairs 

1  F.  O.,  op.  cit.,  ibid. 

«  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  208. 

•  Parl.  Papers,  vol.  xix,  p,  71,  Castlereagh  to  the  courts  of  Austria, 
France,  Prussia  and  Russia,  May,  1820. 

*F.  O.,  Continent,  Circular  Despatches,  1815,  1818,  1820,  Austrian 
Memoir  on  the  Revolution  at  Naples,  28  August,  1820;  Phillips,  op.  cit., 
p.  210. 

5  Ibid.,  F.  O.,  Continental  Circular  Despatches,  1815,  1818,  1820,  Castle- 
reagh to  Stewart,  29  July,  1820,  no.  13. 


GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES 


43 


of  Naples  even  to  the  extent  of  encouraging  other  states  to 
do  so.1  Failing  to  obtain  the  moral  support  of  England  in 
his  Neapolitan  venture,  Metternich  resorted  to  calling  a  new 
congress  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance.2  It  assembled  at 
Troppau  in  October,  1820.  The  very  situation  which  had 
occasioned  the  assembling  of  the  congress  furnished  suffi- 
cient evidence  of  what  was  to  be  its  most  important  business, 
It  was  plain  to  the  government  of  England  that  once  again 
an  attempt  was  to  be  made  to  erect  the  Alliance  into  a 
European  political  system  with  the  authority  to  intervene 
in  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  states.3  Accordingly,  Eng- 
land sent  no  official  representatives  ;  but  instructed  Lord 
Stewart,  the  British  ambassador  at  Vienna,  to  be  present 
as  an  observer.4 

In  a  letter  to  Stewart,  Castlereagh  again  expressed  his 
opposition  to  intervention  in  any  independent  state  distracted 
by  "  internal  convulsions  "  : 

With  the  respect  and  attachment  which  I  feel  for  the  system 
of  the  Alliance  as  regulated  by  the  transaction  of  Aix-la- 
Chapelle,  I  should  much  question  the  precedence,  or,  in  truth, 
the  efficacy,  of  any  formal  exercise  of  its  forms  and  pro- 
visions on  the  present  occasion  when  the  danger  springs  from 

1  Ibid.,  Castlereagh  to  Stewart,  19  July,  1820;  ibid.,  16  'September,  1820. 

«  Ibid.,  Austrian  Memoir  on  the  Revolution  at  Naples,  28  August, 
1820;  ibid.,  Russia,  May-October,  1820;  Bagot  to  Castlereagh,  16  Sep- 
tember, 1820,  no.  22;  ibid.,  Bagot  to  Castlereagh,  25  September,  1820, 
no.  24. 

*  F.  0.,  Continent,  Circular  Despatches,  1815,  1818,  1820,  Castlereagh 
to  Stewart,  16  September,  1820;  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  216. 

4  F.  0.,  Circular  Despatches,  1815,  1818,  1820,  Castlereagh  to  Stewart, 
16  September,  1820,  no.  19;  cf.  ibid.,  Castlereagh  to  Stewart,  16  De- 
cember, 1820;  Snow  (F.),  Treaties  and  Topics  in  American  Diplomacy, 
(Boston,  1894),  p.  241. 


44  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [44 

the  internal  convulsions  of  independent  states,  the  policy  of 
hazarding  such  a  step  is  much  more  questionable.1 

The  British  Parliament  would  be  certain  to  disapprove  any 
course  taken  by  the  government  that  would  bind  England  to 
any  such  engagements.2 

Since  neither  England  nor  France,  the  two  constitutional 
states  in  the  Alliance,  had  given  to  its  representatives  at 
Troppau  plenary  powers,  the  results  of  the  congress  as 
embodied  in  its  "  Protocol  "  and  as  indicated  by  the  in- 
vasion of  Naples  and  Piedmont  by  Austrian  troops,  was 
largely  the  work  of  the  three  autocratic  powers,  Russia, 
Austria  and  Prussia.3  Their  policy  of  intervention  was 
clearly  set  forth  in  the  Troppau  Protocol  in  the  following 
terms : 

States  which  have  undergone  a  change  of  Government 
due  to  revolution,  the  results  of  which  threaten  other  states, 
ipso  facto  cease  to  be  members  of  the  European  Alliance, 
and  remain  excluded  from  it  until  their  situation  gives 
guarantees  for  legal  order  and  stability.  If,  owing  to  such 
alterations,  immediate  danger  threatens  other  states,  the 
Powers  bind  themselves,  by  peaceful  means,  or  if  need  be 
by  arms,  to  bring  back  the  guilty  state  into  the  bosom  of  the 
Great  Alliance.4 

In  order  to  remove  the  "  erroneous  impressions  of  the 

1  Castlereagh,  Correspondence,  vol.  xii,  p.  312,  Castlereagh  to  Stewart, 
16  September,  1820;  cf.  F.  O.,  Continent,  Circular  Despatches,  1815, 
1818,  1820,  note  presented  by  British  ambassador  at  Troppau. 

8  Castlereagh,  Correspondence,  vol.  xii,  p.  314. 

*F.  O.,  Austria,  Lord  Stewart,  March-September,  1821,  Stewart  to 
Castlereagh,  20  March,  1821. 

4  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  viii,  pp.  1149  et  seq.;  F.  O., 
Continent,  Circular  Despatches,  1815,  1818,  1820,  Protocol  Preliminaire, 
19  November,  1820;  ibid.,  Troppau  Circular,  8  December,  1820. 


45]  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES  45 

past  "  which  the  Protocol  might  give,  Castlereagh  drew  up 
the  Circular  of  19  January,  1821,  and  despatched  it  to  the 
British  representatives  at  foreign  courts.  It  defined  in  un- 
mistakable terms  the  attitude  of  the  British  government  to- 
ward the  Congress  of  Troppau.  Against  the  policy  of 
intervening  in  the  domestic  concerns  of  independent  states 
the  government  of  England  protested  that 

they  do  not  regard  the  Alliance  as  entitled,  under  existing 
treaties,  to  assume,  in  their  character  as  Allies,  any  such 
general  powers,  nor  do  they  conceive  that  such  extraordinary 
powers  could  be  assumed,  in  virtue  of  any  fresh  diplomatic 
transaction  amongst  the  allied  courts,  without  their  either  at- 
tributing to  themselves  a  supremacy  incompatible  with  the 
rights  of  other  states,  or,  if  to  be  acquired  through  the  special 
accession  of  such  states,  without  introducing  a  federative 
system  in  Europe,  not  only  unwieldy  and  ineffectual  to  its 
object,  but  leading  to  many  most  serious  inconveniences.1 

England  had  never  understood  the  treaties  of  Vienna  and 
Paris  as  having  placed  any  such  obligations  upon  the  signa- 
tory powers  as  the  Congress  of  Troppau  had  assumed ; 2  nor 
could  the  British  government  admit  that  the  right  to 
interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  an  independent  state  could 
"  receive  a  general  and  indiscriminate  application  to  all  Re- 
volutionary Movements,  without  reference  to  their  im- 
mediate bearing  upon  some  particular  state  or  States,  or  be 
made  prospectively  the  basis  of  an  alliance."  8 

1F.  O.,  Continent,  Circular -Despatches,  1815,  1818,  1820,  Castlereagh, 
Circular  Despatch  to  His  Majesty's  Missions  at  Foreign  Courts,  19 
January,  1821;  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  vii,  pp.  1160  et 
seq.t  Castlereagh  to  British  Ministers  at  Foreign  'Courts,  19  January, 
1821 ;  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  664  et  seq. 

>  Ibid. 

*  Ibid.;  cf.  F.  O.,  Continent,  Circular  Despatches,  1815,  1818,  1820, 
Castlereagh  to  iStewart,  16  December,  1820,  no.  52. 


46  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [46 

Moreover,  interference  in  the  affairs  of  an  independent 
state  would  be  fraught  with  great  dangers :  it  would  increase 
the  popular  suspicion  and  distrust  of  the  rulers,  and  would 
thereby  stimulate  revolutionary  agitation;  if  successful,  it 
would  "  destroy  all  wholesome  national  energy." 

Consistent  with  her  earlier  policy,  England  became  in- 
creasingly outspoken  in  her  opposition  to  intervention. 
Hers  was  the  narrow  and  strict  interpretation  of  the  treaty 
of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  and  her  statesmen  continued  to 
employ  their  efforts  to  limit  the  authority  of  the  Alliance 
to  questions  which  grew  directly  out  of  the  treaties  enumer- 
ated therein. 

Having  given  formal  expression  to  the  principle  of 
intervention,  the  Allies  proceeded  to  give  it  practical 
application.  The  opportunity  for  so  doing  was  afforded 
by  the  revolutionary  movements  in  Naples  and  Piedmont  in 
1820.  Austria  was  commissioned  to  intervene,  and  her 
arms  were  completely  successful  in  restoring  the  reactionary 
kings  of  Naples  and  Piedmont  to  their  respective  thrones. 

Inflated  with  the  pride  of  success  the  Alliance  sought 
the  application  of  their  principle  to  Spain,  where  a  revolu- 
tion had  also  broken  out  in  1820.  The  Spanish  revolu- 
tionists had  forced  the  king  to  accept  the  Constitution  of 
1812;  but  Ferdinand  VII  did  not  expect  long  to  remain  in 
so  uncomfortable  a  political  strait- jacket,  especially  since 
there  were  sympathetic  fellow-monarchs  from  whom  help 
might  be  obtained  to  effect  his  release.  Appeal  was  accord- 
ingly made  to  the  allied  monarchs.  The  latter  agreed  to 
meet  at  Verona  in  1822,  where,  in  accordance  with  the  prin- 
ciple of  intervention,  steps  would  be  taken  to  help  Ferdi- 
nand to  regain  his  former  position. 

Just  on  the  eve  of  the  Congress  of  Verona,  George  Cann- 

1  F.  O.,  op.  cit.,  ibid. 


47]  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES  47 

ing  was  promoted  to  the  office  of  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  the  position  left  vacant  by  the  death  of  Castlereagh.1* 
A  change  of  incumbent  did  not  produce  any  abrupt  change 
in  foreign  policy.2  If  anything,  England's  divergence  from 
the  policy  of  the  Alliance  became  more  pronounced  until 
it  resulted  in  a  complete  break  over  the  Spanish-American 
question. 

England  had  too  many  interests  at  stake  among  the 
numerous  matters  which  were  to  come  before  the  Congress 
of  Verona  not  to  take  an  active  part  in  its  deliberations.3 
It  had  been  Castlereagh's  plan  to  attend  in  person.  That 
mission  was  now  entrusted  to  the  Duke  of  Wellington,4  who 
proceeded  to  Verona  armed  with  a  Memorandum  which 
Castlereagh  had  drawn  up  for  his  own  guidance.5  It  con- 
tained the  following  instructions : 

If  there  be  a  determined  project  to  interfere  by  force  or  by 
menace  in  the  present  struggle  in  Spain,  so  convinced  are  His 
Majesty's  government  of  the  uselessness  and  danger  of  any 
such  interference — so  objectionable  does  it  appear  to  them  in 
principle,  as  well  as  utterly  impracticable  in  execution,  that 
when  the  necessity  arises,  or  (I  would  rather  say)  when  the 
opportunity  offers,  I  am  to  instruct  your  grace  at  once  frankly 
and  peremptorily  to  declare,  that  to  any  interference,  come 
what  may,  His  Majesty  will  not  be  a  party.6 

1  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  243. 

2Broderick  (G.  C.)  and  Fotheringham  (J.  K.),  A  History  of  Eng- 
land, (London,  1906),  vol.  xi,  p.  216. 

3  Snow,  op.  cit.,  p.  241. 

4F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  September-December,  1822,  Canning  to 
Wellington,  14  September,  1822. 

1  Ibid.,  Memorandum  of  Instructions. 

•  ibid.,  Canning  to  Wellington,  27  September,  1822,  no.  4;  Parliament- 
ary Papers,  (1823),  vol.  xix,  p.  2,  Canning  to  Wellington,  27  September, 
1822;  Stapleton  (A.  G.),  The  Political  Life  of  the  Right  Honourable 
George  Canning,  (London,  18311),  vol.  i,  pp.  145  et  seq. 


48  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [48 

The  Spanish  question  assumed  an  overshadowing  import- 
ance above  all  other  questions  before  the  congress;  and  it 
was  the  question  in  which  England  had  the  greatest  interest.^ 
It  practically  monopolized  the  attention  of  the  congress.2 

Despite  the  known  attitude  of  England,  the  other  members 
of  the  Alliance  proceeded  to  take  steps  for  intervention  in 
Spain  with  a  view  to  restoring  Ferdinand  VII  as  an  auto- 
cratic ruler.  After  considerable  diplomatic  wrangling  as 
to  the  best  method  of  procedure,  and  as  to  what  member 
of  the  Alliance  should  be  authorized  to  intervene  on  its  be- 
half, the  congress  decided  in  favor  of  France.3  Meanwhile, 
Wellington,  in  accordance  with  Canning's  instructions,  had 
labored  against  the  plan  of  intervention.4  The  determined 
attitude  of  the  other  powers  caused  Wellington  to  withdraw* 
from  the  congress,5  refusing  also  to  sign  the  proces 
verbaux*  The  break  between  England  and  her  allies,  which 
had  long  been  in  preparation  through  a  growing  divergence 
of  views,  now  became  complete ; 7  and  England  was  left 
free  to  pursue  a  policy  more  in  harmony  with  her  own 

1  Cambridge  Mod.  History,  vol.  x,  p.  33. 
1  Ibid.,  p.  34. 

8  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  x,  p.  921 ;  Stapleton,  op.  cit., 
vol.  i,  p.  153. 

*F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  September  and  October,  1822,  Wellington 
to  Canning,  29  October,  1822,  no.  18;  ibid.,  November,  1822,  Wellington 
Memoranda,  no.  20;  Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  154. 

*F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  November  and  December,  1822,  Welling- 
ton to  Nesselrode,  29  November,  1822,  no.  41 ;  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  274. 

*  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1823),  vol.  xix,  p.  57,  Canning  to  Stewart, 
31  /March,  1823;  F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  November,  1822,  Welling- 
ton, Minute  of  Observation  on  Proces  Verbaux;  ibid.,  27  November, 
Wellington,  Memorandum  of  Interview  with  the  Russian  Emperor. 

5  Ibid.,  November  and  December,  1822,  Wellington,  Memorandum,  27 
November,  1822,  no.  42;  Parliamentary  Papers,  vol.  xix,  p.  8;  Ibid., 
pp.  26  et  seq.',  cf.  Hansard,  ParL  Debates  (n.  s.)  vol.  viii,  pp.  872  et  seq. 


49]  GREAT  BRITAIN  AND  THE  ALLIANCES  49 

interests.1  But  it  was  not  England  that  was  responsible 
for  the  breach  in  the  Alliance.  Her  government  merely  con- 
tinued to  maintain  consistently  its  opposition  to  a  European 
dictatorship  in  the  internal  affairs  of  sovereign  and  inde- 
pendent states,  for  which  the  treaty  of  alliance  of  20  Nov- 
ember, 1815,  furnished  no  warrant.  It  was  instead  the 
Alliance  which  had,  according  to  Castlereagh,2  moved 
t(  away  from  us  without  our  having  quitted  it." 

The  history  of  the  relations  of  England  and  her  con- 
tinental allies  from  1815  to  1822  reveals  not  only  a  conflict 
between  two  political  systems;  but  also  a  difference  in  the 
conception  of  the  right  of  an  individual  state  to  self-expres- 
sion and  political  growth.  England  was  a  constitutional 
monarchy,  and  had  herself  experienced  political  revolution; 3 
while  her  allies,  with  the  exception  of  France,  were  auto- 
cratic states  —  fearful  of  the  consequences  of  any  political 
change,  save  when  handed  down  from  above.4  Naturally, 
England  neither  could  nor  would  oppose  5  or  be  a  party  to 
the  suppression  of  any  movement  occurring  within  a  state, 
which  had  for  its  ultimate  aim  the  establishment  of  political 
institutions  akin  to  her  very  own,  especially  when  .;uch  a 
movement  confined  itself  within  the  boundaries  of  the  sov- 
ereign state  in  question.  So  far,  England's  policy  of  non- 
intervention had  its  source  in  an  attitude  produced  by  her 
own  political  experiences  and  in  a  strict  interpretation  of 
the  treaty  of  20  November,  1815.  However,  additional 
emphasis  was  given  to  that  policy  when  the  Alliance  pro- 

1  F.  0.,  Continent,  Verona,  November  and  December,  1822,  Wellington 
to  Canning,  29  November,  1822,  no.  45. 

*  Ibid.,  Austria,  Domestic,  September-December,  1820,  Report  of  Ester- 
hazy,  October,  1820;  Cambridge  Mod.  History,  vol.  x,  pp.  36  et  seq. 

*  McLaughlin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  113,  116. 

*  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  216. 

8  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  (London,  1859),  pp.  378-79. 


tjO  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [50 

posed  to  intervene  in  Spain  and  threatened  to  intervene  in 
the  Spanish- American  colonies;  because  in  so  doing,  not 
only  would  the  balance  of  power  be  upset,  but  England's 
commercial  interests  would  be  jeopardized.1 

Confronted  still  by  the  same  task  —  that  of  presenting 
an  effective  opposition  to  intervention  —  only  grown  larger, 
more  difficult  of  accomplishment,  and  never  so  urgent  of 
decisive  results,  England  felt  the  necessity  of  gathering  her 
forces  for  a  supreme  achievement. 

1  Henderson   (J.  B.),  American  Diplomatic  Questions,   (New  York, 
p.  313. 


CHAPTER  III 
INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN 

THE  foreign  policy  of  George  Canning  was  essentially 
a  continuation  of  that  of  his  predecessor,1  being  character- 
ized only  by  a  more  determined  effort  to  free  England 
from  the  European  Alliance.  The  interests  of  England 
were  always  to  be  consulted  in  preference  to  the  interests  of 
the  Alliance,  in  shaping  the  course  of  England's  foreign 
policy.2  There  is,  therefore,  some  justification  for  the 
statement  of  Canning's  biographer  that  Canning  was  the 
originator  of  a  really  "  British  Policy,"  and  reduced  it  to  a 
system.3 

As  a  member  of  Lord  Liverpool's  Cabinet  before  becom- 
ing Foreign  Minister,  Canning  had  become  familiar  with 
the  nature  of  England's  relations  with  the  continent;  and 
he  had  opposed  altogether  the  idea  of  congresses.*  In  the 
autumn  of  1823  he  wrote  to  Wellington  what  he  considered 
to  have  been  the  purpose  of  the  Alliance  from  the  beginning. 
His  statement  is  in  substantial  agreement  with  Castlereagh's 
protest 5  against  the  Troppau  Protocol,6  thus  showing  the 

1  Phillips  (W.  A.),  The  Confederation  of  Europe,  p.  244. 
1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  134. 
» Ibid.,  pp.  474-475- 

4  Castlereagh,  Correspondence,  vol.  xii,  p.  56,  Bathurst  to  Castlereagh, 
20  October,  1818. 

•  Hertslet,  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  vol.  i,  p.  664. 

8  Ibid.,  p.  658;  F.  O.,  Continent,  Circular  Despatches,  1815,  1818,  1820, 

Troppau  Circular,  8  December,  1820. 

Si]  51 


52  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [52 

continuity  of  England's  foreign  policy.  Metternich,  he 
says,  "  contends  in  effect,  if  not  in  so  many  words,  that  the 
Alliance  was  framed  against  the  dangers  of  internal  revo- 
lution ;  he  admits,  I  presume,  that  it  was  also  framed  against 
ambitious  aggression  from  without.  We  contend  that  it 
was  framed  wholly  against  the  latter  danger,  with  the  single 
exception  of  a  Buonapartean  revolution  in  France."  Not 
only  would  Canning  refuse  to  support  the  actions  of  the 
Alliance  based  upon  an  interpretation  of  its  purpose  so  much 
at  variance  with  that  of  the  British  government;  but  he 
would  try  to  render  the  Alliance  ineffective.2  Rendered  in- 
effective, it  would  soon  lose  its  raison  d'etre  and  be  dissolved. 
To  that  extent  Canning's  attitude  reflected  a  new  develop- 
ment in  British  policy,  foreshadowed,  but  not  directly  aimed 
at,  by  that  of  Castlereagh. 

In  pursuing  this  course  toward  the  Alliance,  it  cannot  be 
said  that  Canning  was  moved  wholly  by  a  love  of  political 
liberalism.  His  own  political  convictions  were  those  of 
monarchism.3  What  he  objected  to,  no  matter  what  the 
form  of  government  of  a  state,  was  foreign  interference 
with  that  government,  established  or  in  process  of  change.4 
He  was  quick  to  discern  that  Europe  was  experiencing  a 
conflict  between  monarchy  and  democracy.  In  a  speech 
which  he  delivered  in  Liverpool  shortly  before  assuming  the 
office  of  Foreign  Minister  he  made  that  fact  plain;  and, 
though  he  could  not  then  have  thought  of  himself  as  about 
to  be  called  to  the  Foreign  Office,  he  suggested  the  course 
which  his  country  should  pursue  in  the  presence  of  such  a 
conflict : 

1  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  p.  376. 

2  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning t  vol.  i,  p.  135. 
•Ibid.,  p.  485. 

'  Ibid.,  pp.  485-486 ;  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  p.  380. 


53]  INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  53 

Gentlemen,  in  the  time  in  which  we  live  there  is  (disguise 
it  how  we  may)  a  struggle  going  on — in  some  countries  an 
open,  in  some  a  tacit  struggle — between  the  principles  of 
monarchy  and  democracy.  God  be  praised  that  in  that 
struggle  we  have  not  any  part  to  take.  God  be  praised  that 
we  have  long  ago  arrived  at  all  the  blessings  that  are  to 
be  derived  from  that  which  alone  can  end  that  struggle  benefi- 
cially— a  compromise  and  intermixture  of  those  conflicting 
principles.  It  is  not,  as  it  appears  to  me,  the  duty  of  this 
country  to  side  either  with  the  assailants  when  they  aim  at 
too  much,  nor  with  those  who  stand  upon  the  defensive,  when 
they  will  grant  nothing.  England  has  only  to  maintain  her- 
self on  the  basis  of  her  own  solid  and  settled  'Constitution, 
firm,  unshaken — a  spectatress  interested  in  the  contest  only 
by  her  sympathies;  not  a  partisan  on  either  side,  but,  for  the 
sake  of  both,  a  model,  and  ultimately  an  umpire.1 

Neutrality  in  such  a  conflict  would  improve  the  position  of 
England,  keep  from  her  shores  the  danger  of  foreign  war, 
and  protect  her  own  institutions.2  The  scenes  of  the  French 
Revolution,  still  clear  in  his  mind,  and  his  own  experiences 
with  the  champions  of  reaction,  must  have  convinced  Cann- 
ing of  the  danger  of  siding  with  the  party  of  either  extreme, 
had  he  been  privileged  to  exercise  his  choice.  He  was 
equally  persuaded  of  the  wisdom  of  neutrality;  because 
thereby  he  might  maintain  the  political  equilibrium  of  Europe 
by  a  nice  balancing  of  diplomatic  influence.3 

It  was  clever  diplomatic  balancing  of  British  influence 
that  scored  a  triumph  at  the  Congress  of  Verona.  By  her 
refusal  to  be  a  party  to  a  joint  attack  on  Spain,  England 
frustrated  the  plan  of  the  Alliance  for  corporate  action  * 

1  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  p.  368.  2  Ibid. 

*  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  135,  474. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  334,  476 ;  Hansard,  vol.  viii,  p.  1483 ;  Parliamentary  Papers, 
(1823),  vol.  xix,  pp.  7  et  seq.\  Marriott  (J.  A.  R.),  George  Canning  and 
His  Times,  (London,  1903),  p.  95. 


54  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [54 

which  the  Tsar  desired.1  This  success  may  not  have  been 
due  so  much  to  diplomatic  persuasion  as  to  the  fear  of  what 
England  would  do  to  prevent  it.2  Reducing  the  scope  of 
the  impending  conflict  between  the  Alliance  and  the  Spanish 
Constitutionalists,  so  as  to  limit  it  to  a  quarrel  between 
France  and  Spain,3  had  more  than  ordinary  significance. 
Although  it  seemed  likely  that  France  would  make  an  attack 
upon  the  Spanish  Constitutionalists,  France  alone  might 
easily  be  prevented  from  going  to  such  lengths  in  her  rela- 
tions with  Spain  as  to  injure  England's  interests;  whereas, 
if  corporate  action  had  taken  place,  England  would  have 
found  herself  correspondingly  weaker  in  bargaining  for  her 
rights  at  the  conclusion  of  the  war. 

The  relation  of  Spain  and  the  Alliance  having  been  re- 
duced to  a  question  of  war  between  Spain  and  France,4 
Canning  could  carry  one  step  farther  his  plan  for  rendering; 
the  influence  of  the  Alliance  ineffective;  he  would  prevent 
the  outbreak  of  war  which  grew  more  and  more  threatening. 
The  means  which  he  sought  to  employ  in  the  interest  of 
peace  was  mediation.5  An  offer  of  mediation  was  accord- 
ingly made  to  the  French  government ; 6  and  if  accepted, 
Canning's  aim  to  maintain  the  peace  of  Europe  by  dissent- 

1  F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  November,  1822,  Wellington  to  Canning,  19 
November,  1822,  no.  25. 

*  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  37;  cf.  F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona, 
November,  1822,  Wellington  to  Canning,  29  November,  1822,  no.  32. 

3  Canning,  Speeches,  vol.  v,  p.  16. 

4  F.  O.,  Spain,  September-December,  1822,  Canning  to  William  a  Court, 
9  December,  1822,  no.  32 ;  Hansard,  vol.  viii,  p.  882. 

5  Ibid.,  pp.  881,  883;  F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  September-December, 
1822,    Canning  to   Wellington,   6   December,    1822,   no.   24;    Stapleton, 
Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  220,  476. 

6  Ibid.,  vol.  i,  p.  220;  F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  November  and  De- 
cember, 1822,  no.  60,  note;  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1823),  vol.  xix,  p. 
13,  Wellington  to  Montmorency,  17  December,  1822. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  55 

ing  from  the  policy  of  the  Alliance  would  have  been  realized.1* 
But  while  Canning  found  hope  of  success  in  the  fact  that 
France  was  to  act  singly  against  Spain,  Montmorency,  the 
French  representative  at  the  Congress  of  Verona,  declined 
the  offer  of  mediation  on  the  ground  that,  after  all,  the 
Spanish  question  was  "  wholly  European." 2  That  was 
evidently  an  excuse  for  not  wishing  to  accept  the  British 
offer,  because  such  acceptance  would  not  suit  the  convenience 
of  the  French  government  in  the  pursuit  of  its  Spanish 
policy.  However,  the  French  Cabinet  was  not  unanimous 
in  its  interpretation  of  the  question.  Villele,  the  Prime 
Minister,  took  the  view  that  the  question  was  "  wholly 
French,"  3  and  with  him  sided  the  majority  of  the  Ministry. 
Nevertheless,  the  war  party  had  its  way. 

That  France  was  maneuvering  for  individual  advantage 
without  regard  for  the  Alliance  is  shown  in  her  independent 
action  in  dealing  with  Spain.  The  four  powers  —  France, 
Austria,  Prussia  and  Russia  —  had  decided  at  Verona 4  that 
they  would  send  similar  notes  to  Madrid  based  upon  the 
Verona  proceedings.  The  French  government,  having  taken 
the  position  that  the  question  was  "  wholly  French,"  sought 
to  steal  a  march  on  the  Allies.5  Not  only  was  the  French 
despatch  based  upon  that  interpretation  of  the  Spanish 
question,  but  it  was  more  conciliatory  in  tone  than  were 

fanning,  Memoirs,  (London,  1828),  vol.  ii,  p.  359. 

2  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1823),  vol.  xix,  pp.  14  et  seq.,  Montmorency 
to  Wellington,  26  December,  1822. 

3  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  226;   Walpole   (S.),  History 
of  England,  (London,  1890),  vol.  iii,  p.  50. 

4  Wellington,   Despatches,  vol.  i,   p.  519;   British   and  Foreign   State 
Papers,  vol.  x,  p.  9;  Parliamentary  Papers,  vol.  xix,  pp.  6-7',  F.  O., 
Continent,    Verona,    November,    1822,    Wellington,    Memorandum,    121 
November,  1822,  no.  22. 

*  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  226  et  seq. 


56  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [56 

those  sent  by  the  other  Allies.1  Moreover,  the  French  des- 
patch arrived  in  Madrid  two  days  earlier  than  those  of  the 
other  powers,  and  the  French  Minister  at  Madrid  took 
advantage  of  its  earlier  arrival  to  "  interpret "  it  to  the 
Spanish  government ; 2  and  while  the  rest  of  the  Allies  re- 
called their  Ministers  from  Madrid,  France  did  not  do  so 
immediately.3 

It  seemed  clear,  therefore,  that  France  was  taking  advant- 
age of  the  policy  of  intervention  which  had  been  laid  down 
by  the  Alliance,  and  to  which  its  members  gave  support,  to 
create  for  herself  favorable  relations  with  Spain.4  Thus 
the  policy  of  intervention  in  Spain  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
storing Ferdinand  VII  to  his  throne  was  indirectly  to  serve 
the  interests  of  France.5  The  French  government  was  un- 
doubtedly actuated,  despite  its  constitutional  form,  by  a 
desire  to  enforce  the  principle  of  legitimacy  in  the  neighbor- 
ing state,  since  Louis  XVIII  himself  owed  his  restoration  to 
that  principle.6  But  France  had  lost  prestige,  power  and 
territory  as  a  result  of  Napoleon's  defeat,  and  the  thought 
of  recovering  from  these  losses  influenced  the  attitude  of 
French  statesmen  and  caused  France  to  incline  toward  in- 
dependent action  in  dealing  with  Spain.7  By  assuming  a 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  226  et  seq. ;  British  and  Foreign 
State  Papers,  vol.  x,  p.  38,  William  a  Court  to  Canning,  7  January,  1823. 

•  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  x,  p.  38,  William  a  Court  to 
Canning,  7  January,  1823;  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  266 
et  seq. 

•  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  280. 

4  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  226. 

6  F.  O.,  France,  January- April,  1823,  Canning  to  Stuart,  25  February, 
1823,  no.  20. 

•  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning t  vol.  i,  pp.  223-224. 

7  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  pp.  369  et  seq,,  Canning 
to  Bagot,  3  January,  1823 :  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  p.  280. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  57 

conciliatory  attitude  France  possibly  expected  to  gain  com- 
mercial advantages  in  trade  with  the  Spanish  colonial  empire 
or  actually  to  acquire  possession  of  part  of  that  empire.1  If 
such  were  the  motives  of  the  French  government  it  could  ill 
afford  to  accept  Canning's  offer  of  mediation; 2  for,  if  Eng- 
land had  been  successful  in  preventing  war  between  the  two 
countries,  then  English  influence  at  Madrid  would  have 
increased  to  the  detriment  of  French  ambitions.  Of  such 
consequences  France  was  keenly  suspicious.3  It  was  also 
Canning's  thought  that  British  mediation  would  create  be- 
tween England  and  Spain  a  friendly  feeling  that  would  be 
more  efficacious  than  a  display  of  force  in  the  settlement  of 
the  difficulties  existing  between  these  two  countries.4  Out 
of  a  group  of  circumstances  such  as  these  the  ambitious 
plans  of  the  Congress  of  Verona  were  reduced  to  a  rivalry 
between  England  and  France  for  diplomatic  ascendancy  at 
the  Spanish  court,  not  as  the  ultimate  aim,  but  as  a  step 
toward  commercial  advantage.5  England  was  no  less 
anxious  to  maintain  the  influence  which  she  had  established 
at  Madrid  during  the  Peninsular  War  than  was  France  to 
establish  hers.8 

However,  the  opportunity  was  not  lacking  for  the  substi- 
tution of  Anglo-French  cooperation  for  a  state  of  rivalry. 
While  the  commercial  classes  of  France  advocated  the  re- 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  226;  Phillips,  op.  cit.,  264. 

2F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  September-December,  1822,  Canning  to 
Wellington,  13  December,  1822,  no.  28,  note;  British  and  Foreign  State 
Papers,  vol.  x,  p.  28,  Canning  to  William  a  Court,  9  December,  1822; 
Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  223-224. 

1  F.  O.,  France,  March,  1823,  Stuart  to  Canning,  3  March,  1823. 

4  Ibid.,  Continent,  Verona,  September-December,  1822,  Canning  to 
Wellington,  6  December,  1822,  no.  24. 

•  Ibid.,  Canning  to  Wellington,  17  December,  1822,  no.  29. 

•  Phillips,  op.  cit.f  p.  260. 


58  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [58 

cognition  of  South  American  independence  in  the  interest  of 
French  commerce,1  the  more  conservative  legitimists  would 
shape  the  Spanish-American  policy  of  France  in  harmony 
with  the  wishes  of  Spain.2  It  was  for  the  French  govern- 
ment to  choose  whether  to  support  the  cause  of  colonial 
independence  in  response  to  commercial  interest,  or  to  pur- 
sue a  policy  in  harmony  with  the  Doctrine  of  Intervention 
in  support  of  legitimacy.3  Had  it  chosen  to  favor  colonial 
independence,  an  Anglo-French  understanding  relative  to 
South  America  would  not  have  been  impossible.  But  the 
French  government  preferred  cooperation  with  the  allied 
powers  in  the  solution  of  the  Spanish-American  question.4 
The  allied  policy  would  take  the  form  either  of  reconquest 
of  the  former  Spanish-American  colonies  or  an  effort  to 
establish  in  Spanish  America  independent  Bourbon  monar- 
chies.5 With  the  exception  of  the  Spanish  royalists,  few 
men  seriously  believed  in  the  possibility  of  reconquest, 
while  it  seemed  to  the  French  government  that  the  establish- 
ment of  independent  Bourbon  monarchies  in  Spanish 
America  would  at  the  same  time  satisfy  the  principle  of 
legitimacy  and  the  interests  of  the  commercial  classes.6  The 
success  of  such  a  policy  would  depend,  on  the  one  hand, 
upon  the  extent  of  French  influence  at  Madrid,  and  on  the 
other,  upon  the  attitude  of  England. 

1  Paris,  Arch,  dcs  Aff.  Etr.,  Mem.  et  Docs.,  vol.  xxxv,  f.  161  ;  Villele 
(Joachim,  de),  Memoires,  (Paris,  1888-1850),  vol.  iii,  pp.  70  et  seq; 
Perkins  (Dexter),  "Europe,  Spanish  America,  and  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine," Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  xxvii,  p.  208. 


*lbid.,  pp.  208-209. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  209;  Chateaubriand,  Congress  of  Verona,  (London,  1838),  vol. 
i,  pp.  101-102. 

6  Paris,  Corr.  Pol.,  Espagne,  vol.  716,  f.  27;  vol.  722,  f.  56;  Villele,  op. 
cit.,  vol.  iv,  pp.  200-201  ;  Perkins,  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  xxvii,  p.  210. 
*Jbid;  Chateaubriand,  op.  cit.t  vol.  i,  p.  102;  vol.  ii,  p.  209. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  59 

Scarcely  had  the  Congress  of  Verona  come  to  its  close, 
then,  when  its  scheme  for  the  maintenance  of  the  political 
status  quo  yielded  to  the  forces  of  international  rivalry. 
Canning  made  a  significant  comment  on  the  situation  as  it 
appeared  to  him  in  the  early  part  of  1823  : 

,  .  .  .  the  issue  of  Verona  ....  has  split  the  one  and  in- 
divisible Alliance  into  three  parts  as  distinct  as  the  constitu- 
tions of  England,  France,  and  Muscovy.  First  there  are  the 
three  absolute  Crowns,  who  send  their  angry  despatches  to 
their  Ministers  at  Madrid  with  orders  to  come  away  if  they 
do  not  receive  submissive  answers  in  fifteen  days.  Next, 
there  is  France,  who  sends  a  whining  despatch  to  her  Minister, 
with  no  orders  at  all  as  to  coming  away.  Thirdly,  there  is 
we,  who  are  in  a  course  of  amicable  and  furious  correspon- 
dence with  Spain ;  amicable  so  far  as  relates  to  Europe,  in 
which  quarter  of  the  globe  we  defend  her  against  invasion; 
furious  in  relation  to  America,  where  we  have  a  squadron  now 
employed  in  seeking  forcible  redress  for  grievances.  .  .  . 
Every  nation  for  itself,  and  God  for  all.  Only  bid  your 
Emperor  be  quiet,  for  the  time  of  Areopagus,  and  the  like  of 
that,  is  gone  by.1 

Whatever  doubts  concerning  her  motives  France  may 
have  produced  by  rejecting  the  British  offers  of  mediation, 
they  were  dispelled  by  the  speech  of  Louis  XVIII  on  28* 
January,  1823.  In  that  speech,  which  the  king  delivered  in 
the  chamber,  he  virtually  declared  war  on  Spain : 

I  have  ordered  the  recall  of  my  Minister.  One  hundred 
thousand  Frenchmen,  commanded  by  a  prince  of  my  family, 
by  him  whom  my  heart  delights  to  call  my  son,  are  ready  to 
march,  invoking  the  God  of  St.  Louis  to  preserve  the  throne 
of  Spain  for  the  descendant  of  Henry  IV,  to  save  this  beauti- 

1  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  pp.  369-370,  Canning  to 
Bagot,  3  January,  1823. 


60  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [60 

ful  kingdom  from  its  ruin,  and  to  reconcile  it  with  Europe. 
If  war  is  inevitable,  I  will  use  my  utmost  efforts  to  confine 
its  area  and  to  limit  its  duration.  It  shall  only  be  undertaken 
to  conquer  the  peace  which  the  state  of  Spain  would  make 
impossible.  Let  Ferdinand  VII  be  free  to  give  to  his  people 
the  institutions  which  they  cannot  hold  except  from  him.1 

Here,  at  last,  the  French  monarch  announced  the  policy  of 
his  government.  Unsuccessful  in  their  efforts  to  influence 
the  Constitutionalists  and  unwilling  to  accept  mediation,* 
the  French  would  use  force  to  restore  Ferdinand  to  the 
throne  of  his  fathers  untrammeled  by  the  limitations  which 
the  constitution  had  placed  upon  his  power.  Moreover,  if 
the  institutions  of  Spain  were  to  be  changed,  such  changes 
must  proceed  from  royal  initiative,  not  from  that  of  the 
people.  In  that  respect  the  king's  speech  bore  a  striking 
resemblance  to  the  declaration  of  the  Congress  of  Laibach  in 
which  the  continental  monarchs  agreed  that  "  useful  or 
necessary  changes  in  legislation  and  in  the  administration 
of  states  ought  only  to  emanate  from  the  free-will  and  the 
intelligent  and  well-weighed  conviction  of  those  whom 
God  had  rendered  responsible  for  power." 3  Harmony 
certainly  prevailed  between  France  and  her  allies.  But 
Castlereagh  had  lost  no  time  in  protesting  against  the  Trop- 
pau  Protocol,4  and  Canning  was  just  as  emphatic  in  voicing 
British  opposition  to  French  invasion  of  Spain.  Canning' 
declared  that  that  part  of  the  King's  speech  in  which  it  was 
claimed  that  the  only  legitimate  constitution  is  that  which 

1  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  x.  p.  758;  F.  O.,  France, 
January,  1823,  Stuart  to  Canning,  28  January,  1823,  no.  26;  cf.  ibid., 
Continent,  Verona,  November  and  December,  1822,  Wellington  tof 
Canning,  16  December,  1822,  no.  56. 

*  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  247-248. 

3  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  viii,  pp.  1201  e i  seq. 

4  Hertslet,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  pp.  664-665. 


foj  INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  6l 

emanates  from  the  sovereign,"  struck  at  the  very  roots  of 
the  British  Constitution."  *  In  taking  the  attitude  of  op- 
position to  the  policy  announced  by  the  king  of  France, 
Canning  had  the  united  support  of  the  British  people: 
"  Perhaps  there  never  was  an  occasion  in  which  the  opinions 
of  the  people  of  this  country  were  so  united  as  they  were  in 
their  condemnation  and  abhorrence  of  this  document;  .  .  . 
the  Whigs  and  Tories  were  all  as  one  man,  of  the  same  way 
of  thinking,  from  one  end  of  the  country  to  the  other." 
The  people  of  Great  Britain  realized  that  their  influence  in 
Spain  was  to  be  supplanted  by  that  of  France;  and  along 
with  the  loss  of  foreign  influence,  British  liberals  saw  the 
destruction  of  constitutional  government,  the  merchant  class 
saw  a  danger  to  British  commerce,  and  British  patriots  the 
uselessness  of  their  military  exploits  in  the  Peninsular  War.3 
This  unanimity  of  British  public  opinion  must  have  afforded 
the  British  Ministry  a  great  deal  of  satisfaction.  Moreover, 
it  would  be  a  source  of  great  strength  in  support  of  Cann- 
ing's subsequent  policy  when,  in  case  of  French  success  in 
Spain,  he  should  determine  to  thwart  the  designs  of  France 
in  Spanish  America. 

Some  days  before  the  King's  speech  in  the  Chamber, 
Chateaubriand,  who  had  succeeded  Montmorency  as  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  had  tried  to  convince  Canning  of  the 
difficult  position  of  France  as  a  neighbor  of  Spain.  The 
geographical  nearness  of  the  two  countries  made  it  especially 
necessary  for  France  to  take  proper  precaution  lest  the  dis- 
order in  Spain  should  spread  into  France.1  However,  he 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  339- 
1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  251. 
1  Walpole,  op.  eit.,  vol.  iii,  p.  53. 

*  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1823),  vol.  xix,  p.  20,  Chateaubriand  to  Cann- 
ing, 23  January,  1823. 


62  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [62 

admitted  that  if  the  Spanish  constitution  could  be  so  changed 
as  to  eliminate  the  provisions  guaranteeing  popular  sover- 
eignty, and  if  the  change  could  be  shown  to  have  emanated 
from  the  king,  "  neither  France  nor  any  other  Power  will 
have  the  right  to  complain."  *  But  the  king's  speech  had 
so  irritated  the  Spanish  people  as  to  render  such  modification 
impossible.2  It  was  evident  that  the  French  statesman  was 
preparing  for  war  with  Spain.  The  king's  speech  confirmed 
that  belief. 

However,  Canning  did  not  cease  in  his  efforts  to  maintain 
peace  between  France  and  Spain.3  If  successful  in  these 
efforts,  he  would:  (a)  establish  a  constitutional  govern- 
ment in  Spain;  (b)  thwart  the  Alliance  in  its  policy  of 
intervention  in  Spain;  (c)  prevent  the  aggrandizement 
of  France  at  the  expense  of  Spain;  (d)  safeguard  British 
commerce.  With  these  aims  in  mind  he  tried  to  point 
out  to  Monsieur  of  France,  brother  of  Louis  XVIII 
and  later  himself  king  of  France  as  Charles  X,  the  great 
dangers  involved  in  a  war  with  Spain.  Such  a  war  would 
likely  rekindle  the  smoldering  embers  that  still  remained 
from  the  conflagration  of  the  Napoleonic  period.  It  would 
start  a  new  war  of  "  extreme  principles  "  that  would  over- 
throw the  whole  European  settlement.4  It  would  be  a 
source  of  great  danger  to  France  to  intervene  in  behalf  of 
Ferdinand,  because  not  only  would  the  Spanish  people  con- 
stitute a  most  formidable  obstacle,  but  France  might  also 
incur  the  hostility  of  the  British  people  owing  to  the  con- 
flict of  principles  involved,  while  any  prospect  of  permanent 

1  F.  0.,  France,  January,  1823,  Stuart  to  Canning,  27  January,  1823. 
*Ibid.,  February,  1823,  Stuart  to  Canning,  17  February,  1823,  no.  55. 

3  Ibid.,  January-April,  1823,  Canning  to  Stuart,  4  February,  1823,  no. 
II. 

*Stapleton,  Some  Correspondence  of  George  Cann'ng,  (London,  1887), 
vol.  i,  p.  72,  Canning  to  Monsieur,  i  February,  1823. 


63]  INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  63 

occupation  of  Spain  by  France  would  suggest  to  England 
"  considerations  of  the  gravest  nature."  *  As  for  the  prin- 
ciples of  government,  said  Canning,  "  If  I  were  called  upon 
to  choose  between  the  principle  laid  down  in  the  speech  of 
H.  M.  the  King  of  France,  and  its  antagonist  principle  the 
sovereignty  of  the  people,  I  should  feel  myself  compelled  to 
acknowledge  that  the  former  is  the  more  alien  to  the  British 
Constitution."  Not  only  could  not  the  British  Ministry 
enter  into  a  compact  with  France  in  a  war  against  Spain, 
but  not  even  was  France  to  expect  any  moral  support  from 
Britain,  because  the  British  people  were  in  sympathy  with 
the  very  cause  in  opposition  to  which  France  invaded  Spain.3 
In  this  way  Canning  cleverly  capitalized  the  democratic  senti- 
ment in  Great  Britain  in  the  interest  of  peace. 

In  order  to  remove  all  cause  for  suspicion  regarding  the 
motives  of  his  persistent  efforts  for  peace,  Canning  made  it 
plain  to  Monsieur  that  Great  Britain  had  no  desire  for  terrir 
tory : 

We  want  no  more  ....  neither  islands,  nor  provinces,  nor 
privileges  of  trade.  Trade  ....  but  not  exclusive  privileges 
....  all  the  advantages  and  all  the  islands  that  Spain  could! 
offer  us,  are  nothing  worth  in  our  eyes  compared  with  the 
continuance  of  peace.  It  is  of  that  alone  that  we  are  avari- 
cious, however  little  the  French  Ministers  may  believe  us.4 

Villele  was  in  favor  of  peace  with  Spain,5  but  his  efforts 

1  F.  O.,  France,  January-April,  1823,  Canning  to  Stuart,  4  February, 
1823,  no.  15. 

8  Stapleton,  Some  Correspondence  of  George  Canning t  vol.  i,  p.  74, 
Canning  to  Monsieur,  I  February,  1823. 

8  Ibid. 

*Jbia.,  pp.  75-76. 

•  F.  O.,  France,  January,  1823,  Stuart  to  Canning,  23  January,  1823,  no. 
21. 


64  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [64 

availed  nothing  in  the  face  of  the  war  party  in  the  French 
government.  He  remained  premier  of  France,  and  for  the 
sake  of  apparent  consistency  in  his  position  he  blamed  the 
zeal  of  the  Tsar  for  the  step  that  France  was  about  to  take : 
in  case  that  France  did  not  attack  Spain,  the  Tsar  would 
march  a  Russian  army  through  France  into  Spain.  Such  a 
movement  might  be  a  source  of  much  trouble  for  France, 
and  hence  Villele's  statement  that  "  it  was  necessary  to  at- 
tack the  South  in  order  to  escape  the  North." 

Unlike  the  French  Republicans  during  the  revolutionary 
period,  the  Constitutionalists  of  Spain  had  cautiously  avoided 
committing  any  act  that  might  give  offence  to  the  govern- 
ments of  neighboring  states,  and  thus  furnish  them  with 
a  cause  for  war.2  So  far  as  France,  then,  was  acting  in 
defence  of  her  own  existing  institutions  and  those  of  her 
allies,  she  was  striking  at  dangers  rather  imaginary  than 
real.  There  is  room  for  suspecting  that  she  was  employing 
the  situation  in  Spain  as  a  convenient  pretext  for  advancing 
both  her  political  influence  and  her  economic  interests.  The 
circumstances  which  Chateaubriand  detailed  in  justification 
of  war  with  Spain  pointed  to  the  presence  of  commercial 
motives:  piratical  attacks  upon  French  commerce  in  the 
American  seas,3  necessitating  naval  operations  for  its  pro- 
tection; decreased  consumption  of  French  goods  in  Spain, 
due  to  the  disturbed  conditions  of  internal  affairs ; 4  French 
consuls  threatened  in  Spanish  ports;5  and  the  necessity  of 
keeping  armed  forces  on  the  Spanish  frontier,6  made  the 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  262. 
1  Ibid.,  p.  272. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  274. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  275. 

5  Ibid.,  p.  276. 

•  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  276-277. 


65]  INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  65 

more  necessary  by  the  geographical  situation  of  France.1 
That  France  expected  to  derive  great  advantages  from  a 
war  with  Spain  is  evidenced  by  the  opposition  of  the  French 
government  to  any  interference  in  the  question  by  the  other 
members  of  the  Alliance,  and  by  its  resolution  "  to  resist  by 
every  possible  means  their  participation  in  the  contest." 

A  most  critical  situation  was  growing  out  of  the  determi- 
nation of  France  to  intervene  in  Spain.  Whether  the  ap- 
proaching war  was  to  be  limited  to  a  contest  between  France 
and  the  Spanish  Constitutionalists  or  to  grow  into  a  general 
European  struggle  on  a  large  scale,  depended  upon  the  policy 
of  the  British  government.  Great  Britain  had  opposed  the 
policy  of  intervention  in  the  Congresses  because  she  claimed 
it  was  based  on  an  unwarranted  interpretation  of  the  treaties 
of  1815,  and  she  had  broken  with  the  Alliance  for  the 
same  reason  at  the  Congress  of  Verona.  Moreover,  after 
the  Alliance  had  defied  the  opposition  of  Great  Britain  and 
commissioned  France  to  suppress  the  Spanish  Constitution- 
alists, Canning  continued  to  use  all  the  influence  of  his  posi- 
tion to  prevent  a  Franco- Spanish  war,  first  by  offering1 
mediation,  then  by  explaining  to  France  the  dangers  of  such 
a  war.  When  it  became  apparent  that  Canning's  efforts 
for  peace  were  unavailing,  the  question  immediately  arose, 
What  stand  would  Great  Britain  take?  Would  she  carry 
her  opposition  to  the  policy  of  intervention  a  step  farther 
and  enter  the  conflict  on  the  side  of  the  Constitutionalists? 
Having  broken  with  her  allies,  would  Great  Britain  now* 
employ  her  armed  forces  against  them?  The  opinion  pre- 
vailed rather  generally  in  Spain  that  not  only  would  Eng- 
land not  be  a  party  to  intervention,  but  that  the  English 

1  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1823),  vol.  xix,  p.  20,  Chateaubriand  to  Cann- 
ing, 23  January,  1823. 

5  F.  O.,  France,  January,  1823,  Stuart  to  Canning,  27  January,  1823,  no. 
24;  ibid.,  Stuart  to  Canning,  30  January,  1823. 


66  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [66 

government  would  throw  down  the  gauntlet  against  any 
power  which  would  attempt  such  intervention.1 

British  opinion  was  divided  as  to  what  course  England 
should  take.  Canning  and  the  Ministry  favored  neutrality.2 
Of  such  a  policy  two  men,  Lord  Grey  and  Mr.  Hobhouse, 
were  the  most  outspoken  opponents.  They  threw  the 
weight  of  their  influence  strongly  on  the  side  of  British 
intervention  in  behalf  of  the  Constitutionalists.  France, 
said  Lord  Grey,  committed  an  injustice  by  interfering  with 
the  sovereign  rights  of  an  independent  state;  3  occupation 
of  Spain  by  France  would  disturb  the  balance  of  power  to 
the  detriment  of  Great  Britain ;  *  and  if  Portugal  were  at- 
tacked by  France,  Great  Britain  would,  after  all,  by  virtue 
of  a  treaty  with  Portugal,  have  to  throw  the  weight  of  her 
power  eventually  against  France.5 

While  motives  of  justice  and  consistency  favored  British 
intervention,  motives  of  policy  and  peace  made  a  position 
of  neutrality  the  more  expedient.  Many  circumstances 
compelled  such  a  course.  Even  if  France  were  successful 
in  her  invasion  of  Spain,  England  would  have  no  fear  for 
her  own  liberty.6  Her  insular  position  and  her  naval  power 
were  sufficient  guarantees  against  immediate  dangers. 
There  was  no  longer  any  real  fear  of  a  union  of  Spain  and 
France,  because  an  Anglo-Spanish  treaty  of  1814  bound 

1  F.  O.,  Spain,  September-December,  1822,  Canning  to  William  a  Court, 
28  December,  1822,  no.  40. 

*lbid.,  William  a  Court  to  Canning,  27  October,  1822,  no.  21. 

8  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  x,  p.  48,  Canning  to  William 
a  Court,  26  January,  1823;  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1823),  vol.  xix,  pp. 
33  et  seq.,  Canning  to  William  a  Court,  n  January,  1823. 

4  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  317,  354. 

*lbid.,  p.  318;  F.  O.,  France,  January-April,  1823,  Canning  to  Stuart, 
31  March,  1823,  no.  29. 

6  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  321. 


67]  INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  67 

Spain  not  to  enter  into  any  engagement  with  France  that 
would  renew  the  Family  Compact,1  affect  the  independence  of 
Spain,  or  make  any  treaty  with  France  that  would  be  injuri- 
ous to  His  Britannic  Majesty;  and  Chateaubriand  declared 
that  the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  would  be  observed.2  Even 
though  a  union  of  France  and  Spain  should  be  effected,  it 
would  never  be  the  source  of  danger  to  British  interests  in 
the  nineteenth  century  that  it  might  have  been  in  the  days 
of  Spain's  greatness.3  Spain,  instead  of  being  a  source  of 
strength  to  France,  would  be  a  burden.4  Though  France 
might  gain  possession  of  Spain,  such  an  extension  of  her 
power  could  easily  be  balanced  by  the  recognition  of  the 
Spanish-American  colonies  by  Great  Britain.5  So  long, 
then,  as  France  confined  her  operations  to  Spain,  refrained 
from  permanent  military  occupation  and  from  effecting) 
changes  in  the  relations  of  Spain  with  other  powers,  Eng- 
land's interests  were  in  no  immediate  danger.6 

Participation  on  the  side  of  the  Constitutionalists,  offered 
greater  risks  than  did  the  policy  of  neutrality.  If  Great 
Britain  had  entered  the  war  against  France,  the  latter  would 
unquestionably  have  gained  the  military  support  of  her 
continental  allies,7  while  Great  Britain  would  have  fought 
practically  alone  against  a  coalition  of  powers,  which,  in  a 
land  war  for  which  Great  Britain  was  not  so  well  fitted, 

1  British  and  Foreign  States  Papers,  vol.  x,  p.  76. 
*F.  O.,  Spain,  1814,  Treaty  of  Alliance  and  Friendship,  5  July,  1814; 
Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  3i3-3'i4. 
8  Ibid.,  p.  323. 
*Ibid.,  p.  325. 
1  Ibid.,  pp.  325-326 ;  vol.  ii,  p.  2. 

*F.  0.,  France,  January- April,   1823,  Canning  to  Stuart,  31   March, 
1823. 

7  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  327;  ibid.,  Correspondence  of 
George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  86. 


68  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [68 

might  have  proved  themselves  the  victors.1  Great  Britain 
had  been  at  war  for  almost  a  century,  and  had  now  turned 
her  energy  and  resources  to  peaceful  pursuits.  She  could 
little  afford  to  interrupt  the  process  of  reconstruction  to 
engage  in  a  war,  not  yet  absolutely  necessary  for  her  own 
safety  and  which  might  spread,  if  she  did  enter,  into  a 
European  conflagration  with  most  disastrous  consequences.2 
Indeed,  had  Great  Britain  opposed  France  in  her  invasion  of 
Spain,  the  French  government  could  easily  have  converted 
the  war  into  a  war  against  Great  Britain,  and  in  that  way 
made  it  more  popular  at  home.3  Moreover,  the  Franco- 
Spanish  war,  so  far  as  it  was  the  outgrowth  of  the  policy  of 
intervention,  was  a  conflict  between  two  political  systems. 
Canning  would  identify  the  policy  of  his  country  with 
neither  extreme.4  He  shrank  from  making  conservatism  v. 
liberalism  the  issue  of  any  conflict  of  arms.  Nor  had  his 
opposition  to  the  French  invasion  of  Spain  been  prompted 
by  any  particular  sympathy  with  liberal  institutions;  it  was 
prompted  rather  by  his  opposition  to  the  policy  of  interven- 
tion irrespective  of  the  form  of  government. 

The  national  interests  of  Great  Britain,  then,  demanded 
a  policy  of  neutrality.  But  it  was  to  have  its  limits.  Re- 
fusing to  identify  British  policy  with  the  cause  of  liberalism, 
fearing  no  union  of  France  and  Spain,5  and  feeling  confident 
that  Austria,  Prussia  and  Russia  would  prevent  France  from 

1  Stapleton,  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  86. 

*F.  O.,  Spain,  September-December,  1822,  Canning  to  William  a 
Court,  17  (December,  1822;  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  32-7; 
The  Morning  Post,  8  February,  1823. 

8  Stapleton,  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  85-86, 
Memorandum,  February,  1823. 

*  Ibid.,  p  .74. 

5  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  313-314. 


69]  INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  69 

overthrowing  the  balance  of  power,1  Canning  had  only  one 
contingency  to  fear  in  the  event  that  the  French  were  suc- 
cessful in  Spain,  and  that  was  the  extension  of  their  power 
and  influence  to  Spanish  America.2  An  attempt  by  France, 
or  any  of  her  allies,  singly  or  in  combination,  to  carry  the 
policy  of  intervention  to  Spanish  America  would  interfere 
with  British  commerce  and  would  be  opposed.  In  a  memor- 
andum of  his  policy  drawn  up  by  Canning  in  February, 
1823,  he  outlined  his  reasons  for  neutrality  in  the  approach- 
ing war  between  France  and  Spain,  and  very  definitely  and 
with  emphasis  recorded  his  determination  to  prevent  any 
intervention  in  Spanish  America : 

Here,  however,  forbearance  should  stop.  We  have  the  means 
of  easily  and  effectually  preventing  any  such  projects  on  the 
part  of  Spain  and  France  as  those  to  which  I  have  referred 
respecting  South  America  being  carried  into  execution.  There 
our  naval  superiority  would  tell.5 

There  a  maritime  war  would  be  to  a  purpose;  I  should 
have  no  difficulty  in  deciding  that  we  ought  to  prevent,  by 
every  means  in  our  power,  perhaps  Spain  from  sending  a) 
single  regiment  to  South  America  after  the  supposed  termina- 
tion of  the  war  with  Spain,  but  certainly  France  from  afford- 
ing to  Spain  any  aid  or  assistance  for  this  purpose.4 

Somewhat  later,  31  March,  1823,  Canning  reiterated  in 
a  despatch  to  Sir  Charles  Stuart,  British  Minister  at  Paris, 
his  determination  to  prevent  France  from  acquiring  posses- 
sion of  any  part  of  the  Spanish  colonies  either  by  conquest 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  462 ;  George  Canning  and  His 
Times,  pp.  376-377- 

8  Canning,  Speeches,  vol.  v,  p.  27. 

8  The  italics  are  mine. 

4  Stapleton,  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  88-89, 
Memorandum,  February,  1823 ;  infra,  p.  137. 


70  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [70 

or  by  cession  from  Spain.1  He  even  referred  in  the  same 
despatch  to  the  recognition  of  the  independent  status  of 
those  colonies  as  a  matter  subject  to  "  various  external  cir- 
cumstances, as  well  as  by  the  more  or  less  satisfactory  pro- 
gress, in  each  state,  towards  a  regular  and  settled  form  of 
Government."  2  The  failure  of  the  French  government 
to  reply  to  this  despatch  was  considered  in  England  as  tacit 
acquiescence  without,  however,  affording  absolute  assurance. 

British  neutrality,  accordingly,  was  to  'be  limited  to  the 
European  phase  of  the  impending  conflict.3  Should  it  as- 
sume an  American  phase,  new  issues  —  commercial  advant- 
age and  imperialism  —  would  appear  so  prominently  as  to 
overshadow  the  political  issue  of  its  European  phase.  These 
new  issues  would  make  it  not  only  more  possible,  but  desir- 
able and  necessary,  for  Great  Britain  to  enter  the  war  in 
opposition  to  France,  because  the  relation  of  these  issues  to 
the  vital  interests  of  Great  Britain  was  far  more  immediate 
than  was  the  political  issue  of  liberalism  v.  conservatism  in 
Spain,  or  the  policy  of  intervention  in  European  states,  so 
long  as  the  balance  of  power  was  maintained. 

The  decision  of  the  British  government  to  pursue  a  policy 
of  neutrality  in  the  Franco- Spanish  war  was  based  very 
largely  upon  the  fact  of  its  being  a  land  war.4  But  should 
the  war  be  extended  into  South  America,  Great  Britain 
could  enter  it  on  the  side  of  the  Spanish  colonies  to  greater 
advantage.  The  war  would  then  become  a  maritime  war, 
and  the  full  strength  of  the  British  navy  could  be  employed 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  pp.  18-19. 

*F.  O.,  France,  January- April,  1823,  Canning  to  Stuart,  31  March, 
18123,  no.  29;  Hansard,  Parl.  Debates,  (n.  s.),  vol.  viii,  p.  891;  Staple- 
ton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  pp.  18  et  seq. 

8  The  Morning  Post,  16  April,  1823, 

4  Stapleton,  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  86,  Memoran- 
dum, February,  1823. 


INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  ji 

against  France  and  her  allies,  should  they  participate  actively. 
Canning  realized  fully  the  naval  superiority  of  his  country, 
and  determined  to  use  it,  should  France  attempt  to  interfere 
in  South  America.1 

It  so  happened  that  Great  Britain  was  weak  where  France 
was  strong  and  strong  where  France  was  weak.  The  latter, 
knowing  British  naval  power,  was  not  likely  alone  to  attack 
the  nascent  states  of  South  America  so  long  as  such  an  at- 
tack would  surely  invite  the  armed  opposition  of  Great 
Britain.2  Therefore,  whatever  advantages  Great  Britain 
saw  for  herself  in  the  independence  of  the  Spanish- American 
colonies  could  be  gained  rather  through  a  policy  of  neutrality 
in  the  Franco- Spanish  war  than  by  active  participation  with 
doubtful  chances  of  success. 

A  most  powerful  consideration  with  Canning  in  his  deter- 
mination not  to  remain  neutral  should  France,  singly  or 
together  with  her  allies,  attack  Spanish  America,  was  un- 
doubtedly his  knowledge  of  the  Latin-American  policy  of 
the  United  States.  The  interest  which  this  country  had 
for  a  long  time  manifested  in  the  South  American  in- 
dependence movement,  the  expressed  desire  of  the  United 
States  in  1818  for  Anglo-American  cooperation,3  the 
contempt  of  the  United  States  for  the  reactionary  poli- 
tical system  of  Europe,  and  the  fact  that  the  government  of 
the  United  States  had  in  1822  extended  recognition  to  the 
new  states  of  South  America  constituted  sufficient  indication 
of  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  towards  European  in- 
tervention in  South  America.  Canning  must  thereby  have 
been  convinced  of  the  readiness  of  this  country  to  cooperate 

1  Stapleton,  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  86. 

2  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  389. 

3  Castlereagh,  Correspondence,  vol.  xi,  p.  458,  Bagot's  Report  of  In- 
terviews with  Adams. 


72  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [j2 

with  Great  Britain  against  such  interference.  Although 
still  withholding  recognition  of  the  new  South  American 
states,  Canning  in  a  memorandum  of  15  November,  1822, 
commended  the  action  of  the  United  States  government  in 
extending  recognition  to  them : 

It  is  not  intended  to  hold  out  the  example  of  the  United 
States  as  recommending  a  decision  to  which  their  very  origin 
must  necessarily  have  inclined  them  with  so  strong  a  bias; 
but  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  the  United  State  government 
....  pursues  upon  the  whole  a  more  straightforward  course, 
and  presents  itself  before  the  world  in  a  more  intelligible  posi- 
tion, than  Great  Britain  forbearing  for  the  sake  of  Spain  to 
acknowledge  the  separate  existence  of  her  colonies.1 

While  the  British  government  pursued  a  neutral  policy  in 
the  Franco-Spanish  war,  the  press  and  the  public  voiced 
their  indignation  against  the  invasion  of  Spain;  and  had 
Canning  decided  in  favor  of  defending  the  Constitution- 
alists of  Spain,  he  would  certainly  have  had  the  support  of 
the  English  nation.  The  London  Times  commented  signi- 
ficantly on  the  policy  of  the  Alliance  as  being  contradictory, 
of  human  rights :  "  Those  three  or  four  unhappy  men  who 
have  separated  themselves  from  the  rest  of  the  species,  and 
call  themselves  '  Holy ',  employ  every  day  some  new  engine 
of  their  '  policy '  against  those  rights  which  a  wiser  policy 
would  teach  them  that  it  is  their  first  interest  to  foster." 
Like  the  Times,  the  Examiner  considered  the  principles  of 
the  Alliance  as  "  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  freedom 
in  any  portion  of  Europe."  3  The  conclusion  to  which  a 
study  of  Canning's  opposition  to  the  French  invasion  of 

1  Stapleton,  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  51. 
8  The  London  Times,  8  February,  1823. 
•The  Examiner,  9  November,  1823. 


73]  INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  73 

Spain  inevitably  leads  is  that  he  based  that  opposition  upon 
his  policy  of  non-intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  an 
independent  state.  The  press,  on  the  other  hand,  empha- 
sized the  anti-liberal  character  of  the  policy  of  the  Alliance. 
Instance  the  liberal  tone  of  the  following  editorial  note  : 

The  effect  produced  on  all  classes  in  this  country  by  the 
meditated  and  wanton  attack  on  the  liberties  of  Spain  and 
Portugal,  is  worthy  of  the  nation,  and  we  are  glad  to  find,' 
that  the  discussions  at  the  opening  of  the  Parliament,  on  this 
interesting  subject,  have,  if  possible,  heightened  that  indigna- 
tion which  already  glowed  in  the  hearts  of  our  country-men.1 

The  Examiner  thought  that  Canning  had  not  gone  suffi- 
ciently far  in  his  protest  against  the  policy  of  the  Alliance, 
and  was  severely  critical  of  his  failure  to  aid  the  liberal 
cause  in  Spain.  It  deplored  the  fact  that  while  Spain  was 
being  conquered,  England  looked  on  "  in  silence  and  in- 
action." While  in  1808  England  had  employed  her  armies 
and  fleets  at  great  expense  "  to  rescue  Spain  from  the  grasp 
of  France,  in  1823  England  stirs  not  a  finger,  nor  utters  a 
syllable  to  save  Spain  from  conquest  by  French  armies."  3 
The  liberalism  of  Canning  had  become  "  cramped  and  offi- 
cialized." * 

The  people  of  Great  Britain  not  only  sympathized  with 
the  cause  of  Spanish  liberty,  but  they  actively  aided  that 
cause  by  means  of  popular  subscriptions  5  and  public  meet- 
ings.6 On  4  June,  1823,  a  group  of  about  fifty  representa- 

1  The  Morning  Chronicle,  10  February,  1823. 
*  The  Examiner,  9  November,  1823. 


*  Ibid.,  4  January,  1824. 

*  The  Morning  Chronicle,  28  May,  1823;  F.  0.,  France,  MaynDecember, 
1823,  Canning  to  Stuart,  8  July,  1823,  no.  54. 

*  The  Morning  Chronicle,  3  June,  1823. 


74  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [74 

tive  citizens  petitioned  the  Lord  Mayor  of  London  to  con- 
vene a  court  of  the  Common  Council  for  the  purpose  of 
considering  the  practicability  of  making  a  contribution  out 
of  the  city  funds  for  the  cause  of  Spanish  independence. 
The  purpose  of  this  contribution  was  to  "  assist  them  to 
triumph  effectually  over  the  unprincipled  invasion  of  their 
country  by  the  ambitious  and  wicked  Bourbon  Government 
of  France;  which  invasion  not  only  militates  against  the 
principles  of  the  British  Constitution,  but  the  very  existence 
of  Civil  Society."  A  public  subscription  was  opened  on 
13  June,  1823.  At  the  same  time  the  Bourbons  tried  to 
raise  money  in  England,  but  the  unpopularity  of  their 
"  wicked  designs  "  was  evidenced  by  the  failure  of  their 
attempt.2  The  Alliance  was  becoming  the  object  not  only 
of  the  criticism  of  serious-minded  statesmen  3  and  journal- 
ists, but  likewise  of  the  ridicule  of  poetic  wit,  instanced  by 
the  following  "  Hymn  to  the  Holy  Alliance  "  :  , 

"  Hurrah !  Hurrah !  for  the  Kings  of  the  earth, 
<Let  us  worship  the  Holy  Alliance, 
For  the  Royal  Millennium  will  shortly  have  birth, 
And  the  Monarchs  may  hurl  a  defiance 
To  'Liberals,  Patriots,  Sages,  and  all 
Who  would  Tyrants  control,  and  the  world  disenthrall."  4 

Although  the  British  people  would  readily  have  gone  to 
war  in  defense  of  Spanish  liberty,  the  wisdom  of  the  govern- 
ment's policy  was  soon  confirmed.5  Only  a  minority  of  the 
Spanish  people  favored  the  constitution,6  while  a  large  num- 

3  The  Morning  Chronicle,  6  June,  1823. 

•  Ibid.,  5  July,  1823. 

'Hansard,  Parl.  Debates,  (n.  s.)>  vol.  viii,  p.  774. 

*  The  Morning  Chronicle,  7  November,  1823. 

6  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  460-461. 


75]  INTERVENTION  IN  SPAIN  75 

her  of  Spaniards  actually  welcomed  the  French  invaders,1^ 
and  the  bulk  of  the  nation  were  indifferent  to  the  issue  of 
the  struggle.2  Under  such  circumstances  France  had  every 
chance  of  success.  On  i  November,  1823,  the  war  ended 
by  the  surrender  of  Barcelona  to  the  Royalists.  France  was 
victorious.  Ferdinand  was  restored  by  her  aid.  England 
was  an  interested  observer,  but  ready  and  determined  to 
prevent  the  French  from  gaining  any  part  of  Spanish 
America,  or  from  making  any  attempt  to  restore  the  loyalty 
of  the  Spanish  colonies  to  Ferdinand  VII,  under  cover  of 
the  doctrine  of  intervention. 

1  F.  O.,  France,  April,  1823,  Stuart  to  Canning,  n  April,  1823,  no.  144; 
Chapman  (C.  K),  A  History  of  Spain,  (New  York,  1918),  p.  497. 

2F.  O.,  Spain,  September-December,  1822,  William  a  Court  to  Canning, 
7  October,  1822,  no.  10. 


CHAPTER  IV 
BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA 

IN  a  letter,  dated  31  March,  1823,  to  Sir  Charles  Stuart, 
British  ambassador  at  Paris,  Canning  had  declared  it  as 
his  opinion  that  "  time  and  the  course  of  events  appear  to 
have  substantially  decided  their  [the  Spanish  colonies  in 
America]  separation  from  the  mother  country,"  disclaim- 
ing any  intention  to  appropriate  "  the  smallest  portion  of 
the  late  Spanish  possessions  *in  America,"  and  that  he  was 
satisfied  that  France  would  not  seek  to  acquire  any  part 
of  them  "  either  by  conquest,  or  by  cession,  from  Spain." 
The  statement  contains  the  announcement  of  British  policy 
from  which  one  necessarily  concludes  that,  in  the  event  of 
French  success  in  Spain,  France  must  neither  carry  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Alliance  beyond  the  Atlantic  by  force  of  arms, 
nor  seek  compensation  for  her  efforts  by  sharing  with 
Spain  the  latter's  American  empire.  What  were  the  prin- 
ciples, the  aims  or  the  motives  upon  which  that  policy  was 
based?  In  the  answer  to  this  question  we  may  expect  to 
find  the  chief  reasons  for  Britain's  interest  in  South 
America,  for  her  opposition  to  the  extension  of  French 
influence  thither,  and  for  Canning's  desire  for  a  joint  Anglo- 
American  declaration  as  a  "  counterblast  "  to  the  machi- 
nations and  designs  of  the  Alliance. 

Among  the  great  states  of  Europe  Great  Britain  was 
politically  the  most  liberal.     The  revolutionary  origin  of 

1  Parliamentary  Papers,  ( 1823) ,  vol.  xix,  pp.  59-60,  Canning  to  Stuart, 
31  March,  1823;  F.  0.,  France,  January-April,  1823. 

76  [76 


77]  BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  77 

her  constitution  and  the  fact  of  parliamentary  supremacy 
might  suggest  the  possibility  of  a  sympathetic  attitude  to- 
ward movements  of  political  reform  everywhere.  j 

Great  Britain  had  definitely  taken  her  stand  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  doctrine  of  intervention,  both  because  her  gov- 
ernment  deemed  that  policy  contrary  to  the  treaties  of 
1815,  and  because  its  pursuit  involved  undue  interference 
with  the  internal  affairs  of  an  independent  country.  To 
be  consistent  in  her  attitude  toward  that  policy  as  well  as 
true  to  her  own  view  of  the  status  of  the  Spanish- American 
colonies  as  expressed  in  Canning's  letter  to  Stuart  (31' 
March,  1823),  Great  Britain  must  oppose  any  attempt  of 
the  Alliance  to  intervene  in  South  America. 

Great  Britain  was  the  home  of  the  Industrial  Revolution. 
There  it  had  reached  a  higher  development  than  anywhere 
else.  Britain's  insular  position  made  her  a  maritime  state. 
Her  economic  interests  were,  therefore,  primarily  com- 
mercial.1 During  the  eighteenth  century  British  manufac- 
tures  had  depended  largely  on  the  continental  market;  but 
conditions  resulting  from  the  Napoleonic  wars  caused  a 
partial  loss  of  that  market  for  English  goods.2  The  con- 
tinental nations  were  suffering  from  the  decline  of  their 
purchasing  power  through  impoverishment.3  They  also  were 
endeavoring  to  build  up  their  own  industries  by  means  of 
protective  tariffs.4  Conditions  had  changed  considerably 
within  a  period  of  fifteen  years.  As  a  result  of  the  Peace 
of  Amiens,  March,  1802,  the  total  value  of  British  exports 
to  the  continental  states  increased  from  £17,367,218  in 

1  Mahan,  op.  cit.,  p.  28. 

2iLevi  (OL.),  History  of  British  Commerce,  ('London,  1880),  p.  149. 

3 Ibid.',  Cunningham  (:W.),  The  Growth  of  English  Industry  and  Com- 
merce in  Modern  Times,  (Cambridge,  1892),  p.  591. 

4  Ibid.',  Levi,  op.  cit.,  p.  152. 


7S  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [78 

1801  to  £22,061,356  in  I8O2,1  which  was  somewhat  in  pro- 
portion to  the  rate  of  increase  of  the  total  British  exports 
to  all  the  markets  of  the  world  within  the  same  period,  from 
£39,730,659  in  1 80 1  to  £45,102,330  in  1802. 2  The  re- 
sumption of  war  in  1803  caused  a  decline  of  British  exports 
to  the  continent,  while  the  colonial  trade  increased.3  When 
finally  Napoleon  had  been  defeated,  and  peace  had  again 
been  declared,  England  failed  to  recover  the  continental 
market  as  quickly  as  in  1802,  for  reasons  already  stated.* 
In  1814  her  exports  to  the  continental  market  amounted 
to  £32,617,289;  but  in  1819  they  had  declined  to  £23,013,- 
226  and  reached  a  total  of  only  £24,995,268  in  1822.* 
The  total  British  exports  were  similarly  affected:  £45,494,- 
219  in  1814;  £35,208,321  in  1819;  and  £36,968,964  in 

I822.6 

Meanwhile  British  goods  were  similarly  affected  in  the 
markets  of  the  United  States.  The  amount  of  British 
imports  into  the  United  States  actually  increased  after  the 
War  of  Independence,7  and  about  one-third  of  the  total 
British  exports  during  the  three  years  of  1805-1807  were  to 
the  United  States.8  As  the  result  of  Orders  in  Council, 
and  of  the  Embargo  and  Non-Intercourse  Acts,  the  greater 
part  of  this  trade  was  lost.  The  American  tendency  toward 

1  Marshall,  op.  cit.,  pt.  iii,  pp.  71-75. 

2  Porter  (G.  JR.),  The  Progress  of  the  Nation,  (London,  1838),  vol. 
ii,  p.  98. 

3  Marshall,  op.  cit.,  pt.  iii,  pp.  74-75. 

4  Supra,  p.  77. 

5  Marshall,  op.  cit.,  pt.  iii,  pp.  71-75. 

6  Porter,  op.  cit.,  p.  98. 

7  Cunningham,  op.  cit.,  p.  512;  Marshall,  op.  cit.,  pt.  iii,  pp.  71-75. 

8  Cunningham,  op.  cit.,  p.  519;  Porter,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  145;  Bogart, 
(E.  L.),   The  Economic  History  of  the   United  States,   (New  York, 
1913),  P-  156. 


79]  BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  79 

economic  independence,  fostered  by  the  War  of  1812,  in- 
augurated a  period  of  rapid  industrial  development  which 
was  destined  to  make  this  country  less  dependent  upon 
British  manufactures.  When,  therefore,  at  the  close  of  the 
War  of  1812,  Great  Britain  threatened  to  prevent  the  suc- 
cessful development  of  our  industries  by  flooding  the  Ameri- 
can market  with  British  goods,  economic  interest,  combined 
with  patriotism,  influenced  Congress  to  pass  the  protective 
tariff  of  1816.  The  effect  was  immediate  upon  the  volume 
of  British  exports  to  this  country.  They  dropped  from 
£11,936,501  in  1815  to  £7,801,062  in  the  following  year," 
and  to  £3,920,262  in  1820,*  for  which  the  crisis  of  1819 
was  partly  responsible.2 

It  was  thus  that  a  combination  of  circumstances,  some 
the  effects  of  war,  others  due  to  the  deliberate  efforts  of 
nations  to  develop  their  own  resources  in  order  to  render 
themselves  economically  more  independent,  reacted  against 
the  British  export  trade  for  at  least  a  decade  following  the 
close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars.  The  average  annual  value  of 
British  exports  for  the  ten  years  1811-1820  hardly  exceeded 
that  of  the  period  i8oi-i8io.3 

This  decline  of  the  export  trade  was  felt  the  more 
severely  in  England  because  of  her  improved  methods  of 
production,  resulting  in  the  accumulation  of  large  stocks.* 
Loss  of  markets  compelled  the  manufacturers  to  reduce  *^ 
production,  resulting  in  unemployment  and  low  wages 6 
especially  in  the  textile  industry.6  England  now  felt  the 

1  Marshall,  op.  cit.,  pt.  iii,  p.  74. 

"Dewey  (D.  R.),  Financial  History  of  the  United  States,  (New  York, 

,  P-  166;  Bogart,  op.  cit.,  p.  239. 
•Porter,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  100;  Levi,  op.  cit.,  p.  151. 
*  Cunningham,  op.  cit.,  p.  508. 
6  Levi,  op.  cit.,  p.  149. 
6  Porter,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  252-253. 


go  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [go 

need  of  adopting  a  policy  of  greater  freedom  of  trade ; x 
and  the  relaxation  of  the  navigation  laws  in  1822  2  pro- 
moted commerce  with  Latin  America.3 

The  growth  of  the  South  American  market  would  com- 
pensate in  a  large  measure  for  the  loss  of  the  markets  else- 
where. Indeed,  the  motives  which  had  determined  British 
policy  relative  to  Spanish  America  ever  since  1702  had  been 
chiefly  those  of  trade.4  In  1823  her  chief  interest  in  South 
America  was  still  commercial,5  only  far  greater  than  it  had 
ever  been  before,  because  of  the  decline  of  the  continental 
market  in  Europe  and  the  development  of  favorable  trade 
relations  with  Latin  America  during  the  war  period.  It 
was  in  order  to  continue  these  favorable  trade  relations 
that  the  British  government  was  led  to  resist  allied  interven- 
tion in  the  former  American  colonies  of  Spain.6  It  was 
the  thought  of  the  commercial  interests  of  his  country  in 
Latin  America  which  caused  Canning  to  say  in  a  letter  to 
Wellington  that  "  in  the  present  state  of  the  world,  of  the 
peninsula,  of  the  country,  the  American  questions  are  out 
of  all  proportion  more  important  than  the  European,  and 
if  we  do  not  seize  and  turn  them  to  our  advantage  in  time 
we  shall  rue  the  loss  of  an  opportunity  never  to  be  re- 
covered." 7 

The  period  of  the  Napoleonic  wars  and  the  succeeding1 

1  Page  (W.),  Commerce  and  Industry,  (-London,  1919),  pp.  19  et  seq. 

3  Levi,  op.  cit.,  pp.  160,  166. 

•Page,  op.  tit.,  pp.  53  et  seq;  Hansard,  Parl.  Debates,  (n.  s.),  vol. 
xiv,  p.  773 ;  ibid.,  p.  69. 

4  Camb.  Mod.  Hist.,  vol.  x,  p.  308. 

•  Parliamentary  Papers,    (1882),   vol.   Ixxx,   p.  88,   Frelinghuysen  to 
Lowell,  8  May,  1882;  Reddaway,  op.  cit.,  pp.  21,  23. 

6  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  p.  313;  North  American  Review,  vol.  clxxvi,  p. 
192. 

*  Wellington,  Despatches,  vol.  i,  pp.  637  et  seq.,  Canning  to  Wellington, 
8  November,  1822. 


BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  gl 

disorder  in  Spain  had  been  especially  favorable  for  the 
expansion  of  British  commerce  in  South  America.1  Char- 
acteristic of  the  restrictive  and  exclusive  colonial  system 
of  European  countries  in  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth 
centuries,  the  Spanish  government  tried  to  monopolize  all 
trade  with  the  colonies  to  the  exclusion  of  all  other  nations ;  * 
while  Canning's  first  concern  was  to  promote  and  protect 
British  trade  with  Spanish  America.3  During  the  eigh- 
teenth century  the  Spanish  policy  of  colonial  trade 
monopoly  was  somewhat  compromised,  partly  through  the 
influence  of  foreign  residents  in  the  colonies,  and  partly 
through  a  deliberate  policy  of  the  government.4  As  early 
as  1713,  at  the  close  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession, 
Spain  granted  to  England  in  the  Asiento  Treaty:  (a)  the 
monopoly  of  the  slave  trade  with  Spanish  America  for  a 
period  of  thirty  years;5  (b)  the  right  to  bring  annually 
to  Porto  Bello  500  tons  of  merchandise.*  While  the  con- 
science of  the  civilized  world  was  soon  to  render  the  slave 
trade  monopoly  of  diminishing  importance,  the  second  trade 
privilege  was  destined  to  grow  more  and  more  profitable 
and  to  affect  within  the  century  the  attitude  of  England  to- 
ward the  whole  Spanish  colonial  system.  English  mer- 
chants shipped  many  times  500  tons  of  merchandise  every 
year,7  thus  violating  the  terms  of  the  Asiento  Treaty,  a  cir- 
cumstance which  helped  to  bring  on  the  War  of  Jenkins' 
Ear  in  1739.  But  at  the  close  of  the  war  the  treaty  was 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  to. 

2  Latane,  op.  cit.,  pp.  6  et  seq. 

*  Temperley,  op.  cit.,  p.  177. 

4  Chapman,  op.  cit.,  p.  458. 

5  Hill  (D.  J.),  A  History  of  E*rofieo»  Diplomacy,  (New  York,  1914), 
vol.  iii,  pp.  333. 

•Ibid. 

*  Latane,  op.  cit.,  p.  14. 


82  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [82 

renewed  for  a  period  of  four  years.  Other  European 
nations  entered  the  field  of  South  American  trade  in  de- 
fiance of  Spanish  prohibitions.1  Thus  the  taste  of  the 
South  Americans  for  the  products  of  a  wider  civiliza- 
tion was  stimulated ; 2  and  the  Spanish  colonists  grew  cor- 
respondingly impatient  with  the  trade  restriction  of  their 
mother  country.  They  were,  therefore,  as  likely  to  welcome 
freedom  of  trade  as  the  European  states  which  coveted  the 
opportunities  of  the  South  American  market. 

A  new  Anglo-Spanish  trade  agreement  was  made  in  1810, 
when  the  Spanish  government  granted  permission  to  Great 
Britain  to  trade  with  the  Spanish-American  colonies  in  re- 
turn for  mediation  between  Spain  and  the  colonies.3  Al- 
though the  Spanish  government  decided  not  to  employ 
British  mediation,  Great  Britain  nevertheless  insisted  upon 
the  continuation  of  that  commercial  intercourse,4  not  find- 
ing it  "  practicable  to  withdraw  commercial  capital  once 
embarked  in  Spanish  America."  5 

According  to  Castlereagh's  instructions  to  the  British 
plenipotentiary  at  the  Congress  of  Verona,  he  was  to  call 
the  attention  of  the  congress  "  to  the  intercourse  which,  for 
a  long  period  of  years,  has  subsisted  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  Provinces  of  Spain  in  America,  .  .  .  and  the  im- 
possibility of  its  being  obstructed  or  checked,  without  the 
certainty  of  rousing  the  utmost  spirit  of  discontent  in  the 
commercial  world."  6  Such  instructions  compel  the  con- 

lHall  (B.) , Extracts  from  a  Journal  Written  on  the  Coasts  of  Chili, 
Peru,  and  Mexico,  (Philadelphia,  1824),  vol.  i,  p.  253. 
*Ibid. 

8  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  xi,  p.  51. 
*lbid. 

5 Ibid.',  F.  O.,  South  America,  1822-1823,  Communications  with  France 
and  Spain  relating  to  the  Spanish- American  colonies,  no.  I. 

6F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  September-December,  1822,  Castlereagh, 
Memorandum;  cf.  ibid.,  September-October,  1822,  Wellington  to  Cann- 
ing, 21  September,  1822,  no.  3. 


BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  83 

elusion  that  when,  at  the  Congress  of  Verona,  the  British 
government  would  not  surrender  its  "  independent  discre- 
tion to  act  according  to  circumstances/'  L  the  desire  td 
satisfy  the  commercial  interests  constituted  a  dominant 
motive  of  its  policy. 

So  great  had  grown  the  volume  of  British  trade  with 
Spanish  America  during  the  Napoleonic  period  that  Spain 
felt  it  necessary  to  induce  the  British  government  to  main- 
tain a  policy  of  neutrality  between  Spain  and  her  colonies, 
fearing  that  otherwise  commercial  motives  might  induce 
Great  Britain  to  support  the  cause  of  South  American  in- 
dependence.2  It  was  understood,  however,  that  the  main- 
tenance of  strict  neutrality  should  in  no  way  imply  a  pro-  i 
hibition  of  commercial  intercourse  between  Great  Britain 
and  the  Spanish  colonies.3  Anglo-Spanish  treaty  relations 
seemed,  therefore,  to  assure  the  continuance  of  British  trade 
with  Spanish  America.  But  should  France  or  the  Alliance 
interfere,  a  great  part  of  that  trade  might  pass  into  the 
hands  of  France.  It  was  that  which  Canning  was  deter- 
mined to  prevent.4 

An  idea  of  the  value  and  growth  of  England's  South 
American  trade  during  the  period  in  question  is  afforded 
by  the  following  statistics. 

Official  annual  value  of  the  exports  from  Great  Britain  to 
the  Spanish  colonies  on  the  continent  of  America  from  1807 
to  1815: 

•  » F.  &.,  Continent,  Verona,  September-December,  1822,  Castlereagh, 
Memorandum. 

*  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  10. 
•Ibid.,  p.  ii. 

4  Bigelow,  (J.),  American  Policy,  (New  York,  1914),  pp.  44-45; 
Tower  (C),  Essays,  Political  and  Historical  (Philadelphia,  1914),  p.  15. 


84  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [84 

Year  Value 

1807  .................  .......  £407,146 

1808  ........................  621,178 

1809  ........................  328,771 

1810  ........................  473,921 

1811  ........................  215,879 

1812  ........................  500,651 

1813  ........................  -  * 

1814  ........................  558,866 

1815  ........................ 


A  comparison  of  the  above  figures  with  those  of  the  British 
exports  to  the  same  market  from  1822  to  1827  will  reveal  a 
most  astonishing  increase  in  the  annual  value  of  that  trade  :  * 

Year  Value 

1822  ......................  £3,990,344  , 

1823  ......................  5,802,437 

1824  ......................  7,857,6io 

1825  ......................  8,682,163 

1826  ......................  4,531,094 

1827  ......................  6,602,163 

British  imports  for  the  same  period  inclined  toward  greater 
uniformity  in  their  annual  value.  At  the  same  time  the  value 
of  the  imports  was  far  less  than  that  of  the  exports,  the  balance 
of  trade  remaining  throughout  strongly  in  favor  of  Great 
Britain.  The  reason  for  this  is  found  in  the  industrial  in- 
equality of  England  and  South  America. 

British  imports  from  the  states  of  South  America  and 
Mexico  from  1822  to  1827:  3 

Year  Value 

1822  ......................  £1,541,218 

1823  ......................  1,733,803 

1824  ......................  2,084,916 

1825  ......................  2,630,408 

1826  ......................  1,263,650 

1827  .  .  ....................  1,752,461 

1  Records  destroyed  by  fire. 

•  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1828),  vol.  xtx,  p.  479. 

•  Ibid. 


35]  BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  85 

The  figures  given  above  reveal  two  very  significant  facts. 
In  the  first  place,  the  average  annual  value  of  British  ex- 
ports to  Spanish  America,  not  including  Cuba,  from  i8o/ 
to  1814  was  only  £443,773;  while  during  the  period  from 
1822  to  1827,  their  annual  value  amounted  to  £6,244,333. 
Secondly,  the  average  annual  value  of  the  exports  during 
the  three  years  immediately  preceding  recognition  of  the 
South  American  states  was  £5,883,397,  while  the  imports 
reached  an  average  annual  value  of  £1,786,646  for  the  same 
period.  The  average  annual  value  of  this  trade  for  the 
period  of  three  years  immediately  following  the  extension 
of  recognition  was,  of  exports,  £6,605,269,  and  of  imports, 
£1,882,173. 

These  figures  show  that  during  the  period  from  the 
treaties  of  Paris  and  Vienna  to  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco- 
Spanish  war  in  1823,  British  commerce  with  Spanish 
America  had  increased  enormously.  To  the  extent,  there- 
fore, that  the  interest  of  Great  Britain  in  the  fortunes  of 
Spanish  America  was  guided  by  economic  motives,  that  in- 
terest was  far  greater  in  1823  than  it  had  been  previous 
to  the  Treaty  of  Vienna.  At  the  same  time  that  Britain's 
commercial  intercourse  with  Spanish  America  was  becom- 
ing increasingly  valuable,  the  Alliance  was  becoming  in- 
creasingly insistent  upon  the  execution  of  their  policy  of 
intervention.  From  these  two  circumstances  one  can  easily 
understand  the  withdrawal  of  Great  Britain  from  the 
Alliance,  and  her  determination  to  use  force,  if  necessary, 
to  oppose  intervention  in  South  America. 

A  comparison  of  the  value  of  British  trade  with  Spanish 
America  during  the  three  years  immediately  preceding  her 
recognition  of  some  of  the  new  states,  with  the  value  of 
that  trade  during  the  three  years  following  upon  recogni- 
tion, reveals  the  interesting  fact  that  the  value  of  the  trade 
during  the  latter  period  is  only  slightly  greater  than  it  was 


86  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [86 

during  the  former  period.  The  conclusion  is  thereby 
forced  upon  us  that  the  extension  of  recognition  to  the  new 
states  was  not  compelled  by  any  immediate  economic  neces- 
sity, since  a  normal  volume  of  South  American  trade  was 
already  in  the  hands  of  Great  Britain.1  Recognition,  then, 
made  no  immediate  difference  in  the  volume  of  that  trade; 
but  recognition  of  the  new  states  by  Great  Britain  was  none 
the  less  desirable  in  British  trade  circles,  lest  the  United 
States  should  presently  gain  a  position  of  preference  with 
those  states.2 

The  inevitable  post-war  agitation  for  the  extension  of 
markets  and  for  governmental  encouragement  of  commerce 
took  place  in  Great  Britain  soon  after  the  close  of  the 
Napoleonic  wars.3  Great  Britain  was  then  in  a  peculiarly 
favorable  position  to  satisfy  the  markets  of  the  world  because 
of  her  industrial  development.  But  her  merchants  suspected 
rivalry  from  France 4  and  the  United  States  5  in  the  markets 
of  South  America;  and  consequently,  it  was  to  the  South 
American  markets  which  British  traders  gave  their  closest 
attention. 

Strong  pressure  was  brought  upon  the  government  by 
the  mercantile  class  of  England  for  the  improvement  of 
commercial  facilities  in  general  during  the  decade  following 
the  Napoleonic  wars.  The  substance  of  a  petition  presented 
by  the  merchants  of  London  to  the  House  of  Commons  in 
i82O,6  was  a  demand  for  the  removal  of  restrictions  on 
foreign  trade  and  for  its  improvement  by  various  means.7 

irThe  London  Times,  n  November,  1823. 
2  Ibid.,  12  September,  1823. 
9  Annual  Register,  vol.  Ixii,  pp.  770  et  seq. 
4  The  London  Times,  25  November,  1823. 
6  Ibid.,  14  September,  1822. 

*  Porter,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  152-156;  Annual  Register,  vol.  Ixii,  pp.  773 
et  seq. 

1 1bid.,  pp.  770  et  seq. 


BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  g; 

A  committee  of  Parliament  was  appointed  to  consider  "  the 
means  of  maintaining  and  improving  the  foreign  trade  of 
the  country."  *  In  its  report  the  removal  of  trade  restric- 
tions was  recommended.2  At  the  same  time  an  attempt  was 
made  to  clarify  and  make  more  uniform  the  commercial  laws 
of  the  country.3 

In  an  article  on  South  America  in  Bell's  Weekly  Messen- 
ger* the  commercial  importance  of  South  America  was 
heavily  stressed.  In  fact,  it  was  the  first  of  a  series  of 
articles  aiming  to  acquaint  Englishmen  with  those  countries 
and  with  their  commercial  value  to  England :  "  As  to  her 
particular  importance  to  the  merchants  and  manufacturers 
of  Great  Britain,  it  may  here  be  generally  observed,  that 
the  greatest  nation  in  the  world  must  necessarily  derive  the 
greatest  benefit  from  the  creation  of  a  new  market."  5 

In  a  petition  of  London  merchants  to  the  Board  of  Ad- 
miralty  in  September,  1822,  it  was  pointed  out  that: 

(a)  The  volume  of  the  South  American  trade  had  vastly 
increased. 

(b)  The  protection  afforded  American  shipping  by  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  would  give  the  American  citizens 
the  precedence  in  markets  which  Great  Britain  would  conse- 
quently lose. 

(c)  Convoy  for  British  merchant  vessels  ought,  therefore, 
to  be  provided.6 

On  21  July,  1823,  twenty-one  representative  merchants 
of  London  petitioned  Canning  to  appoint  commercial  agents 
to  the  various  states  of  South  America,  so  as  to  place) 

1  Porter,  op.  cit.f  pp.  773  et  seq. 

2  Ibid.;  Parliamentary  Papers,  (i&2O),  vol.  ii,  pp.  367  et  seq. 

*  Annual  Register,  vol.  Ixiii,  p.  77. 

4  23  December,  1821. 

5  Ibid. 

*  The  London  Times,  14  September,  1822. 


88  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [88 

British  commercial  interests  in  those  countries  on  the  same 
footing  as  the  interests  of  the  nations  which  had  already 
appointed  official  commercial  repsesentatives.  The  British, 
they  asserted,  had  already  some  eighty  establishments  in 
various  parts  of  South  America,  and  investments  of  several 
millions  sterling.1  It  seemed  clear  to  the  merchants  that 
their  hopes  of  a  flourishing  commerce  with  the  new  states 
would  go  glimmering  unless  the  government  took  some 
steps  for  its  safety  and  promotion. 

Merchants  and  shipowners  petitioned  the  government  to 
improve  the  political  relations  between  England  and  Latin 
America  in  the  interest  of  commerce.  The  Liverpool  Ship- 
-owners' Association  petitioned  "  The  Lords  of  His  Majesty's 
Most  Honourable  Privy  Council "  that,  in  view  of  the 
increasing  demand  for  British  goods  in  South  America  and 
the  increasing  commerce  with  that  continent,  and  since  those 
colonies  were  practically  independent,  there  might  be  estab- 
lished with  them  such  political  relations  as  would  "  secure 
the  freedom  and  safety  of  our  trade  on  a  permanent  and 
favourable  foundation/' 2  The  merchants  of  the  same 
city  sent  in  a  petition  of  similar  tenor,  supporting  it  with 
the  argument  that  the  abundant  riches  of  South  America, 
its  large  population  of  fifteen  millions,  the  consumption  by 
these  millions  annually  of  £13,000,000  worth  of  European 
manufactures,  and  the  increasing  magnitude  of  British  trade 
with  South  America,  deserved  the  attention  of  the  govern- 
ment, and  pointing  out  that  during  the  years  1820-1821,  and 
to  the  first  week  in  May,  1822,  no  less  than  155  vessels 
cleared  from  British  ports  for  Buenos  Ayres,  Chile,  Peru 
and  Mexico,  and  that  the  British  exports  were  mostly 
woolens,  cotton  and  linen.8 

>F.  O.,  South  America,  1822-1823,  Petition  of  Sundry  British  Mer- 
chants, 21  July,  1823;  the  London  Times,  12  September,  1823. 

3  F.  0.,  South  America,  1822-1823,  Memorial  of  Liverpool  Shipowi»ers' 
Association,  9  May,  1822. 

*Ibid.f  Memorial  of  the  Liverpool  Merchants,  June,  1822. 


89]          BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  89 

In  another  petition  from  the  merchants  and  shipowners, 
jointly,  it  was  argued  that  the  establishment  of  favorable 
political  relations  with  the  new  South  American  states  was 
rendered  the  more  urgent  by  the  announced  intention  of  some 
of  those  states,  notably  Colombia,  to  allow  commercial  pri- 
vileges in  the  order  of  recognition.1 

From  the  manufacturing  city  of  Glasgow  came  another 
petition  signed  by  sixty-one  representative  merchants  and 
manufacturers.  They  declared  that  "  the  commercial  in- 
terests of  the  United  Kingdom,  in  all  their  most  important 
branches,"  were  most  "  materially  affected  by  the  state  of 
the  intercourse  with  that  interesting  part  of  the  Globe  " 
[South  America].  In  order  to  satisfy  their  commercial 
interests  and  in  order  to  promote  "  that  universal  confidence 
necessary  for  commercial  intercourse,"  they  urged  upon 
the  government  the  early  consideration  of  the  recognition 
of  South  American  independence.2 

The  Manchester  Chamber  of  Commerce,  in  its  petition, 
pointed  to  the  increasing  volume  of  trade  with  South 
America  as  justifying  the  appointment  of  consular  agents; 3 
to  which  Canning  replied  that  the  matter  was  under  con- 
sideration.4 The  Belfast  Chamber  of  Commerce  not  only 
requested  the  appointment  of  consuls  in  the  several  ports  of 
South  America,  but  also  urged  the  government  to  acknow- 
ledge the  independence  of  the  new  states.5 

That  the  merchant  class  of  Great  Britain  feared  the  com- 

1  P.  O.,  South  America,  1822-1823,  Memorial  of  Merchants  and  Ship- 
owners of  Liverpool,  July,  1822. 

f  Ibid.,  Memorial  of  Merchants  and  Manufacturers  of  the  City  of 
Glasgow,  1822. 

*Ibid.,  Application  of  the  Manchester  Chamber  of  Commerce  for  the 
Appointment  of  Consuls  in  South  America,  14  August,  1825. 

4  Ibid.,  Canning  to  Stanley,  19  August,  1823. 

*  Ibid.,  Petition  of  Belfast  Chamber  of  Commerce,  26  August,  1823. 


90  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [90 

mercial  rivalry  of  France  is  again  evidenced  by  the  fact  that 
on  22  November,  1823,  a  committee  of  two,  representing 
the  London  merchants,  called  on  Canning  and  Huskisson  to 
find  out  what  was  the  attitude  of  France  relative  to  South 
America.  They  were  told  that  France  did. not  seem  to  have 
any  designs  on  South  America,  and  that  there  was  no  im- 
mediate danger  to  British  commerce  with  the  South  Ameri- 
can states.1  But  the  London  Times  remained  skeptical  as 
to  the  intentions  of  France,  asserting  that  the  French  were 
laying  their  plans  on  American  soil,  where  they  could  not 
be  so  closely  watched  by  their  jealous  European  rivals, 
and  denied  that  France  had  "  any  more  right  to  interfere 
for  the  destruction  of  the  independence  of  New  Spain,  than 
we  have  to  interfere  for  its  protection."  2 

The  London  Times  never  tired  of  giving  vigorous  sup- 
port to  the  claims  of  the  merchant  class,  and  it  was  ablyl 
seconded  by  other  important  papers.  It  pointed  out  that 
the  offer  of  the  Spanish-American  states  to  accord  priority 
of  commercial  advantage  to  foreign  states  in  the  order  in 
which  they  might  extend  recognition,  made  early  recogni- 
tion imperative.8  It  attributed  to  that  offer  "  the  readiness 
with  which  the  North  American  Republic  "  caught  "  at  the 
promised  good,  by  hastening  her  formal  act  of  recognition/' 
and  threatening  "  thus  to  forestall  the  merchants  of  Great 
Britain  in  the  trade  with  South  America."  4  The  difficul- 
ties and  inconveniences  experienced  by  British  merchants 
because  of  having  no  officially  accredited  agents  in  South 
America,  as  well  as  the  large  amount  of  capital  invested  in 
trade  with  that  continent,  demanded  an  early  recognition  of 

1  The  London  Times,  25  November,  1823. 

•  Ibid.,  19  December,  1823. 
*lbid.t  12  September,  1823. 

*  Ibid. 


•gi ]  BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  91 

those  states.1  Immediate  action  seemed  especially  neces- 
sary since  France  was  suspected  of  a  plan  to  intervene  in 
South  America  in  behalf  of  Spain,  and  evidently  to  secure 
from  Spain,  in  compensation  for  her  services,  an  agreement 
"  that  France  should  be  the  favored  nation  in  her  trade 
with  the  Spanish  colonies  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others ;  out 
of  which,  too,  would  grow  the  establishment  of  the  French 
Bourbons  in  complete  supremacy  over  Spain  both  trans- 
marine and  European."  There  must  be  no  union  of 
French  and  Spanish  Bourbons  in  the  nineteenth  century 
any  more  than  in  the  eighteenth. 

A  new  conception  of  the  relation  of  government  and 
business  was  plainly  evident  in  the  pressure  which  the  com- 
mercial element  brought  upon  the  government.  It  was  a 
conception  characteristic  of  the  new  industrial  age ;  namely 
that  the  government  should  confine  its  activities  to  the 
encouragement  of  private  initiative  and  the  protection 
of  private  business.3  The  insistent  demands  that  were 
made  upon  the  British  government  for  recognition  of 
the  new  states  proceeded  from  a  growing  desire  for  the 
government  to  provide  the  opportunities  of  free  and  unre- 
stricted individual  enterprise.  >f  The  mercantile  body  has 
an  indefeasible  claim  upon  the  government,  that  its  fears 
should  be  tranquillized,  its  judgment  guided,  and  its  in- 
terests  in  every  way  protected,"  declared  the  London  Times* 
The  balance  of  power  and  commercial  opportunity  were 
equally  at  stake.  Protection  of  the  former  would  preserve 
the  latter,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  South  American  con- 
tinent. Thus  commerce  and  public  policy  were  conveniently 

1  The  London  Times,  12  September,  1823. 
8  Ibid. 

'Cheyney  (E.  P.),  Industrial  and  Social  History  of  England,  (New- 
York,  1920),  pp.  192  ft  seq. 
4  22  September,  1823. 


A. 

;1 


92  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

interdependent.  The  danger  to  both  seemed  especially  im- 
minent in  the  autumn  of  1823.  The  realization  of  that 
danger  was  reflected  in  the  vigor  of  the  following  editorial 
comment : 

One  security  against  French  officiousness  might  perhaps  be 
an  early  recognition  of  the  South  American  states  by  this 
government.  A  shield  would  thus  be  raised  before  the  new 
republics  upon  which  the  House  of  Bourbon  would  hardly 
dare  to  strike.  .  .  .  Let  meetings  be  held  in  every  part  of 
England,  and  let  the  feelings  of  the  commercial  interest  upon 
every  point  connected  with  maritime  and  colonial  policy  as 
involved  in  the  present  contest,  be  carried  so  strongly  and  dis- 
tinctly to  the  throne,  that  His  Majesty's  Ministers  may  be 
enabled  to  display  a  moral  power  in  arms  against  French 
encroachment,  too  mighty  for  the  House  of  Bourbon  to 
encounter.1 

The  commercial  and  political  freedom  of  South  America 
"concerned  a  British  interest  of  the  highest  order;  for  the 
liberty  of  South  America  and  the  commerce  of  South 
America  are  important  and  precious  to  Great  Britain."  ^ 
The  commerce  of  Great  Britain  with  South  America  was 
considered  "  as  free  and  open  "  to  the  British  in  1823  as 
her  commerce  with  any  independent  European  state.8  Of 
J  so  great  an  advantage,  France  would  have  no  right  to  de- 
prive Great  Britain.4 

About  a  month  before  the  news  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
arrived  in  England,  the  London  Times  expressed  an  edi- 
torial view  that  was  similar  to  the  spirit  and  purpose  of  the 
political  principle  of  that  policy.  In  both  instances  the 

1  The  London  Times,  22  September,  1823. 
*Ibid.t  20  September,  1823. 
*Ibid.,  ii  November,  1823. 


BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA 


93 


independence  of  the  South  American  states  was  insisted 
upon,  and  that  their  independence  must  be  protected  against 
foreign  interference.  But  while  the  United  States  had 
extended  recognition  to  them,  Great  Britain  had  not  yet 
done  so.  It  was  in  urging  British  recognition  of  their  in- 
dependent status  that  the  Times  editor  anticipated  the  poli- 
tical principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  : 

But  without  touching  the  question  of  the  propriety  of  the 
formal  recognition  of  the  independence  of  the  American  states, 
let  us  take  them  simply  as  they  are,  ...  as  independent 
de  facto  .  .  .  and  trade  with  them  in  that  character;  no  one 
can  deny  it  ;  and  that  is  their  present  condition,  and  it  has  been 
effected  by  no  operation,  or  even  mediation,  of  ours:  it  is  the 
work  of  their  own  hands.  "  The  courts  of  the  North,"  it  is 
said,  "  are  about  to  publish  a  non-recognition  of  the  independ- 
ence of  the  American  states."  The  courts  of  the  North  might 
publish  a  non-recognition  of  the  light  of  day,  or  the  darkness 
of  the  night  ;  but  the  fact  that  day  is  light  and  night  dark,  are 
none  the  less  true  ;  neither  can  the  present  separation  and  inde- 
pendence of  South  America  be  altered  by  the  negation  of  all 
the  Powers  and  Princes  of  Europe.1 

The  same  attitude  was  reflected  in  President  Monroe's 
Message  of  2  December,  1823  : 

But  with  the  Governments  who  have  declared  their  independ- 
ence we  have,  on  great  consideration  and  on  just  principles, 
acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  interposition  for  the 
purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling  in  any  other  manner 
their  destiny,  by  any  European  power  in  any  other  light  than 
as  the  manifestation  of  an  unfriendly  disposition  toward  the 
United  States.2 

While  it  would  not  always  be  good  diplomacy  for  the 

1  The  London  Times,  18  Norember,  1823. 
'  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  218. 


94  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [94 

government  to  speak  boldly  in  reference  to  the  economic 
interests  of  the  country,  the  press  is  not  thus  restrained  in 
the  expression  of  a  country's  motives.  The  following  quo- 
tation from  Bell's  Weekly  Messenger  on  the  South  Ameri- 
can situation  as  it  appeared  in  December,  1823,  is  a  very 
straightforward  statement  of  the  motives  which  actuated  a 
large  and  important  group  of  British  subjects : 

Upon  the  whole,  we  are  certain  that  we  have  the  right  to 
resist  this  confederate  attempt  by  the  Allied  Powers  to 
establish  a  universal  despotism,  and  to  oppose  this  league  of 
Kings  to  defend  themselves  against  all  reforms,  responsibility 
and  revolution.  And  we  are  equally  certain  that  it  is  our 
duty  to  do  so.  Our  commerce  is  vitally  concerned.  If  South 
America  be  now  shut  against  us,  it  will  stop  that  progress  in 
our  cotton,  woollen,  linen  and  silk  manufactures,  by  the  effect 
of  which  we  are  gradually  recovering  from  the  consequences 
of  the  war.1 

But  economic  motives  were  not  confined  to  the  manu- 
facturers and  merchants.  When  in  1823  Spain  was 
trying  to  negotiate  an  English  loan,  the  bankers  demanded 
the  recognition  by  Spain  of  the  independence  of  her  South 
American  colonies  as  a  condition  upon  which  the  loan  would 
be  granted.2  On  the  other  hand,  the  revolutionary  authori- 
ties seemed  to  experience  no  difficulty  in  raising  large  Eng- 
lish loans  in  furtherance  of  their  cause.3 

It  must  not,  however,  be  supposed  that  it  was  all  smooth 
sailing  for  the  merchants  and  manufacturers  who  saw 
in  South  American  independence  a  source  of  increased  com- 
mercial and  industrial  opportunities.  Opposed  to  them 

1  Bell's  Weekly  Messenger,  21  December,  1823;  cf.  The  Examiner, 
28  December,  1823.  The  Italics  arc  mine. 

9  The  London  Times,  23  December,  1823. 
3  Camb.  Mod.  Hist.,  vol.  x,  p.  307. 


BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  95 

were  those  who  saw  in  the  new  industrial  class  the  rising 
aristocracy  of  wealth.  A  good  example  of  such  opposition 
is  the  following  indictment  fulminated  against  the  mer- 
chants by  Cobbett's  Political  Register: 

From  the  nature  of  things,  the  advantages  to  England  from 
the  independence  of  South  America  would  be  very  great,  and 
would  be  almost  exclusive.  When  I  say  England,  here,  I  do 
not  mean  the  people  of  England  in  general.  I  mean  more 
particularly  the  Jews  and  Jobbers;  I  mean  this  odious  aris- 
tocracy, and  the  almost  as  odious  aristocracy  of  the  merchants. 
The  main  body  of  the  people  would  continue  to  be  what  they 
are  now ;  that  is  to  say,  the  most  wretched  creatures  in  Europe. 
But  the  Jews  and  Jobbers  of  Change  Alley  and  the  greedy 
merchants  and  big  manufacturers  would  profit  largely.1 

As  the  moment  of  France's  triumph  in  Spain  was  ap- 
proaching, and  as  her  intervention  in  South  America  ap- 
peared more  and  more  possible,2  the  pressure  of  the  mer- 
chants increased,  while  Canning's  popularity  was  growing 
among  this  class  of  his  fellow-citizens.3  This  increase  of 
his  popularity  was  unmistakably  due  to  signs  of  yielding  to 
their  demands;  as,  for  instance,  his  promise  in  reply  to  a 
merchants'  petition,  22  August,  1823,  that  commercial 
agents  would  soon  be  sent  to  the  South  American  countries.* 
The  fulfillment  of  this  promise  in  the  autumn  of  1823  5  was 
characterized  as  "  a  kind  of  half -step  to  appease  mercantile 
alarm,  and  to  prepare  the  ground  of  opposition  to  the  pro- 

1  Cobbett's  Political  Register,  vol.  xiviii,  p.  470. 

'The  Examiner,  12  October,  1823. 

3  Annual  Register,  vol.  Ixv,  p.  146. 

4 Ibid.;  F.  0.,  South  America,  1822-1823,  Planta  to  Marragat  &  Son, 
22  August,  1823;  cf.  ibid.,  Planta,  Circular  to  Merchants,  17  October, 
1823. 

5  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  pp.  28,  33;  Rush  (R.),  The  Court 
of  London,  (London,  1873),  p.  408. 


96  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [96 

bable  early  results  of  Bourbon  policy,  principle,  and  ambi- 
tion." * 

Ascendancy  of  French  influence  at  the  court  of  Madrid 
was  not  the  only  source  of  danger  to  British  commerce  with 
the  Spanish-American  states.  Piratical  attacks  on  British 
shipping  in  the  West  Indies  were  a  real  obstacle  to  com- 
merce and  a  humiliating  defiance  of  British  naval  prestige.2 
Even  Spanish  warships  captured  British  trading  ships  and 
brought  them  to  port  where  they  were  condemned  as  prizes.8 
A  notable  case  in  point  was  the  attack  on  the  "  Lord  Colling- 
wood."  *  The  reason  given  for  the  condemnation  of  the 
vessel  was  that  it  was  found  trading  with  the  rebels  of 
Buenos  Ayres.5  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  was  found  not 
the  slightest  trace  of  Spanish  authority  in  that  colony.6 
The  action  of  the  Spanish  authorities  in  condemning  the 
"  Lord  Collingwood  "  was  in  open  violation  of  an  earlier 
agreement  between  Great  Britain  and  Spain  to  the  effect 
that  if  the  former  would  not  prevent,  through  measures  of 
recognition,  a  possible  amicable  arrangement  between  Spain 
and  her  colonies  in  America,  Spain,  even  though  she  might 
regain  those  colonies,  would  never  reestablish  the  old  exclu- 
sive system.7  The  depredations  on  British  commerce  were 

1  The  Examiner,  28  September,  1823. 

'Stapleton,  Some  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  t,  p.  49, 
Cabinet  Circular,  15  November,  1822. 

*F.  O.,  Continent,  Verona,  November,  1822,  Wellington^  Memorandum 
on  the  Spanish  Colonies  in  America. 

*lbid.,  Spain,  September-  December,  1822,  Canning  to  William  a 
Court,  18  October,  1822,  no.  9. 


a  Ibid.  ;  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  168. 

*  F.  O.,  Spain,  September-December,  1822,  Canning  to  William  a 
Court,  18  October,  1822,  no.  9;  Annual  Register,  vol.  Ixiv,  p.  163; 
Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  168. 


BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  97 

committed  not  only  by  vessels  sailing  under  the  authority  of 
the  Spanish  government,  but,  probably  in  the  majority  of 
cases,  by  pirates  infesting  the  American  waters  and  illegally 
using  the  Spanish  flag.1 

Great  Britain  could  not  very  well  submit  to  these  re- 
peated attacks  on  her  South  American  commerce,  nor  could 
it  be  expected  that  she  should  submit  to  Spain's  exclusive 
colonial  system  when  the  colonies  enjoyed  practically  an  in- 
dependent existence.  Applications  for  redress  of  griev- 
ances were  made  at  Madrid,  but  without  satisfactory  re- 
sponse.2 

The  offended  dignity  of  a  nation,  combined  with  practical 
expediency,  forced  the  government  to  adopt  measures  for 
the  protection  of  British  commerce.  Politely,  but  none  the 
less  firmly,  the  Spanish  government  was  informed  of  the 
British  intentions.3  At  the  same  time,  and  in  order  to 
give  less  offence  to  royal  dignity,  Great  Britain  protested 
her  friendship  for  His  Catholic  Majesty,  regarding  herself 
as  merely  lending  the  influence  of  her  own  navy  in  the  in- 
terest of  Spain  at  the  time  when  the  latter  was  powerless 
to  maintain  order  in  the  West  Indian  waters.4  But  while 
Canning  thus  purported  to  act  vicariously,  as  it  were,  for 
Spain,  he  was  inclined  to  consider  the  Spanish  colonies  de 
facto  independent  states :  "  It  is  not  necessary  to  declare 
war  on  Spain.  Spain  and  her  colonial  empire  are  altogether 
separated  de  facto.  She  has  perhaps  as  little  direct  and 
available  power  over  the  colonies  which  she  nominally  re- 

1  Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  p.  169. 
5  Ibid. 

3  F.   O.,  Spain,   September-December,    1822,   Canning   to  William   a 
Court,  18  October,  1822,  no.  9;  ibid.,  William  a  Court  to  Canning,  24 
December,  1822 ;  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  170  et  seq. 

4  Ibid. ;  F.  O.,  Spain,  September-December,  1822,  Canning  to  William  a 
Court,  24  November,  1822,  no.  16. 


gS  BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE          [98 

tains,  as  she  has  over  those  which  have  thrown  off  her' 
yoke."  1  The  determination  of  the  British  government  to 
employ  naval  forces  for  the  protection  of  British  commerce 
became  a  matter  of  serious  concern  at  Madrid.  The 
Spanish  Ministry  yielded  to  the  extent  of  promising  satis- 
faction for  the  ships  that  had  been  captured,  to  withdraw1 
prohibitions  against  trading  with  the  colonies  in  America, 
and  to  make  immediate  payment  of  those  claims  which  had 
already  been  acknowledged  as  valid.2  But  Spain  was  quite 
powerless  to  furnish  effective  means  of  protection  against 
piratical  attacks.3  Several  of  the  de  facto  governments  of 
Spanish  America  were  sufficiently  strong  to  afford  that  pro- 
tection; but  they  were  not  recognized,  and  could,  therefore, 
not  be  held  responsible.4  The  irresponsibility  of  the  new 
states,  lacking  British  recognition,  and  the  weakness  of  the 
Spanish  government  were  the  Scylla  and  the  Charybdis 
which  threatened  the  destruction  of  British  commerce  in 
South  America,  with  France  as  an  interested  spectator. 
Some  form  of  recognition  of  the  de  facto  governments  of 
South  America  seemed,  therefore,  to  recommend  itself.5 
As  if  this  combination  of  circumstances  did  not  afford 
sufficient  sources  of  affliction  to  British  commerce,  the 
British  merchants  thought  that  they  saw  in  the  United 
States  a  powerful  rival  for  the  trade  with  the  southern  con- 

1  Stapleton,  Some  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  53, 
Cabinet   Circular,    15   November,    1822;    cf.   F.   O.,  Spain,   September- 
December,  1822,  Canning  to  William  a  Court,  30  November,  18212,  no.  19. 

2  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  176;  F.  O.,  Spain,  September- 
December,   1822,  William  a  Court  to  Canning,  9  November,   1822,  no. 
30;   ibid.,  Canning  to  William   a  Court,   30  November,   1822,  no.  20; 
ibid.,  William  a  Court  to  Canning,  24  December,  18122. 

8  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  12. 
*  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  3. 

5  F.   O.,   Continent,   Verona,   1822,   Wellington,    Memorandum,  on  the 
Spanish  Colonies  of  America,  no.  31. 


99]  BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  99 

tinent.  This  rivalry  was  at  least  potential;  while  the  con- 
ditions attending  recognition  of  the  new  states  might  easily 
determine  which  of  the  two  powers  should  become  the  ulti- 
mate victor  in  the  rivalry  for  commercial  advantage.  So 
far  as  the  action  of  the  United  States  was  prompted  by; 
commercial  motives,  agencies  of  support  were  not  wanting, 
as  instanced  by  the  following  remark  of  an  influential  New* 
York  newspaper: 

A  few  days  since  we  took  the  liberty,  in  a  short  paragraph, 
to  call  the  attention  of  the  American  merchants  to  the  vast 
markets  about  to  be  opened  to  the  enterprise  of  the  world, 
in  the  late  American  colonies  of  Spain ;  and  we  now  beg  leave 
again  to  direct  their  attention  to  the  same  subject,  as  we  all 
are  apprehensive  notwithstanding  our  propinquity  to  them, 
that  the  vigilant  and  indefatigable  John  Bull  will  get  the 
start  of  us.1 

Such  plain  expression  of  American  opinion  must  have 
given  considerable  concern  to  the  commercial  interests  of 
Great  Britain.  The  London  Times  considered  the  statement 
of  sufficient  importance  to  copy  it.2  A  few  months  later 
the  Examiner  called  upon  Great  Britain  to  protect  herself 
against  the  disgrace  of  being  outrivaled  by  the  Americans : 
"Could  anything  be  more  disgraceful  in  the  British 
Ministers  than  to  let  the  North  Americans,  with  nothing 
like  our  motives,  and  some  natural  feeling  to  the  contrary, 
get  the  start  of  us  in  establishing  a  profitable  connection 
with  the  immense,  fertile,  and  improving  States  of  Southern 
America  ?  "  The  same  thought  was  expressed  by  other 
British  papers.4 

1  New  York  Commercial  Advertiser,  6  June,  1822. 

*  The  London  Times,  3  July,  1822. 

8  The  Examiner,  30  November,  1823. 

4  Bell's  Weekly  Messenger,  20  June,  1824. 


I00         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [IOo 

To  maintain  and  to  improve  her  commerce  with  the  new 
-^states  of  South  America  was  the  ruling  motive  of  Great 
Britain's  American  policy.1  The  aim  was  clear.  What 
means  would  offer  the  greatest  possibility  of  success  in  its 
realization?  A  situation  wherein  figured  the  commercial 
interest  of  the  United  States,  the  political  and  commercial 
designs  of  France,  the  political  watchfulness  of  the  Alliance, 
and  the  irresponsibility  of  the  unrecognized  South  American 
governments,  was  one  which  Great  Britain  could  ill  afford 
to  entrust  to  "  time  and  the  course  of  events  "  to  direct  in 
her  favor.  Some  direct  action  proceeding  from  a  conscious 
purpose  seemed  imperative.  The  only  question  in  the  minds 
of  British  statesmen  was  the  course  of  action.  The  recogni- 
tion of  the  new  states  was  growing  in  favor,  and  was  urged 
by  the  press  and  by  the  commercial  organizations.2  But 
even  such  an  innocent  measure  had  its  pitfalls. 

Although  there  remained  not  a  vestige  of  Spanish  author- 
ity in  some  of  the  Spanish  colonies,  would  not  British  re- 
cognition, interpreted  in  accordance  with  Old- World  diplo- 
matic standards,  be  considered  as  an  affront  to  Spain? 
Would  it  not  increase  the  element  of  bitterness  in  the 
attitude  of  the  continental  powers  toward  Great  Britain? 
Premature  recognition  of  the  South  American  republics 
by  Great  Britain  might  encourage  the  spirit  of  revolt  within 
her  own  colonial  possessions,3  which  would,  moreover, 
offer  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain  the  most  excellent  op- 
portunity for  retaliation.  Furthermore,  British  liberal 
opinion  failed  to  see  how  Great  Britain  could  consistently 
extend  recognition  to  these  states  without  at  the  same  time 

1  Bigelow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  44-45 ;  Reddaway,  op.  cit.,  p.  23. 

*  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  pp.  14-15. 

*  Kasson   (J.  A.),  The  Evolution  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States  of  America  and  History  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  (Boston,  1904), 
p.  229. 


IOI]         BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA  IOi 

providing  for  a  more  liberal  franchise  at  home.1  But  there 
is  a  discouraging  absence  of  any  convincing  evidence  point- 
ing to  motives  of  political  liberalism  in  Canning's  attitude 
toward  the  whole  South  American  question.  Indeed,  in  a 
letter  to  the  Comte  d'Artois,  the  future  Charles  X,  Canning 
expressed  his  happiness  at  the  restoration  of  His  Royal 
Highness  "  to  the  palace  of  your  ancestors."  2  The  form 
of  government  which  seemed  the  most  desirable  to  the  minds 
of  Canning  and  Polignac,  at  the  time  of  their  famous 
October  conference  3  relative  to  the  South  American  ques- 
tion, was  the  monarchical.4  The  fact  that  the  revolted 
colonies  had  organized  themselves  as  republics  on  the  model 
of  the  United  States,  may  have  been  one  reason  for  the 
reluctance  of  Canning  to  recognize  the  new  states,  both  be- 
cause of  the  aversion  of  the  British  governing  classes  for 
republicanism  and  because  of  the  unpopularity  of  that  form 
of  government  on  the  continent.  Had  Great  Britain  acted 
hastily  in  extending  recognition  to  states  organized  as  re- 
publics, such  action  might  have  caused  the  British  govern- 
ment some  very  disagreeable  complications  in  its  relations 
with  the  continental  powers. 

The  Examiner  was  fearlessly  outspoken  in  its  analysis  of 
the  government's  motives  in  dealing  with  the  South 
American  question : 

The  whole  secret,  however,  of  their  playing  fast  and  loose 
with  South  America  is  this :  our  government  is  trying  to  trim 
between  Legitimacy  on  the  one  hand,  and  its  own  commercial 

1  Cobbett's  Political  Register,  vol.  xlviii,  p.  474. 

2  Stapleton,  Some  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  72, 
Canning  to  Monsieur,  i  February,  18213. 

5  Infra,  pp.  122-124. 

4  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  xi,  p.  53,  Memorandum  of 
Conference  between  Canning  and  Prince  de  Polignac;  Rush,  op.  cit., 
pp.  412,  468. 


I02          BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [IO2 

interests  on  the  other.  In  principle,  the  invasion  of  South 
America  would  be  no  worse  than  the  conquest  of  Spain;  but 
then,  as  Mr.  Brougham  said,  the  former  would  touch  our 
pockets,  would  be  a  fearful  blow  to  British  manufactures,  trade, 
and  revenue.  Hence,  this  sudden  respect  for  liberty  and  the 
independence  of  states — this  horror  of  foreign  powers  inter- 
fering— this  resolution  to  form  a  barrier  against  such 
interference.1 

The  view  that  the  British  government  was  actuated  by 
motives  growing  out  of  political  conservatism  and  com- 
mercial interest  was  not  limited  to  British  subjects.  Richard 
Rush,  probably  as  keen  an  observer  and  skillful  diplomat 
as  ever  represented  the  United  States  at  the  Court  of  St. 
James,  wrote  his  opinion  of  British  motives  to  his  chief. 
The  statement  is  so  important  and  so  valuable  in  its  bearing 
on  the  South  American  question  that  it  deserves  to  be 
quoted  at  length : 

As  regards  the  principle  of  traffick,  and  especially  as  regards 
the  whole  range  of  her  foreign  trade,  we  have,  it  is  true,  wit- 
nessed of  late  on  the  part  of  this  nation  [Great  "Britain]  an 
approach  to  more  liberality  than  had  governed  her  heretofore. 
It  is  possible  that  she  may  go  farther  in  this  policy;  a  policy 
irresistibly  recommended,  and,  as  she  will  not  scruple  herself 
to  admit,  forced  upon  her,  by  the  changing  circumstances  of 
the  commercial  world.  But  as  regards  the  principles  of  poli- 
tical freedom,  whether  in  relation  to  herself  or  other  states, 
we  shall  not  find  it  easy  to  perceive  as  yet  any  such  favorable 
alteration  in  her  conduct.  .  .  .  She  at  least  perceives  a  crisis 
likely  to  come  on,  bringing  with  it  peril  to  her  own  com- 
mercial prospects  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  and  to-  her 
political  sway  in  both  hemispheres.  Hence  probably  some  of 
her  recent  and  remarkable  solicitudes.  The  former  war  of 
twenty  years  more  than  once  shook  her  prosperity  and  brought 

1  The  Examiner,  8  February,  1824. 


BRITISH  INTERESTS  IN  SOUTH  AMERICA 

hazards  to  her  existence,  though  for  the  most  part  she  was 
surrounded  by  allies.  A  second  war  of  like  duration  with  no 
ally  for  her  in  Europe  might  not  have  a  second  field  of 
Waterloo  for  its  termination.  Such  are  the  prospective  dan- 
gers that  possibly  do  not  escape  her.1 

It  is  impossible  to  escape  the  conclusion  that  Canning's 
opposition  to  having  the  Spanish-American  colonies  pass 
into  the  hands  of  any  other  power  but  Spain  was  dictated 
by  commercial  motives.2  But,  viewed  from  the  diplomatic 
as  well  as  the  political  standpoint,  it  would  be  singularly! 
fortunate  for  Great  Britain  could  she  discover  the  ways  and 
the  means  of  safeguarding  her  commercial  interests  in 
South  America  without  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  recogni- 
tion for  some  time.  There  were  three  possible  solutions 
to  this  difficult  problem:  first,  an  understanding  with  the 
government  of  the  United  States  in  opposition  to  the  designs 
of  France  and  the  Alliance  in  South  America;  second,  de- 
ferring recognition  until  Spain  had  recognized  the  indepen- 
dence of  her  own  colonies ;  3  third,  permitting  Spain  alone 
to  attempt  to  regain  her  colonies,  hoping  that  if  Spain  were 
successful  in  her  attempt,  such  success  would  be  achieved 
only  through  liberal  concessions  to  the  colonies  in  the  form 
of  greater  economic  freedom,  or  the  "  open  door,"  from 
which  British  commerce  would  derive  valuable  advantages. 
But  whether  or  not  Spain  would  feel  compelled  to  recognize 
the  independence  of  her  colonies,  or  be  forced  to  proceed 
alone  to  attempt  to  regain  them,  would  depend  very  much 
upon  an  understanding  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  relative  to  the  South  American  question. 

1  Ford  (W.C.),  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  Connection  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,    (Cambridge,    1902),    pp.    52    et   seq.;     Rush    to   Adams,    15 
September,  1823, 

2  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  pp.  316  et  scq. 

8  F.  O.,  Spain,  September-December,  1822,  William  a  Court  to  Cann- 
ing, 28  December,  1822,  no.  62. 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE 

As  early  as  November,  1822,  Canning  had  given  thought 
to  the  matter  of  recognition  of  the  republics  of  South 
America.  In  his  Cabinet  Circular  of  15  November  he 
pointed  to  the  difficulties  encountered  in  trading  with  these 
states  as  probably  constituting  the  circumstances  which 
would  finally  compel  British  recognition.1  After  an  en- 
umeration of  the  obstacles  placed  in  the  way  of  British 
commerce  by  the  Spanish  authorities,  he  asked  the  question : 

What  resource  have  we  but  to  take  away  all  pretext  for  the 
enforcement  of  these  absurd  and  absolute  pretensions  against 
us,  by  conferring  on  the  colonies,  so  far  as  our  recognition  can 
do  it,  an  independent  instead  of  a  colonial  character,  and  thus 
cutting  short  all  dispute  as  to  Spain's  colonial  jurisdiction? 
No  man  can  say  that  under  such  circumstances  our  recognition 
of  these  states  can  be  indefinitely  postponed.2 

Such  a  step  he  considered  as  being  "  most  justifiable  to- 
wards Spain,  most  acceptable  to  her  late  colonies,"  and  of 
very  great  benefit  to  Great  Britain.8 

But  the  circumstances  relating  to  recognition  were  far 
more  tangled  than  the  November  Cabinet  Circular  seems  to 
indicate.  The  decision  of  the  Congress  of  Verona  (in 

1Stapleton,  Some  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  pp.  56-57, 
Cabinet  Circular,  15  November,  1822. 
»7feid.,  p.  57- 
>  Ibid. 

104  [104 


I05]  THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE  105 

which  Great  Britain  refused  to  concur)  to  coerce  the 
Spanish  Constitutionalists  moved  the  British  government 
to  refrain  from  further  increasing  the  difficulties  of  Spain 
through  recognition  of  her  American  colonies.1  There  was 
some  doubt  also  whether  the  new  states  had  developed  suffi- 
cient force  and  stability  to  merit  the  recognition  of  their 
independence.2  The  act  of  the  British  government  in  send- 
ing naval  squadrons  to  the  waters  of  the  West  Indies  pro- 
duced a  salutary  effect  upon  the  Spanish  government,  which 
immediately  promised  redress  of  grievances  and  reparation 
of  damages.8  This  attitude  of  good  intentions  seemed  to 
make  immediate  recognition  unnecessary. 

In  December,  1822,  Canning  announced  to  the  govern- 
ment of  Spain  his  intention  of  sending  consuls  to  the  various 
Spanish  colonies  in  America  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
British  trade.4  On  31  March,  1823,  on  the  eve  of  the 
French  invasion  of  Spain,  Canning  said  in  his  letter  to 
Stuart  that  "  time  and  the  course  of  events  appeared  sub- 
stantially to  have  decided  their  separation  from  the  Mother 
country."  5  With  these  two  exceptions  little  attention  was 
paid  to  the  matter  of  recognition  from  the  close  of  the  Con- 
gress of  Verona  to  the  summer  of  1823,  when  European  in- 
tervention in  South  America  was  threatening.6 

The  course  of  events  which  would  decide  the  question  of 
recognition  referred  mainly  to  the  French  invasion  of 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  17. 

2  Stapleton,  Some  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  38; 
Broderick  and  Fotheringham,  op.  cit.,  vol.  xi,  p.  216. 

3  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  pp.  16-17. 

4 1  bid.,  p.  18;  F.  0.,  Spain,  September-December,  1822,  Canning  to 
William  a  Court,  9  December,  1822,  no.  35;  ibid.,  South  America, 
1822-1823,  Planta  to  Lack,  7  December,  1822. 

6  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1823),  vol.  xix,  pp.  59-60,  Canning  to  Stuart, 
31  March,  1823 ;  (Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  18. 

« Ibid. 


106         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [IO6 

Spain.1  It  practically  amounted  to  an  announcement  of 
the  policy  which  Canning  would  pursue  in  the  event  of 
any  effort  'by  France  or  the  Allies  to  intervene  in  America, 
or  in  the  event  that  France  should  insist  upon  indefinite 
military  occupation  of  Spain.  During  the  summer  of  1823 
the  "  course  of  events  "  in  Spain  was  becoming  daily  more 
favorable  to  France  until  it  terminated  in  complete  victory 
for  the  invaders  and  the  restoration  of  King  Ferdinand  VII. 
At  that  juncture  might  occur  the  very  event  which  both 
the  government  of  Great  Britain  and  that  of  the  United 
States  had  long  suspected — European  intervention  in  South 
America.  King  Ferdinand,  emboldened  by  success,  would 
give  such  an  enterprise  his  most  active  encouragement. 
France  would  profit,  the  old  order  would  be  victorious,  and 
probably  the  old  colonial  system  would  be  restored.  Eng- 
land's position  of  influence  among  the  states  of  Europe 
would  be  eclipsed  by  France,  her  commerce  with  South 
America  seriously  impaired.  Even  though  the  Alliance 
should  not  interfere,  there  was  the  threatening  ascendancy 
of  the  United  States  in  the  western  hemisphere.  Such  was 
the  ominous  spectre  which  British  statesmen  saw  rising^ 
above  the  horizon  of  possibilities  in  the  summer  of  1823. 

Some  of  the  South  American  republics  had  now  been  re- 
cognized by  the  United  States.  But  recognition  had  not 
yet  been  accorded  them  by  Great  Britain — that  other  country 
to  which  they  had  cause  to  look  as  a  shield  of  protection 
against  the  menacing  threats  of  the  continental  powers  of 
Europe.  Would  not  British  recognition  now  have  been  a 
most  timely  event?  Would  it  not  have  convinced  the 
European  Allies  that  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
were  in  accord  on  the  Spanish-American  question?  Would 

ip.  O.,  France,  January-April,   1823,  Canning  to  Stuart,  31   March, 
1823,  no.  29. 


THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE 

not  the  evidence  of  such  an  accord  of  the  two  English-speak- 
ing countries  have  been  convincing  of  the  futility  of  any 
attempt  to  enforce  the  Doctrine  of  Intervention  in  the( 
former  colonies  of  Spain?  No  attempt  will  be  made  to 
answer  these  questions  here,  but  affirmative  evidence  is 
found  in  the  failure  of  the  Allies  to  intervene  when  they 
became  aware  of  the  later  Anglo-American  understanding1 
of  which  we  shall  treat  presently.  Meantime  it  became 
clear  to  the  British  Foreign  Office  that  to  accord  recognition 
to  the  Spanish-American  republics  during  the  summer  of 
1823  would  have  been  most  inexpedient.1  It  was,  in  fact, 
judged  more  difficult  in  the  autumn  of  1823  than  in  the 
autumn  of  1822  for  Great  Britain  to  accord  recognition 
to  these  states  as  a  counterpoise  to  the  growth  of  French 
influence  in  Spain.  If  Great  Britain  had  recognized  the 
independence  of  the  new  states  in  1822,  the  act  would  have 
been  interpreted  by  the  Allies  as  a  blow  directed  against  the 
Constitutionalists  in  Spain.  On  the  other  hand,  had  recog- 
nition been  extended  in  the  autumn  of  1823,  after  Ferdinand 
and  the  conservative  regime  had  been  restored  in  Spain,  it 
would  have  been  deemed  a  blow  at  the  very  government  in 
Spain  which  France  and  the  Allies  had  supported  and 
brought  back  into  power.2  Such  an  act  in  the  autumn  of  1823 
would  have  been  in  such  complete  defiance  of,  and  so  con- 
tradictory to,  the  policy  of  the  Allies  as  to  lead  probably  to 
an  open  break  between  them  and  Great  Britain.3  Recogni- 
tion, then,  under  these  circumstances,  must  be  the  last  re- 
course after  all  other  means  of  protecting  the  new  states 
from  allied  intervention  had  been  entirely  exhausted.  To 
satisfy  these  aims  an  Anglo-American  declaration  of  policy 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  22. 

» Ibid. 

•lemperley,  op.  cit.,  p.  179. 


I08         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [IO8 

suggested  itself  to  Canning; x  and  in  seeking  the  coopera- 
tion of  the  United  States  he  was  one  of  the  first  English 
statesmen  to  appreciate  the  influence  and  value  of  a  good 
understanding  between  the  two  countries.2  \ 

Notwithstanding  the  fact  that  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  had  only  recently  been  at  war,  there  was  de- 
veloping a  friendly  feeling  between  their  governments  dur- 
ing the  years  immediately  preceding  the  issuance  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  In  an  editorial  on  President  Monroe's 
Message3  of  3  December,  1821,  the  editor  of  the  London 
Times  delighted  to  dwell  on  the  friendly  feeling  toward 
England  of  which  the  Message  gave  evidence :  "It  may 
be  satisfactory  to  add,  that  there  is  not  an  expression  used 
toward  Great  Britain,  in  the  several  paragraphs  wherein 
her  relations  with  the  United  States  are  referred  to,  which 
indicates  anything  but  the  continuance  of  the  most  undis- 
turbed and  perfect  harmony  between  the  two  govern- 
ments." 4 

The  official  attitude  of  the  British  government  was  no  less 
favorable  toward  the  United  States.  Canning  in  the  course 
of  an  address  delivered  in  Liverpool  said  with  reference  to 
Anglo-American  relations :  "  Where  a  child,  having  perhaps 
displeased  a  parent — a  daughter,  for  instance  in  contracting! 
a  connection  offensive  to  that  parent's  feelings,  some 
estrangement  would  ensue;  but  after  a  lapse,  the  irritation 
is  forgotten,  the  force  of  blood  again  prevails,  and  the 
daughter  and  the  mother  stand  together  against  the  world/' 
Upon  the  passage  in  Canning's  address  the  editor  of  the 

^tapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  22. 
1  Hart,  op.  cit.,  p.  49. 

3  Richardson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  pp.  98  et  seq. 

4  The  London  Times,  i  January,  1822. 

5  Quoted  in  the  Morning  Chronicle,  22  September,  1823. 


109]  THE  ANGL°-AMERICAN  ENTENTE 

Morning  Chronicle  commented :  "  We  hardly  imagined 
that  the  time  was  so  near  at  hand  for  imposing  on  the 
people  of  this  country  the  necessity  of  cultivating  the  friend- 
ship of  our  American  offspring  as  almost  essential  to  our 
own  safety."  *  This  statement  leads  one  to  the  conclusion 
that  Great  Britain  was  not  only  well  disposed  toward  the 
United  States,  but  that  she  actually  felt  the  necessity  of  an 
understanding  with  this  country  for  the  purpose  of  effec- 
tive opposition  to  the  policies  of  the  Alliance.2  Even  Rush 
was  impressed  with  the  favorable  attitude  shown  by  the 
British  government  toward  his  country.  He  communicated 
his  observations  to  President  Monroe  under  date  of  15  Sep- 
tember, 1823  :"....  my  most  careful  observation  in  Eng- 
land during  my  residence,  had  impressed  me  with  the  be- 
lief, that  the  present  administration,  with  Lord  Liverpool  at 
its  head,  was  as  favorably  disposed  toward  us  as  any  that 
could  be  formed."  3 

Circumstances,  therefore,  seemed  auspicious  for  an 
Anglo-American  accord  on  one  of  the  greatest  problems  of 
that  period.  But  two  obstacles  must  be  overcome  before 
joint  action  could  be  possible:  first,  the  traditional  American 
policy  of  isolation;  second,  the  difficulties  that  might  arise 
from  the  fact  that  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States 
stood,  in  1823,  on  a  different  footing  in  their  relations  with 
the  new  states  of  South  America.  During  the  initial  in- 
terview between  Canning  and  Rush  in  the  summer  of  1823, 
relative  to  a  joint  Anglo-American  declaration,  the  latter, 
desirous,  undoubtedly,  of  paving  the  way  for  Great  Britain's 
support  of  South  American  independence,  reminded  Can- 
ning of  his  reference  to  recognition  of  the  South  American 

1  The  Morning  Chronicle,  22  September,  1823. 
9  Cobbett's  Political  Register,  vol.  xlvii,  p.  715. 

1  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  387;  Ford,  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  Connection  with 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  54,  Rush  to  Monroe. 


IIO         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [no 

republics.1  That  reference  was  contained  in  Canning's 
letter  to  Stuart,  31  March,  i823«2  Not  only  did  Rush 
entirely  approve  of  Canning's  views  as  then  expressed,  but 
he  professed  to  see  in  that  statement  a  purpose  of  prevent- 
ing France  from  interfering  with  the  progress  of  political 
emancipation  in  South  America.3  It  must  have  inspired 
belief  in  the  possibility  of  some  form  of  Anglo-American 
cooperation  in  behalf  of  South  American  independence,  and 
disposed  Rush  to  entertain  any  overtures  with  a  view  to 
such  cooperation.  But  the  plan  of  Rush  was  a  similarity 
of  policy  through  British  recognition  rather  than  a  joint 
declaration  of  the  two  governments  while  remaining  on  a 
different  footing  in  relation  to  the  new  states. 

Some  sort  of  understanding  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  was  becoming  daily  more  necessary  in 
the  minds  of  the  British  Cabinet,4  and  evidently  more  wel- 
come to  the  United  States,  as  the  two  governments  witnessed 
the  growing  ascendancy  of  France  in  the  Peninsula.5  Ap- 
prehensive of  the  danger  of  a  combined  attack  by  France 
and  the  other  members  of  the  Alliance,  Canning  conceived 
of  a  plan  to  prevent  it.6  If  he  were  successful  in  prevent- 
ing an  agreement  among  them  to  attack  South  American  in- 
dependence, he  would  thereby  also  prevent  an  armed  con- 
flict between  England  and  the  continental  powers.7  For  if 
the  Alliance  had  seriously  aimed  at  the  subjugation  of 
South  America,  England  would  have  been  equally  deter- 
mined to  prevent  it;  and  in  that  case  war  would  have  been 

•    l  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  361. 

*  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1823),  vol.  xix,  pp.  59-60. 
3  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  361. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  381. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  389. 

'  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  23. 
7Stapletoo,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  23. 


!  !  !  ]  THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE  1 1 1 

unavoidable.  The  desire  of  Canning  to  maintain  peace, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  protect  the  interests  of  Great  Britain 
in  South  America,  accounts  for  his  haste  in  sounding  Rush 
on  the  possibility  of  a  joint  declaration  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States.1 

Canning's  knowledge  of  the  sympathy  of  the  people  of  the 
United  States  with  the  independence  movement  among  the 
Spanish  colonists  gave  him  sufficient  reason  to  believe  in  the 
willingness  of  the  United  States  government  to  enter  into 
some  such  engagement  with  Great  Britain.2  The  political 
liberalism  of  the  United  States  was  about  to  be  capitalized 
in  support  of  the  commercial  interests  of  Great  Britain;  or, 
the  commercial  interests  of  Great  Britain  were  about  to  be 
employed  in  the  interest  of  political  liberalism  in  the  western 
hemisphere.  Whichever  of  these  views  one  takes,  the  fact 
remains  that  the  Anglo-American  entente  on  the  South 
American  question  had  its  immediate  origin  in,  and  pro- 
ceeded from,  the  commercial  interests  of  the  one  country  and 
the  political  liberalism  of  the  other.3 

It  was  in  the  course  of  the  interview  between  Canning! 
and  Rush  on  16  August,  1823,  that  the  former  asked  Rush 
what  the  government  of  the  United  States  would  think  of 
"  going  hand  in  hand  with  England  in  such  a  policy."  4  Rush 
had  just  expressed  his  approval  of,  and  admiration  for,  the 
position  assumed  by  Canning  in  reference  to  any  ulterior? 
designs  which  France  might  have  upon  the  Spanish  colonies. 
It  was  now  apparent  that  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  viewed  the  Spanish- American  question  in  the  same 
light — to  the  extent  that  both  were  opposed  to  European  in- 

1  Stapleton,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  23. 
•  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  p.  317. 
•Tower,  op.  cit.,  pp.  17-18. 
4  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  362. 


1 12         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [ z  I2 

tervention.  What  seemed  more  reasonable  and  expedient 
than  for  them  to  present  some  outward  and  visible  evidence 
of  their  common  understanding  in  the  matter?  Canning} 
saw  in  such  an  understanding  an  effective  check  to  any 
project  of  European  interference.  Said  Canning: 

The  knowledge  that  our  two  countries  .  .  .  hold  the  same 
opinions,  would,  by  its  moral  effect,  put  down  the  intention 
on  the  part  of  France,  if  she  entertained  it.  This  belief  was 
founded  .  .  .  upon  the  large  share  of  the  maritime  power  of 
the  world  which  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  shared 
between  them,  and  the  subsequent  influence  which  the  knowl- 
edge of  their  common  policy  on  a  question  involving  such 
important  maritime  interests,  present  and  future,  could  not 
fail  to  produce  on  the  rest  of  the  world.1 

Canning's  suggestion  of  a  joint  Anglo- American  policy 
presented  questions  so  intricately  bound  up  with  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  United  States  that  Rush  felt  impelled  to  refer 
the  whole  matter  to  his  government  before  committing  him- 
self.2 Acceptance  of  Canning's  invitation  to  joint  action 
would  have  produced  a  new  departure  in  the  policy  govern- 
ing the  relations  of  the  United  States  and  Europe.  It 
would  have  been  contradictory  of  the  policy  of  isolation. 
The  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States  was  therefore  in- 
volved. Should  it  be  a  policy  of  association  with  a  Euro- 
pean power  or  powers,  or  should  it  remain  one  of  isolation 
and  aloofness? 

Meanwhile,  Rush  was  desirous  of  ascertaining  where 
Great  Britain  stood  in  relation  to  the  new  communities, 
"  and  especially  on  the  material  point  of  acknowledging 
their  independence."  3  It  was  already  the  purpose  of  Rush 

1  Rush,  op.  cit.,  pp.  362-363,  366. 

2  Ibid.,  pp.  363,  380-381,  393. 

3  Rush,  The  Court  of  London,  p.  363 ;  cf.  ibid.,  p.  393. 


U-j]  THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE 

to  bring  about,  if  possible,  British  recognition  of  the  new: 
states,  so  that  not  only  would  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States  stand  in  a  similar  relation  to  these  states,  but  the 
interest  of  the  British  government  could  thus  be  made  to 
rest  upon  the  broad  basis  of  principle  and  sympathy.  Under 
such  conditions,  not  only  would  the  government  of  the 
United  States  assume  a  more  favorable  attitude  toward  the 
policy  of  concurrent  action,1  but  such  action  would  be 
rendered  more  effective,  and  the  foreign  policy  of  this 
country  would  escape  the  humiliating  imputation  of  being 
an  instrument  in  support  of  the  commercial  interests  of 
Great  Britain. 

To  the  inquiry  made  by  Rush  with  reference  to  the  recog- 
nition of  the  South  American  republics,  Canning  replied  that 
Great  Britain  would  never  again  attempt  to  settle  the  dis- 
pute between  Spain  and  her  colonies;2  but  if  such  settle- 
ment should  be  brought  about,  Great  Britain  would  not  op- 
pose it.3  He  agreed  with  Rush  that  there  was  no  longer 
any  opportunity  for  Spain  to  regain  her  colonies.4  He 
would,  however,  place  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of  a  settle- 
ment between  Spain  and  her  colonies  that  would  secure  to 
Spain  special  commercial  advantages.5  In  regard  to  recog- 
nition, Canning  stated  that  his  government  was  on  the  point 
of  taking  certain  steps  of  a  "  preparatory  nature,"  but  that 
these  steps  would  still  leave  his  country  free  to  extend  or 
withhold  recognition  as  circumstances  might  require.6 

So  far,  the  discussion  of  the  British  Foreign  Secretary 
and  the  American  Minister  had  been  informal  and  limited 

1  Rush,  op.  cit.t  p.  384. 
•/Wtf.,  p.  363. 

•  *wa.,  P.  364. 

•  Ibid. 

6  Ibid.,  p.  365. 

•  Ibid. 


BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE       [  x  14 

to  the  preliminary  stage  of  ascertaining  one  another's  posi- 
tion relative  to  Latin  America.  On  22  August,  setting* 
forth  the  British  position,  and  at  the  same  time  appealing1, 
for  an  Anglo-American  understanding,  Canning  asked  "  if 
the  moment  has  not  arrived  when  our  two  governments 
might  understand  each  other  as  to  the  Spanish-  American 
Colonies;  and  if  so,  whether  it  would  not  be  expedient  for 
ourselves,  and  beneficial  for  all  the  world,  that  our  principles 
in  regard  to  them  should  be  clearly  settled  and  avowed. 
That  as  to  England  she  has  no  disguise  on  the  subject." 

Then,  proceeding  to  explain  the  position  of  England 
categorically,  Canning  stated  that  his  government  conceived 
as  hopeless  the  recovery  of  the  colonies  by  Spain  ;  2  that  the 
recognition  of  these  colonies  as  independent  states  would 
be  determined  by  time  and  circumstances  ;  3  that  England 
would  place  no  obstacle  in  the  way  of  settlement  by  amicable 
negotiation  between  Spain  and  her  colonies;*  that  England 
disclaimed  all  desire  to  obtain  possession  of  any  portion  of 
the  colonies;5  and  that  she  could  not  see  with  indifference 
the  transfer  of  any  portion  of  the  colonies  to  any  other 
power.8  In  case  that  the  United  States  "  acceded  to  such 
views,  a  declaration  to  that  effect  on  their  part  concurrently 
with  England,  would  be  the  most  effectual,  and  least  offen- 
sive, mode  of  making  known  their  joint  disapprobation  of 
contrary  projects."  T 

Rush  must  have  had  his  doubts  as  to  any  amicable  nego- 
tiations between  Spain  and  her  colonies.8  But  an  Anglo- 

1  Rush,  op.  dt.t  p.  376. 
8  Ibid. 
•Ibid.,?.  377. 


•  Ibid. 
7  Ibid. 
*lbid.,  p.  378. 


I !  5 ]  THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE  1 1 5 

American  declaration  to  the  effect  that  no  impediment  was 
to  be  placed  in  the  way  of  such  negotiations  would  be  only 
a  harmless  diplomatic  courtesy.  On  23  August  Canning's 
propositions  were  despatched  to  Secretary  Adams,  together 
with  the  comment  by  Rush  "  that  this  Government  has  the 
subject  of  Canning's  proposition  much  at  heart,  and  cer- 
tainly his  note  bears  upon  the  face  of  it  a  character  of  earnest- 
ness, as  well  as  cordiality,  towards  the  Government  of  the 
United  States,  which  cannot  escape  aotice." 

While  the  question  of  concurrent  action  was  being  re- 
ferred to  the  government  of  the  United  States,  the  course 
of  events  in  Europe  called  for  quick  decision.  Canning 
informed  Rush  on  26  August  that  he  had  heard  of  a  pro- 
posal for  a  new  congress  of  the  powers  for  the  special 
purpose  of  dealing  with  the  Spanish- American  question.* 
There  could  be  no  doubt  as  to  the  results  should  the  Spanish- 
American  situation  be  left  to  such  a  congress  for  solution — \ 
suppression  of  the  independence  movement,  restrictions  on 
trade,  destruction  of  the  balance  of  power.  Confronted 
by  such  a  crisis  as  that  to  which  the  holding  of  the  proposed 
congress  seemed  to  point,  the  governments  of  Great  Britain 
and  the  United  States  must  act  quickly  and  decisively.  So 
well  did  Rush  understand  the  serious  consequences  of  such 
a  congress,  so  keenly  alive  was  he  to  the  necessity  of  resist- 
ance, and  so  well  did  his  own  attitude  reflect  that  of  his 
government  that  he  replied  almost  immediately  (27  August) 
to  Canning's  note  of  the  26th.  He  set  forth  in  his  reply 
that: 

(a)  The  government  of  the  United  States  would  regard  any 
interference  in  the  affairs  of  Spanish  America  without  the 
<x>nsent  of  the  new  states  as  objectionable.3 

1  Rush,  op.  dt.,  p.  380. 

*  Ibid.,  p.  382 ;  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  20. 

8  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  383, 


H6         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

(b)  He  considered  the  convening  of  a  congress  for  the  pur- 
pose of  deliberating  upon  the  affairs  of  Spanish  America  "  as 
a  measure  uncalled  for,  and  indicative  of  a  policy  highly  un- 
friendly to  the  tranquillity  of  the  world."  l 

(c)  The  government  of  the  United  States  would  never  look 
with  indifference  upon  any  attempt  to  exercise  European  juris- 
diction over  the  new  states,  which  were  of  right  now  entitled 
to  regulate  their  own  affairs.2 

(d)  If  England  were  ready  to  acknowledge  the  independence 
of  the  new  states,  that  fact  would  not  only  prompt  the  United 
States  to  early  action,  but  would  also  facilitate  negotiations 
with  Canning.8 

Despite  the  urgency  of  early  action  on  the  part  of  the  two 
governments,  some  delay  was  experienced,  partly  because  the 
British  government  hesitated  in  extending  recognition, 
partly  because  of  the  necessity  of  referring  to  Washington 
for  instructions.  The  fact  that  Rush  lacked  powers  for 
immediate  procedure  with  negotiations  was  a  source  of 
much  disappointment  to  Canning,  who  confessed  his  in- 
ability to  wait  for  instructions  to  arrive.*  Meantime  the 
government  of  Great  Britain  must  have  a  free  hand  to 
deal  with  whatever  emergency  might  arise  from  the  French 
invasion  of  Spain.5  Since  the  course  of  events  during  the 
interval  might  make  necessary  some  action,  diplomatic  or 
otherwise,  on  the  part  of  the  British  government,  Rush  was 
asked  by  Canning  to  consider  the  proposition  of  concurrent 
action  "  not  as  a  proposition  already  made,  but  as  evidence 
of  the  nature  of  one  which  it  would  have  been  his  desire 
to  make."  *  This  change  of  view  left  Canning  free  to  take 

1  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  383. 
'  Ibid. 

*Ibid.t  p.  384. 
'Ibid.,  pp.  384-385- 
•Ibid.,  p.  385. 
•  Ibid. 


j  I7]  THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE  i  tj 

whatever  action  would  be  consistent  with  British  policy  and 
interests,  awaiting  instructions  from  Washington. 

A  change  of  view  as  to  the  binding  nature  of  the  pro- 
position did  not  imply  any  change  in  purpose;  for  Canning* 
continued  as  strongly  desirous  of  the  cooperation  of  the 
United  States  as  before.  In  fact,  in  an  interview  with 
Rush  on  1 8  September,  Canning  employed  the  pressure  of 
skilled  arguments  to  convince  Rush  and,  through  him,  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  of  the  timeliness  and  the 
necessity  for  some  form  of  joint  action.  In  reporting  this 
interview  to  Secretary  Adams,  19  September,  Rush  des- 
cribed the  arguments  in  his  own  wrords : 

The  question  was  a  new  and  complicated  one  in  modern 
affairs.  It  was  also  full  as  much  American  as  European,  to  say 
no  more.  It  concerned  the  United  States  under  aspects  and 
interests  as  immediate  and  commanding,  as  it  did  or  could  any 
of  the  states  of  Europe.  They  [the  United  States]  were  the 
first  power  established  on  that  continent,  and  now  confessedly 
the  leading  power.  They  were  connected  with  Spanish 
America  by  their  position,  as  with  Europe  by  their  relations; 
and  they  also  stood  connected  with  these  new  states  by  political 
relations.1  .  .  .  Was  it  possible  that  they  could  see  with  in- 
difference their  fate  decided  upon  by  Europe  ?  Could  Europe 
expect  this  indifference  ?  Had  not  a  new  epoch  arrived  in  the 
relative  position  of  the  United  States  towards  Europe,  which 
Europe  must  acknowledge  ?  Were  the  great  political  and  com- 
mercial interests  which  hung  upon  the  destinies  of  the  new 
continent,  to  be  canvassed  and  adjusted  in  this  hemisphere, 
without  the  cooperation  or  even  knowledge  of  the  United 
States?  Were  they  to  be  canvassed  and  adjusted  .  .  .  without 
some  proper  understanding  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain,  as  the  two  chief  maritime  states  of  both  worlds?  2 
.  .  .  He  [Canning]  had  the  strongest  reasons  for  believing  that 

1  Rush,  op.  dt.,  p.  391. 
.,  p.  392. 


BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE       [n% 

the  cooperation  of  the  United  States  with  England,  through  my 
instrumentality,  afforded  with  promptitude,  would  ward  of? 
altogether  the  meditated  jurisdiction  of  the  European  powers 
over  the  new  world.1  .  .  .  Why  then  should  the  United  States, 
whose  institutions  resembled  those  of  Great  Britain  more  than 
they  did  those  of  the  other  powers  of  Europe,  and  whose 
policy  upon  this  occasion  was  closely  approximated  to  her's. 
hesitate  to  act  with  her  to  promote  a  common  object  approved 
alike  by  both;  and  achieve  a  common  good  estimated  alike 
by  both.2 

These  were  potent  arguments.  They  were  not  only  con- 
vincing of  Canning's  anxious  desire  for  an  Anglo-American 
understanding  on  the  Spanish-American  situation,  but  they 
were  clearly  intended  to  furnish  some 


motive  and  to  give  a  certain  direction  to  the  attitude  of  the 
United  States  relative  to  the  situation.  The  community  of 
interest  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain,  the  special 
interest  of  the  former  as  the  first  power  in  the  western 
hemisphere,  the  reference  to  the  similarity  of  their  institu- 
tions, their  maritime  strength,  the  sure  effectiveness  of 
their  combined  action,  and  the  justice  and  necessity  of  such 
action,  were  points  to  which  the  American  statesmen  must 
have  listened  with  interest.  Some  of  them  must  have 
sounded  like  echoes  of  earlier  pronouncements  of  American 
policy;  others  encouraged  the  hope  of  its  realization.  The 
position  assumed  by  Great  Britain  as  expressed  by  Cann- 
ing must  have  given  such  encouragement.  Whether  the 
government  of  the  United  States  would  act  jointly  with  that 
of  Great  Britain  to  prevent  European  intervention  in  South 
America,  or  avail  itself  now  of  the  opportunity  to  declare 
to  the  world  the  existence  of  a  distinctly  American  policy, 
long  maturing,  the  favorable  attitude  of  Great  Britain  was 

1  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  394. 
»  Ibid.,  p.  395. 


THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE 


x  Io. 


no  less  necessary  to  render  the  policy  of  European  exclusion 
effective.  *^ 

Rush  recognized  in  the  policy  of  Great  Britain  something 
that  harmonized  with  that  of  the  United  States,  although  he 
also  saw  something  in  it  that  was  designed  to  benefit  Great 
Britain.  Yet,  since  the  support  of  that  policy  would  add 
strength  to  that  of  the  United  States,  Rush  was  favorably 
disposed  toward  the  acceptance  of  Canning's  proposition 
for  its  practical  effects.1  But  a  serious  obstruction  to  any 
agreement  looking  to  concurrent  action  still  remained.  It 
was  Canning's  unwillingness  to  acknowledge  the  independ- 
ence of  the  new  states  of  South  America.  To  all  the  argu- 
ments which  Canning  had  presented  in  the  hope  of  persuad- 
ing the  United  States  to  join  her  policy  with  that  of  Great 
Britain,  Rush  replied  that  the  whole  matter  would  come  to 
a  most  satisfactory  conclusion  if  only  Great  Britain  would 
recognize  the  independence  of  these  states.  The  European 
congress  might  meet  afterwards,  but  it  would  be  of  no 
account.2  If  only  Great  Britain  would  extend  recognition^ 
Rush  would  consent,  in  the  name  of  his  government,  to  the 
"  formal  promulgation  to  the  world  "  of  that  declaration 
to  which  Canning  had  invited  him.3  But  Canning  was  un- 
yielding, believing,  as  he  told  Rush,  that  the  new  states  did 
not  yet  possess  sufficient  internal  stability  to  warrant  British 
recognition.4  Moreover,  Canning  admitted,  immediate  re- 
cognition might  cause  his  country  some  embarrassment,  of 
which  there  was  no  danger  in  the  case  of  the  United  States 
when  the  latter  recognized  the  southern  republics.8  He  was 
evidently  alluding  to  England's  relations  with  the  con- 

1  Rush,  op.  dt.,  p.  405, 
8  Ibid.,  p.  396. 
'*  Ibid.,  p.  397. 
4  Ibid.,  p.  39& 
*  Ibid. 


120         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [I2O 

tinental  powers,  and  to  the  probable  effect  of  immediate 
recognition  upon  those  relations.1  The  European  situation 
was  such  as  to  demand,  on  the  part  of  England,  the  exer- 
cise of  diplomatic  caution  to  avoid  war.  For  England, 
then,  favorable  conditions  for  the  recognition  of  the  re- 
publics had  not  yet  matured  through  "  time  and  circum- 
stances." The  best  that  Canning  could  offer  was  a  promise 
of  future  acknowledgment  of  their  independence ; z  but  Rush 
was  firm  in  his  insistence  upon  its  immediate  recognition 
as  the  price  of  a  joint  declaration  of  policy.8 

The  series  of  interviews  between  Canning  and  Rush  re- 
lative to  an  Anglo-American  declaration  terminated  rather 
suddenly  on  8  October.4  In  reporting  the  incident  to 
Secretary  Adams,  Rush  remarked: 

At  a  conference  with  Mr.  Canning  on  the  day  before  yester- 
day, he  said  nothing  of  Spanish-American  affairs,  except 
barely  to  remark  at  parting,  that  he  should  send  off  consuls  to 
the  new  states  very  soon,  perhaps  in  the  course  of  this  month. 
...  Mr.  Canning  not  having  acceded  to  my  proposal,  nor  I 
to  his,  we  stand  as  we  were  before  his  first  advance  to  me,  with 
the  exception  only  of  the  light  which  the  interesting  discussion 
may  be  supposed  to  have  shed  upon  the  dispositions  and  policy 
of  England  in  this  important  matter.  It  appears  that  having 
ends  of  her  own  in  view,  she  has  been  anxious  to  facilitate 
their  accomplishment  by  invoking  my  auxiliary  offices  as  the 
Minister  of  the  United  States  at  this  court;  but  as  to  the 
independence  of  the  new  states  of  America,  for  their  own 
benefit,  that  this  seems  quite  another  question  in  her 
diplomacy.6 

1  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  405;  supra,  pp.  100-101. 

•  Ibid.,  p.  405.  s  ibid. 

4  Ford,  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  Connection  with  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, p.  56,  Rush  to  Adams,  10  October,  1823. 

8  Ford,  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  Connection  with  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trint,  pp.  56-57,  Rush  to  Adams,  10  October,  1823. 


!  2  j  ]  THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE  1 2 1 

Canning  refused  immediate  recognition  of  the  South 
American  states  as  a  condition  of  a  joint  Anglo-American 
declaration  not  only  because  he  considered  such  a  step  as 
diplomatically  inexpedient,1  but  also  because  of  his  own 
preference  for  the  monarchical  form  of  government  and  the 
unpopularity  of  republicanism  in  Europe  generally.  Al- 
though he  may  not  have  entertained  any  serious  hopes  of 
ever  seeing  the  monarchical  form  of  government  substituted 
for  the  republican  by  the  South  American  states,  and  al- 
though he  would  not  insist  upon  such  a  change  as  a  condition 
upon  which  Great  Britain  would  grant  recognition,2  never- 
theless the  fact  that  the  new  states  were  republics  may  have 
been  the  strong  political  obstacle  to  immediate  recognition. 
The  language  of  the  Memorandum  recording  the  conclu- 
sions of  the  Canning-Polignac  conference  respecting  Latin 
America,  9  October,  1823,  gives  the  impression  of  Can- 
ning's desire  to  see  the  monarchical  form  of  government 
established  by  the  new  states.  The  last  paragraph  of  the 
Memorandum  represents  Canning  as  having  said  that 

however  desirable  the  establishment  of  a  monarchical  form  of 
government,  in  any  of  those  Provinces  might  be,  on  the  one 
hand,  or  whatever  might  be  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  it, 
on  the  other,  his  government  could  not  take  upon  itself  to 
put  it  forward  as  a  condition  of  their  recognition.3 

However,  any  aversion  which  Canning  might  have  had  for 
the  republican  form  of  government  would  probably  have 
yielded  to  the  pressure  of  the  commercial  interests  had  the 
act  of  recognition  been  diplomatically  safe. 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  22;  Temperley,  op.  cit.,  p.  i?9; 
supra,  p.  107. 

a  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  xi,  p.  53. 

8  Ibid.,  Memorandum  of  Conference  between  Canning  and  Prince  de 
Polignac;  cf.  Rush,  op.  cit.,  pp.  412,  468. 


122         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE       [122 

It  was  the  failure  to  reach  an  agreement  with  Rush  that 
made  it  necessary  for  Canning1  to  seek  other  means  through 
which  a  practical  solution  of  the  Spanish-American  ques- 
tion might  be  found, — a  solution  that  would  safeguard  the 
interests  of  Great  Britain  in  Spanish  America.  For  this 
purpose  Canning  now  turned  to  France,  the  one  nation  from 
which  he  had  the  most  to  fear.1 

Rush  suspected,  in  his  despatch  to  Secretary  Adams  on 
10  October,  that  some  "  fresh  explanations  with  France  '* 
were  the  cause  of  the  sudden  termination  of  Canning's  in- 
terest in  an  Anglo-American  concert  of  policy.2  He  was  con- 
firmed in  this  belief  when,  on  24  November,  Canning  told 
him  that,  owing  to  their  failure  to  reach  an  agreement  on 
the  policy  of  concurrent  action,  and  because  "  time  and  the 
pressure  of  events  did  not  allow  of  an  indefinite  postpone- 
ment of  a  matter,  which  was  liable,  from  day  to  day,  to  be 
brought  into  immediate  discussion  by  other  Powers,"  he 
had  found  it  indispensable  to  come  "  to  an  explanation  with 
France."  3 

It  was  during  the  early  part  of  October  that  Canning  and 
Prince  de  Polignac  had  these  conversations  which  finally 
concluded  with  the  agreement  of  9  October.4  In  this 
agreement  the  French  government  admitted  the  hopeless- 
ness of  restoring  the  American  colonies  of  Spain  to  their 
former  relation  of  loyalty  to  their  mother  country ; 6  and 

1Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  26. 

3  Ford,  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  Connection  with  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, p.  57,  Rush  to  Adams,  10  October,  1823. 

8  Ford,  John  Quincy  A  dams ,  his  Connection  with  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, pp.  62  et  seq.,  Rush  to  Adams,  16  November,  1823;  Rush,  op. 
cit.,  pp.  409-410. 

4  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  xi,  pp.  49-53 ;  F.  O.,  Russia, 
January-December,  1823,  Canning  to  Bagot,  3  December,  1823,  no.  20; 
Parliamentary  Papers,  (1824),  vol.  xxiv,  pp.  645  et  seq. 


J23]  THE  ANGLO-AMERICAN  ENTENTE 

Prince  de  Polignac  abjured  for  France  any  "  design  of 
acting  in  any  case  against  the  colonies  by  force  of  arms." 
These  admissions  on  the  part  of  the  French  representative 
considerably  lessened  the  chances  of  any  difficulty  arising 
out  of  British  recognition  of  the  new  republics,2  and  vir- 
tually acknowledged  the  right  of  the  Spanish-American 
colonies  to  independent  sovereignty.3  As  a  result  of  the 
Canning-Polignac  agreement,  British  apprehensions  were 
fully  allayed.  Canning  no  longer  had  any  reasons  to  fear 
either  armed  intervention  by  France  in  South  America  or 
any  interruption  of  the  peace  of  Europe  on  that  account.* 
It  was  a  great  victory  for  Canning  at  the  expense  of  France, 
whose  government  now  manifested  a  yielding  attitude.5 
Wheffthe  news  of  the  Canning-Polignac  agreement  reached 
the  courts  of  the  allied  powers,  their  reaction  to  it  was  one 
of  displeasure.6 

Of  the  significance  of  this  agreement  as  a  solution  of  the 
Spanish-American  problem  which  Canning  and  Rush  had 
aimed  to  solve  by  a  joint  declaration,  Canning  wrote  to 
Rush: 

...  I  flatter  myself  that  neither  you  nor  we  shall  have  to 
lift  our  voice  against  any  of  the  designs  which  were  appre- 
hended a  few  months  ago.7 

Thus  Canning  interpreted  his  agreement  with  Prince  de 

1  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1824),  vol.  xxiv,  pp.  645  et  seq. 

1  Ibid. 

3 Ibid.;  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  33. 

*Ibid.'t  Ford,  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  Connection  with  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  p.  64,  Rush  to  Adams,  26  November,  1823. 

6  Ibid. 

8  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  33. 

T  Ford,  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  Connection  with  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, p.  65,  Canning  to  Rush,  13  December,  1823. 


124 


BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE 


PoHgnac  as  so  conclusive  as  to  render  unnecessary  any 
declaration  by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  either 
singly  or  jointly,  against  European  intervention  in  America. 
But  eleven  days  previous  to  the  date  of  Canning's  letter, 
President  Monroe  announced  to  the  world  the  doctrine  that 
bears  his  name. 


CHAPTER  VI 
THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

ALTHOUGH  the  South  American  policy  of  'both  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain  aimed  to  prevent  European 
intervention,  the  interests  and  diplomatic  relations  of  the 
one,  and  the  traditional  policy  and  suspicions  *  of  the  other, 
prevented  their  governments  from  engaging  in  a  joint  de- 
claration. Separate  statement  of  policy  was  resorted  to  in 
the  case  of  each  of  these  countries.  Notwithstanding  that 
fact  they  were  as  successful  in  achieving  the  immediate  pur- 
pose common  to  both  as  if  their  opposition  to  European  in- 
tervention had  taken  the  form  of  a  joint  declaration. 

Canning's  suggestion  for  an  Anglo-American  declaration 
met  with  the  opposition  of  the  statesmen  in  the  United 
States  whose  reverence  for  the  traditional  policy  of  aloof- 
ness would  not  permit  their  government  to  engage  in  any 
action  which  might  compromise  the  continuity  of  that  policy. 
Rush  was  thoroughly  familiar  with  this  attitude  among  his 
fellow-statesmen.2  The  policy  of  the  United  States  had 
been  one  of  peaceful  relations  with  all  nations,  "  without 
offending  or  forming  entangling  alliances  with  any."  8  Ac- 
ceding to  Canning's  propositions  would  have  meant  the 
association  of  the  United  States  with  one  of  the  great 
powers  of  Europe  against  a  group  of  other  powers  of  the 
same  rank.* 

1  Infra,  p.  129. 

•  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  390. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  391. 

4  Ibid.,  p.  390. 

125]  125 


I26         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE       [I26 

The  strongest  opponent  of  the  policy  of  joint  declaration 
was  John  Quincy  Adams,  who  occupied  at  the  time  the  very 
strategic  position  of  Secretary  of  State.  To  him  a  separate 
declaration  of  policy  by  the  United  States,  now  that  the  op- 
position of  Great  Britain  to  European  intervention  in  South 
America  was  known,  would  be  fully  as  effective  as  a  joint 
Anglo-American  declaration.  He  aimed  at  the  preservation 
of  the  traditional  policy  of  the  United  States,  and  at  the 
same  time  at  the  prevention  of  European  interference.  . 

However,  President  Monroe  wisely  sought  the  counsel 
of  men  who  could  speak  from  experience  gained  in  his  own 
position :  the  two  ex- Presidents  of  the  United  States,  Jef- 
ferson and  Madison.  Jefferson  replied  to  President 
Monroe's  request l  for  his  advice : 

The  question  presented  by  the  letters  you  have  sent  me,  is  the 
most  momentous  which  has  ever  been  offered  to  my  con- 
templation since  that  of  Independence.  That  made  us  a  nation, 
this  sets  our  compass  and  points  the  course  which  we  are  to 
steer  through  the  ocean  of  time  opening  on  us.  ...  One 
nation,  most  of  all,  could  disturb  us  in  our  endeavor  to  make 
our  hemisphere  that  of  freedom;  she  now  offers  to  lead,  aid, 
and  accompany  us  in  it.  By  acceding  to  her  proposition,  we 
detach  her  from  the  bonds,  bring  her  mighty  weight  into  the 
scale  of  free  government,  and  emancipate  a  continent  at  one 
stroke,  which  might  otherwise  linger  long  in  doubt  and  diffi- 
culty. Great  Britain  is  the  nation  which  can  do  us  the  most 
harm  of  any  one,  or  all  on  earth ;  and  with  her  on  our  side  we 
need  not  fear  the  whole  world.  With  her,  then,  we  should 
most  sedulously  cherish  a  cordial  friendship ;  and  nothing  could 
tend  more  to  knit  our  affections  than  to  be  fighting  once  more, 
side  by  side  in  the  same  cause.  .  .  ,  With  Great  Britain 
withdrawn  from  their  scale  and  shifted  into  that  of  our  own 

1  Hamilton  (S.  M.),  The  Writings  of  James  Monroe,  (New  York> 
1902),  vol.  vi,  pp.  323-325. 


I27J  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  127 

continents,  all  Europe  combined  would  not  undertake  such 
a  war.1 

Madison  concurred  in  the  opinion  of  Jefferson: 

It  is  particularly  fortunate  that  the  policy  of  Great  Britain, 
though  guided  by  calculations  different  from  our's,  has  pre- 
sented a  cooperation  for  an  object  the  same  with  our's.  With 
that  cooperation  we  have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  rest  of 
Europe,  and  with  it  the  best  assurance  of  success  to  our  laud- 
able views.  There  ought  not,  therefore,  to  be  any  backward- 
ness, I  think,  in  meeting  her  in  the  way  she  has  proposed.2 

Two  days  after  sending  these  views  to  President  Monroe, 
Madison  wrote  Jefferson  a  letter  in  which  he  reiterated  that, 
"  with  the  British  power  and  navy  combined  with  our's,  we 
have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  rest  of  the  world " 

Both  these  veteran  statesmen  were  convinced  of  the  ef- 
fectiveness of  a  joint  Anglo-American  policy  in  keeping 
the  European  Alliance  from  intervening  in  South  America. 
The  danger  of  such  intervention  to  the  cause  of  freedom 
seemed  so  real  to  their  minds  that  they  permitted  the  prac- 
tical expediency  of  joint  action  to  overcome  their  scruples 
against  foreign  entanglements.  Political  considerations 
made  Jefferson  to  hope  that  by  joining  with  Great  Britain, 
that  country  could  be  permanently  won  over  to  the  side  of 
liberal  institutions.  Not  only  did  these  statesmen  perceive 
in  a  joint  policy  a  means  of  preventing  European  inter- 
vention in  South  America :  they  saw  in  it  the  opportunity  of 
administering  a  decisive  blow  to  political  despotism  in  old 
Europe.3 

1  Ford,  The  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  vol.  x,  pp.  277  et  seq., 
Jefferson  to  Monroe,  24  October,  1823. 

'Hunt  (G.),  The  Writings  of  James  Madison,  (New  York,  1900-10), 
vol.  ix,  pp.  157  et  seq.,  Madison  to  Monroe,  30  October,  1823. 

8  Ford,  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  vol.  x,  pp.  277  et  seq.,  Jefferson 
to  Monroe,  24  October,  1823. 


I28         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE       [I2g 

However,  other  circumstances  besides  those  arising  out 
of  the  policy  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  determined  the 
course  of  the  American  government.  While  opposition  to 
the  continental  policy  of  intervention  afforded  a  common 
ground  upon  which  the  governments  of  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  might  have  acted  in  concert,  the  suspicions 
which  each  entertained  of  the  other's  desire  to  acquire  ad- 
ditional territory  in  the  western  hemisphere  was  a  most 
powerful  factor  in  determining  the  government  of  the 
United  States  to  act  alone.  For  some  time  previous  to  the 
declaration  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  both  England  and  the 
United  States  had  manifested  their  concern  for  the  fate  of 
Cuba.1 

Early  in  1823,  Stratford  Canning,  British  Minister  at 
Washington,  reported  to  his  chief  that  the  American  Cabinet 
was  busy  with  some  new  project  in  the  West  Indies,  that 
confidential  agents  had  been  despatched  to  Porto  Rico,  that 
"  the  fate  of  Cuba  is  still  an  object  of  general  discussion/' 
that  one  journalist  had  published  an  address  to  the  Cubans 
with  a  view  to  inciting  them  to  an  "  immediate  declaration 
of  independence/'  The  British  commander  in  West 
Indian  waters  instructed  Captain  Bouchier  to  find  out  all 
he  could  about  Key  West  and  its  advantage  as  a  naval  base 
in  case  of  war.  But  he  must  not,  in  his  attempt  to  obtain 
the  desired  information,  arouse  the  suspicions  of  the  Ameri- 
cans.8 

President  Jefferson,  as  early  as  1808,  expressed  his  fears 
kst  the  ownership  of  Cuba*  should  be  transferred  from 

1  Stapleton,  Some  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  i,  p.  52; 
Latane,  op.  cit.,  pp.  84-88. 

9  h~.  O.,  America,  March-August,  1823,  Stratford  Canning  to  George 
Canning,  9  April,  1823,  no.  38. 

9F.  O.,  America,  March- August,  1823,  Bouchier  to  Stratford  Canning, 
19  April,  1823. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

Spain  to  some  other  power;  and  in  1809  he  hinted  strongly 
at  the  possible  acquisition  of  the  island  by  the  United  States.1 

It  is  clear  that  both  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
realized  the  strategic  importance  of  the  island,  and  that  its 
possession  carried  with  it  the  control  of  the  Caribbean  and 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  Possession  of  the  island  by  any 
strong  European  power,  such  as  England,  would,  therefore, 
place  a  tremendous  obstacle  in  the  way^of  the  southward 
expansion  and  the  political  hegemony  of  the  United  States 
in  the  New  World. 

Secretary  Adams  interpreted  the  last  of  Canning's  five 
propositions  2  as  representing  the  intention  of  the  British 
government  to  obtain  from  the  government  of  the  United 
States  a  public  pledge  against  seeking  to  acquire  any  part 
of  the  Spanish- American  possessions.3  Such  a  joint  self- 
denying  declaration  would  have  prevented  future  expansion 
of  the  United  States  through  the  acquisition  of  Spanish- 
American  territory,  except  with  the  consent  of  Great  Britain. 
The  United  States  would  have  lost  the  freedom  of  individual 
action.4 

In  respect  to  Spanish-American  territory  the  aims  of  the 
two  countries  seemed  to  be  mutually  exclusive.  Accord- 
ingly, Adams  insisted,  not  only  upon  a  separate  protest  by 
his  government  against  European  intervention,  but  also 
upon  the  announcement  of  a  principle  aiming  to  prevent  the 
acquisition  of  additional  American  territory  by  European 
powers,  England  included.5  The  scope  of  American  policy 

1  Ford,  The  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  vol.  xi,  p.  106,  Jefferson 
to  Madison,  19  April,  1809. 

2  Supra,  p.  114. 

3  Adams  (C.  F.),  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  (Philadelphia,  1874- 
77),  vol.  vi,  p.  177- 

*Temperley,    "The    Later    American    Policy   of    George   Canning," 
American  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  xi,  p.  797. 
8  Adams,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  200. 


I30         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [130 

was  thus  to  be  enlarged  to  include  a  prohibition  against 
further  colonization  in  the  western  hemisphere. 

The  widening  of  the  scope  of  this  policy  was  influenced 
by  the  independent  action  of  the  Russian  government,  as 
well  as  by  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  American  government 
to  exclude  the  British  from  the  Oregon  country.  On  4 
September,  1821,  the  Russian  Tsar  issued  a  ukase  in  which 
he  claimed  for  Russia  the  northwestern  coast  of  America 
as  far  south  as  the  fifty-first  parallel,  and  also  prohibited  the 
vessels  of  foreign  powers  from  approaching  within  one 
hundred  Italian  miles  of  the  territory  thus  claimed.1  These 
claims  were  offensive  alike  to  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain;  because  both  countries  had  previous  claims  to  a 
part  of  the  region  embraced  in  the  ukase.  Some  of  the 
places  lying  within  the  area  claimed  by  Russia  were  actually 
occupied  by  American  and  British  subjects.2  The  United 
States  rested  its  claims  upon  the  Spanish  treaty  of  1819 
(ratified  in  1821)  by  which  Spain  ceded  to  the  United 
States  all  her  rights  to  the  land  north  of  the  forty-second 
degree  north  latitude,3  and  upon  the  rights  of  discovery  and 
exploration.4  Great  Britain  also  based  her  claims  upon 
the  rights  of  previous  discovery  and  exploration.5 

By  the  Anglo-American  treaty  of  i8'i8  the  two  countries 
had  agreed  upon  joint  occupation  of  any  "  country  that  may 
be  claimed  by  either  party  on  the  northwest  coast  of 

1  U.  S.,  Foreign  Relations,  (1890),  p.  439;  F.  O.,  Russia,  September- 
December,  1821,  Bagot  to  Londonderry,  17/29  November,  1821,  no.  56. 

2  Hansard,  Par/.  Debates,  (n.  s.),  vol.  ix,  p.  387. 

*F.   O.,  Russia,  January-December,    1823,    Bagot  to  Canning,    17/29 
October,  1823,  no.  48. 

4  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  v,  p.  446,  Adams  to 
Rush,  22  July,  1823. 

5  F.    O.,    America,    Domestic,    Various,    September-December,    1823, 
Stratford  Canning  to  George  Canning,  24  December,  1823. 


!  3 1  ]  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  1 3 1 

America,  westward  of  the  Stony  Mountains."  1  Being  joint 
occupants  of  the  territory,  part  of  which  was  so  extra- 
vagantly claimed  by  Russia,  both  the  government  of  the 
United  States  and  that  of  Great  Britain  protested  against 
the  ukase.2  The  government  of  Great  Britain  considered 
the  exclusion  of  vessels  of  other  powers  from  within  a 
radius  of  one  hundred  Italian  miles  of  the  northwest  coast 
as  contrary  to  the  law  of  nations;  while  Secretary  Adams 
informed  Baron  de  Tuyll,  the  Russian  Minister  at  Washing- 
ton, "  that  we  should  contest  the  right  of  Russia  to  any 
territorial  establishment  on  this  continent,  and  that  we 
should  assume  distinctly  the  principle  that  the  American 
continents  are  no  longer  subjects  for  any  new  European 
colonial  establishments."  3  i 

Although  both  of  the  joint  occupants  of  the  Oregon 
country  at  first  perceived  certain  advantages  in  joint  nego- 
tiations with  Russia  respecting  the  northwest  claims  of  the 
three  powers,4  and  although  Secretary  Adams  sent  instruc- 
tions to  Rush  and  Middleton,  the  latter  being  American 
Minister  at  St.  Petersburg,  with  that  purpose  in  view,  the 
British  government  suddenly  decided  to  treat  separately1 
with  Russia.  The  government  of  the  United  States,  there- 
fore, proceeded  to  negotiate  the  Russo-American  treaty  of 
17  April,  i824.5  By  that  treaty  the  United  States  and  Russia 
agreed  upon  the  line  54°  40'  as  the  boundary  between  their 
respective  claims  on  the  northwest  coast,  while  Russia  at 

1  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  v,  p.  446,  Adams  to 
Rush,  22  July,  1823. 

3  Ibid.,  p.  447. 

8  Adams,  op.  cit.,  vol.  vi,  p.  163. 

*/*".  O.f  America,  March -August,  1823,  Stratford  Canning  to  George 
Canning,  3  May,  1823,  no.  47;  ibid.,  Russia,  January-December,  1823, 
Canning  to  Bagot,  12  July,  1823,  no.  12. 

6  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  v,  pp.  432  et  seq. 


BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

the  same  time  recognized  the  three-mile  limit  of  her  coastal 
waters. 

Viewed  in  their  relation  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  two 
most  interesting  developments  arising  out  of  the  Russian 
claims  are :  first,  the  fact  that  the  Russian  ukase  afforded 
the  government  of  the  United  States  a  stronger  ground  upon 
which  to  base  its  opposition  to  further  colonization  of  the 
American  continents  by  European  powers ;  secondly,  the  re- 
fusal of  Canning  to  enter  into  joint  Anglo-American  nego- 
tiations with  Russia  because  of  the  principle  which  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  adopted  of  "  not  considering 
the  American  continents  as  subjects  for  future  colonization 
by  any  of  the  European  powers — a  principle  to  which  Great 
Britain  does  not  accede." 

On  15  November,  1823,  the  government  of  the  United 
States  received  from  the  Tsar  a  communication  in  which, 
as  the  spokesman  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  he  expressed  his 
admiration  for  the  system  of  government  which  that 
Alliance  represented,  declaring  also  his  intention  not  to  re- 
ceive representatives  from  any  of  the  new  republics  of 
Latin  America.2  The  document  seemed  but  another  chal- 
lenge of  republican  institutions  by  European  despotism.  It 
must  be  answered  immediately,  lest  the  Alliance  should 
actually  intervene  in  Latin  America,  and  there  should  take 
place  the  political  changes  and  the  transfer  of  territory 
which  would  be  so  detrimental  to  the  future  leadership  of 
the  United  States  in  the  western  hemisphere. 

Conditions  were  now  most  favorable  and  most  compel- 
ling for  the  announcement  of  a  distinctly  American  policy. 
Its  announcement  at  this  juncture  of  the  conflicting  pur- 

1  Ibid.,  p.  463,  'Rush  to  Middleton,  9  January,  1824;  cf.  Smith,  In- 
ternational Law,  p.  95. 

*  American  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  viii,  pp.  30  et  seq.,  Count  Nesselrode  to 
Baron  Tuyll,  30  August,  1823. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

poses  of  nations  not  only  afforded  the  administration  the 
opportunity  to  make  it  more  comprehensive  in  its  principles, 
but  gave  to  it  a  wider  application  than  would  have  been  the 
case  had  it  been  limited  to  a  joint  Anglo-American  protest, 
as  suggested  by  Canning,  against  European  intervention  in 
Latin  America.  The  Russian  ukase  of  1821,  the  Tsar's 
communication  of  30  August,  1823,  and  the  American  sus- 
picions of  British  territorial  designs,  all  combined  to  in- 
fluence the  administration  in  its  decision  to  decline  joint 
action  with  Great  Britain,  and  to  enlarge  the  protest  against 
European  intervention  so  as  to  include  a  prohibition  of 
further  attempts  by  European  powers  to  colonize  any  part 
of  the  American  continents.1 

The  essential  elements  of  this  policy  are  contained  in 
Adams'  reply  2  to  the  Tsar's  communication  of  30  August, 
1823;  but  they  were  publicly  declared  in  the  President's 
Message  of  2  December  of  the  same  year.  In  the  Message 
'its  principles  were  directed  as  a  protest  against  the  ambi- 
tions, political  or  territorial,  of  no  one  power,  but  of  all  of 
them — England  included,  so  far  as  she  aimed  at  territorial 
acquisitions. 

On  29  November  Secretary  Adams  despatched  to  Rush 
the  official  reply  of  the  United  States  to  Canning's  invita- 
tion to  concert  of  action.  After  expressing  "  an  anxious 
solicitude  for  the  cultivation  of  that  harmony  of  opinions, 
and  unity  of  object  between  the  British  and  American 
Nations,  upon  which  so  much  of  the  Peace,  and  Happiness, 
and  Liberty  of  the  world  obviously  depend,"  Adams  replied 
categorically  to  Canning's  five  propositions.3  In  the  first, 

JFord    (W.  €.),  "John  Quincy  Adams  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine," 
American  Hist,  Rev.}  vol.  viii,  p.  32. 

2 1 bid.,  pp.  41-42. 
3  Supra,  p.  1 14. 


BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

Adams  naturally  concurred.  In  the  case  of  the  second,  the 
United  States  had  already  recognized  the  hopelessness  of 
the  recovery  of  the  colonies  by  Spain  and  had,  therefore, 
acknowledged  them  as  independent  nations.  In  reply  to  the 
third,  Adams  insisted  that  the  amicable  arrangement  be- 
tween the  colonies  and  Spain  should  be  founded  on  inde- 
pendence, and  "  provided  their  accommodation  with  Spain 
was  founded  on  that  basis,"  the  United  States  would  claim 
equal  favor  with  the  most  favored  nations  politically  and 
commercially  in  her  relations  with  the  Latin-American 
states.1 

In  reply  to  the  last  two  of  Canning's  propositions,  Adams 
set  forth  the  condition  on  which  a  joint  declaration  of  policy 
would  be  possible  : 

In  both  these  positions  we  fully  concur  —  and  we  add  that 
we  could  not  see  with  indifference  any  attempt  by  one  or  more 
powers  of  Europe,  to  restore  those  new  states  to  the  crown  of 
Spain,  or  to  deprive  them,  in  any  manner  whatever,  of  the  free- 
dom and  independence  which  they  have  acquired.2 

But  a  joint  declaration  of  policy  with  Great  Britain  was 
conditioned  only  upon  British  recognition  of  the  new  re- 
publics.3 

So  far  Adams  had  answered  Canning's  five  propositions  ,* 
and  although  willing  to  enter  into  joint  action  with  Great 
Britain,  provided  that  the  latter  would  recognize  the  new 
states,  he  feared  that  in  case  of  an  alliance,  the  United 
States  would  become  a  mere  "  cock-boat  of  the  British  man- 
o'-war."  That  fear  and  his  patriotic  pride,  coupled  with 
the  strong  statesmanlike  motive  of  shaping  the  course  of 
American  policy  consistently  with  the  potentialities  of  his 

1  A  merican  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  viii,  p.  36. 


8  Ibid. 


I35]  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  135 

growing  country,  prompted  him  to  advocate  separate  action 
unless  future  circumstances  should  compel  an  Anglo-Ameri- 
can concert.  Hence  the  tone  of  the  concluding  paragraph : 

We  believe,  however,  that  for  the  most  effectual  accomplish- 
ment of  the  object  common  to  both  governments,  a  perfect  un- 
derstanding with  regard  to  it  being  established  between  them, 
it  will  be  most  advisable  that  they  should  act  separately  each 
making  such  representation  to  the  Continental  European  Allies 
or  either  of  them,  as  circumstances  may  render  proper,  and 
mutually  communicating  to  each  other  the  purport  of  such 
representations,  and  all  information  respecting  the  measures 
and  purposes  of  the  Allies  .  .  .  towards  the  honourable  end 
which  will  be  common  to  them  both.1 

The  reply  to  the  British  government  represented  a  triumph 
of  the  conservative  policy  of  avoiding  foreign  alliances; 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  enunciated  in  the  President's  Mes- 
sage represented  an  attitude  that  was  common  to  both  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  so  far  as  that  attitude  was 
one  of  opposition  to  European  intervention  in  South 
America.  But  while  the  Monroe  Doctrine  represented  in 
part  an  Anglo-American  policy,  its  prohibition  of  future 
colonization  on  the  American  continents  was  distinctly  of- 
fensive to  Great  Britain,  and  made  necessary  its  separate 
declaration  by  the  government  of  the  United  States.  On 
the  other  hand,  had  the  government  of  the  United  States 
failed  entirely  to  declare  its  policy,  and  permitted  Great 
Britain  alone  to  act  in  seeking  to  prevent  European  inter- 
vention in  South  America,  it  is  probable  that  the  gratitude 
of  the  new  states  would  have  enabled  the  British  to  gain  a 
controlling  influence  over  them.2  If  there  were  any  grounds 
for  such  suspicions,  it  was  imperative  for  the  government 

1  American  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  viii,  pp.  37-38. 

2  Johnson,  America's  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  i,  p.  344. 


I36         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [136 

of  the  United  States  to  declare  its  policy  immediately, 
though  separately. 

Secretary  Adams  had  played  a  clever  diplomatic  game: 
he  would  have  an  understanding  with  Great  Britain,  but  he 
would  not  make  of  his  country  a  mere  cock-boat  to  follow, 
in  the  wake  of  the  British  man-o'-war.  The  result  added 
strength  to  the  position  of  the  United  States  which  was  now, 
able  to  assume  a  more  courageous  stand  in  relation  to  the 
European  Allies.  He  felt  certain  that  Great  Britain  would 
cooperate  without  a  joint  declaration:  ".  .  .  .  My  reliance 
upon  the  cooperation  of  Great  Britain  rested  not  upon  her 
principles  but  upon  her  interests. "  England  possessed  at 
that  time  a  navy  as  large  as  the  combined  navies  of  all  the 
other  powers  of  the  world ; 2  and  so  far  as  the  existence  of 
the  British  navy  compelled  respect  for  those  interests,  it  also 
compelled  respect  for,  and  observance  of,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine.8 

It  would  be  a  difficult  task  to  measure  the  relative  import- 
ance of  the  motives  which  actuated  Canning  in  his  policy 
toward  South  America.  They  have  been  variously  inter- 
preted. He  was  undoubtedly  possessed  of  a  desire  to  redress 
the  balance  of  the  old  world,  to  erect  a  barrier  against  the 
ambitious  designs  of  France,  to  protect  British  commercial 
interests  in  South  America,  and  to  oppose  consistently  the 
policy  of  intervention.4  Probably,  too,  he  actually  sensed 
a  danger  to  British  interests  in  South  America,  should  the 
influence  of  the  United  States  gain  the  ascendancy  among 
the  new  republics.5  Canning  was  also  inspired  by  the 

1  Adams,  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams,  vol.  vi,  p.  203. 

2  Hansard,  Parl.  Debates,  (n.  s.),  vol.  x,  p.  172. 
*  Fish,  American  Diplomacy,  p.  2111. 

4  Marriott   (J.  A.  R.),  "The  Foreign  Policy  of  the  United  States," 
Edinburgh  Rev.,  vol.  ccxxix,  pp.  356-357;  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p. 
336;  Moore,  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  p.  240;  The  Examiner, 
28  September  and  26  October,  1823, 

5  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  471. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

patriotic  motive  of  raising  Great  Britain  to  a  position  of 
leadership  through  a  course  of  action  independent  of,  even 
contrary  to,  the  policy  of  the  continental  powers.1 

But  irrespective  of  the  interests  of  the  British  people,  or 
the  motives  and  principles  of  their  government,  the  policy 
of  Great  Britain  as  pursued  by  her  Foreign  Secretary  har- 
monized sufficiently  with  that  of  the  United  States  to  pre- 
sent an  effective  Anglo-American  opposition  to  European 
intervention  in  South  America.2 

The  failure  of  Canning  and  Rush  to  reach  any  agreement 
looking  to  concurrent  action  practically  threw  Great 
Britain  back  upon  the  letter  which  Canning  had  sent  to  Sir 
Charles  Stuart  on  31  March,  1823,  "as  the  basis  of  the 
policy  of  England."  *  The  agreement  with  Prince  de 
Polignac  was  in  essential  respects  nothing  but  a  restate- 
ment of  that  policy,  the  only  difference  being  that  the 
letter  of  3 1  March  was  a  warning,  while  the  agreement  with 
Polignac  was  an  acceptance  by  France  of  the  attitude  of 
Great  Britain  as  expressed  in  the  letter  to  Stuart.  By  that 
agreement  Canning  practically  forced  Prince  de  Polignac, 
by  threat  of  war,  to  "  disclaim  any  idea  of  French  aggres- 
sion or  influence  to  restore  the  revolted  colonies  to  Spain." 
Canning  thereby  placed  the  British  navy  between  France 
and  the  Spanish  colonies,  thus  lending  force  and  encourage- 
ment to  the  policy  that  was  shaping  in  the  United  States.3 
British  interests,  for  the  time  being  at  least,  were  safe;  a 

1  Stapleton,   George   Canning  and  His   Times,  p.  439,   Memorandum, 
27  April,  1825. 

2  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  467;  Henderson,  American  Diplomatic  Questions, 
p.  316. 

5  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  412. 

4Temperley  (H.  W.  V.),  "Later  American  Policy  of  George  Cann- 
ing," American  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  xi,  p.  779;  supra,  p.  69. 
5  Rush,  op.  cit.,  pp.  416-417. 


BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [138 

substitute  had  been  found  for  the  proposed  Anglo-American 
declaration.  The  harmony  of  the  South  American  policies 
of  the  two  English-speaking  countries  appeared  so  plain  to 
European  statesmen  that  they  were  inclined  to  regard  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  as  an  endorsement  of  British  policy.1 

In  his  report  of  the  contents  of  the  Canning-Polignac 
note,  Rush  commented  significantly  upon  the  results  of 
the  conclusions  at  which  these  two  statesmen  had  arrived: 
"  The  apprehensions  of  Britain,  however,  seem  to  be  fully 
allayed,  at  least  for  the  present;  and  it  is  certain  that  she 
does  not  now  anticipate  any  speedy  interruption  of  the 
peace  of  Europe  from  this  cause."  2 

The  principles  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  had  not  yet  been 
formulated  when  the  Canning-Polignac  conference  took 
2f\  ^  place.  /Indeed,  whether  or  not  there  was  to  be  a  Monroe 
doctrine  seems  to  have  depended  largely  upon  the  outcome 
V  of  that  conference)  Bat  the  firm  attitude  of  Great  Britain, 
coupled  with  the  fact  that  the  United  States  must  have 
I"  ,.  been  considered  at  least  as  a  potential  supporter  of  Eng- 
land's policy,  was  sufficient  reason  for  France  to  modify 
her  attitude.  Considerations  of  that  nature  weighed 
heavily  in  favor  of  Great  Britain  at  the  time  of  the  con- 
ference. The  very  character  and  political  sympathies  of 
the  United  States  were  consequently  a  powerful  asset  favor- 
able to  the  success  of  British  diplomacy  in  the  attempt  to 
check  French  aggression  in  Spanish  America.  Canning,  hav- 
ing become  familiar  with  the  position  of  the  United  States, 
felt  that  he  could  safely  depend  upon  the  support  of  this 
country  should  France  become  stubborn  and  defiant — the 
failure  of  his  plan  for  a  joint  declaration  notwithstanding. 
He  was  also  conscious  of  the  powerful  impetus  which  his 

^emperley,  "Later  American  Policy  of  George  Canning,"  American 
Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  xi,  p.  779. 
2  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  414;  cf.  Annual  Register,  vol.  Ixv,  pp.  164-165. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  139 

overture  to  Rush  gave  to  American  policy,1  in  which  he 
saw  a  source  of  strength  that  would  assure  the  success  of 
his  own:  ".  .  .  .  I  have  no  doubt  that  his  [Rush's]  report 
to  his  government  of  this  sounding  (which  he  probably  re- 
presented as  an  overture)  had  a  great  share  in  producing, 
the  explicit  declarations  of  the  President." 

The  governments  of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain 
had  become  familiar  with  one  another's  attitude  on  the 
South  American  question  through  the  Canning-Rush  cor- 
respondence and  interviews.3  The  result  was  a  feeling  of 
confidence  in  one  another's  support.  Just  as  Canning's  posi- 
tion in  his  conference  with  Prince  de  Polignac  was  streng- 
thened by  his  knowledge  of  the  attitude  of  the  United 
States,  so  the  knowledge  of  Canning's  attitude  encouraged 
the  government  of  the  United  States  to  declare  its  policy 
in  a  firm  and  decisive  tone.4  Sir  James  Mackintosh  asserted 
in  Parliament  that  President  Monroe's  Message  was  in- 
fluenced by  the  British  communications.5  Rush  himself 
agreed  essentially  with  that  opinion: 

Although,  in  the  end,  no  concerted  movement  took  place  be- 
tween the  two  governments,  the  communications  to  me,  from 
the  Secretary  of  State,  in  responding  to  the  overtures  of  Mr. 
Canning,  were  in  a  high  degree  conciliatory  towards  England ; 
and  framed  with  every  just  sensibility  to  the  frank  and  friendly 
spirit  of  those  overtures.6  .  .  .  My  despatches  had  distinctly 

1  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  p.  395,  Canning  to  William 
a  Court,  31  December,  1823. 

2  Ibid. 

8  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  39. 

4  Ibid.,  pp.  39,  46;  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  420;  Bryce  (J.),  "British  Feeling 
on  the  Venezuelan  Question,"  North  Am.  Rev.,  vol.  clxii,  p.  147. 

5  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  39. 

6  Rush,  op.  cit.,  pp.  417-418. 


I40         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [140 

put  before  our  government  the  intentions  of  England,  with 
which,  in  the  main,  our  policy  harmonized.1 

For  various  reasons,  then,  Canning,  though  no  outspoken 
advocate  of  liberal  forms  of  government,  found  himself 
by  coincidence  of  economic  interest,  a  champion  of  liberal- 
ism in  1823. 2  That  he  was  guilty  of  exaggeration  when 
he  asserted  in  1826  that  he  had  "  called  the  new  world 
into  existence  to  redress  the  balance  of  the  old  "  cannot  be 
denied.  His  chief  contribution  to  the  pronouncement  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  to  be  found  in  the  policy  of  his 
office  in  dealing  with  the  Alliance,  France,  Spain  and  the 
South  American  states;  the  international  situation  which 
that  policy  created ;  the  encouragement  which  he  gave  to  the 
government  of  the  United  States  through  a  frank  expres- 
sion of  his  own  attitude  and  that  of  his  country ; 3  above  all, 
in  his  desire  to  satisfy  the  commercial  interests  of  England, 
and  his  determination  to  use  force  to  do  so,  if  necessary; 
and  in  his  warning  of  the  danger  that  was  threatening! 
American  liberties  from  the  plans  of  the  continental  powers.4 

Thus,  the  British  policy  as  represented  by  Canning,  and 
the  American  policy  as  represented  by  President  Monroe, 
derived  their  effectiveness  from  the  fact  that  they  rested 
upon  a  common  understanding,  and  consequently  upon  the 
faith  of  ultimate  unity  of  action.5 

The  proposed  Congress  of  Paris,6  of  which  Canning  had 

1  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  418. 

2  Beaumarchais  (M.  P.  J.  D.),  La  Doctrine  de  Monroe,  (Paris,  1898), 
p.  6;  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  467. 

3  Tower,  op.  cit.,  p.  20. 

4  Johnson,  op.  cit.,  vol.  i,  p.  348;  Henderson,  op.  cit.,  p.  316;  McLaugh- 
lin,  America  and  Britain,  pp.  119-120. 

6  Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  420. 

*  F.  O.,  South  America,  1822-1823,  Communications  with  France  and 
Spain  Relating  to  the  Spanish-American  Provinces,  no.  2. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

warned  Rush,  failed  to  assemble.1  The  purpose  of  that 
congress  was  to  discuss  the  affairs  of  South  America;  but 
the  attitude  of  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  con- 
vinced the  continental  statesmen  of  its  utter  futility.2  Great 
Britain  declined  the  invitation  to  be  represented.3  In  his 
reply  to  Count  Ofalia,  Canning  stated  that  Great  Britain's 
opposition  to  intervention  in  South  America  by  any  Euro- 
pean power,  except  Spain,  could  not  be  changed.  It  was 
a  position  which  Great  Britain  had  maintained  consistently 
since  the  Congress  of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  and  from  which  no 
congress  of  powers  could  move  her.  He,  therefore,  con- 
sidered the  congress  proposed  by  the  Spanish  government 
rather  as  a  possible  source  of  delay  than  as  an  aid  in  the 
solution  of  the  Spanish-American  question.4  The  United 
States  refused  to  "  sanction  by  our  presence  any  meeting 
of  European  Potentates  to  dispose  of  American  Repub- 
lics." 5 

In  reference  to  representation  at  this  congress  of  powers, 
Canning  had  already  (18  September)  stated  to  Rush  that 
should  he  [Rush]  be  invited  to  attend  the  congress,  and 
then  decline  the  invitation,  Canning  would  reserve  the  right, 
should  he  be  invited,  also  of  staying  away  from  the  meet- 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  39;  Ford,  John  Quincy  Adams, 
his  Connection  with  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  p.  49,  Canning  to  Rush, 
23  August,  1823;  F.  O.,  South  America,  1822-18231,  Communications 
with  France  and  Spain  Relating  to  the  Spanish -American  Provinces, 
no.  2;  T'emperley,  George  Canning,  p.  180. 

1  Stapleton,  Life  of  Canning,  vol.  ii,  p.  39. 

*lbil.,  pp.  36,  38,  40-41;  F.  O.,  South  America,  Communications  with 
France  and  Spain,  Canning  to  William  a  Court,  30  December,  1823. 

4  bid.,  no.  3,  (Canning  to  William  a  'Court,  30  January,  1824;  cf. 
ibid.,  France,  May-December,  1823,  Canning  to  Stuart,  9  November, 
1823,  no.  84. 

•Ford,  John  Quincy  Adams,  etc.,  p.  23,  Adams  to  Rush,  November  30, 
1823. 


BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [142 

ing.1  Nothing  could  point  more  plainly  to  the  perfect  sin- 
cerity of  Canning  in  a  strong  effort  to  identify  the  policy 
of  his  country  with  that  of  the  United  States.  By  staying 
away  from  the  congress  if  the  American  representative  did, 
he  would  impress  the  other  European  statesmen  with  the 
fact  that  England  and  the  United  States  were  in  accord  re- 
specting the  Spanish-American  question. 

Without  the  cooperation  of  England  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
would  have  been  little  short  of  useless  as  a  preventive  of 
European  intervention.  The  allied  governments  had  shown 
little  or  no  regard  for  the  attitude  of  the  United  States 
in  formulating  their  Spanish- American  policy.2  They 
showed  as  little  respect  for  that  attitude  when  given  formal 
expression  by  President  Monroe.3  Even  after  President 
Monroe's  Message  had  reached  the  European  capitals,  the 
allied  powers  tried  to  induce  the  government  of  England 
to  cooperate  with  them  in  the  settlement  of  the  Spanish- 
American  question.4  The  refusal  of  England  to  join  with 
them  in  a  new  congress  deprived  them  of  the  support  of 
the  one  state  necessary  for  the  success  of  their  plan.  Nessel- 
rode,  Russian  secretary  of  foreign  affairs,  readily  admitted 
that  with  England  in  opposition,  the  failure  of  the  allied 
plan  of  intervention  in  Spanish  America  was  a  foregone  con- 
clusion :  "  Though  the  Allies,  by  a  strict  interpretation  of 
their  doctrines,  might  be  bound  not  to  refuse  a  direct  assis- 
tance in  men  and  ships  to  Spain,  that  power  will  readily  see 
that  so  rigid  a  construction  of  their  engagements  will  serve 
no  useful  purpose  while  England  maintains  its  present 

•>Rush,  op.  cit.,  p.  395. 

2  British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  vol.  xi,  p.  49;  F.  0.,  France, 
vol.  295,  no.  557;  'Chateaubriand,  Congress  of  Verona,  vol.  ii,  p.  2^2; 
Perkins,  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  xxvii,  pp.  211-213. 

3  F.  O.,  Austria,  vol.  182,  no.  16 ;  ibid.,  France,  vol.  305,  desp.  8. 

4  Perkins,  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  xxvii,  p.  215. 


I43]  THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE  143 

attitude ;  "  *  and  Chateaubriand  was  determined  "  not  to  risks 
a  rupture  with  the  Cabinet  of  St.  James  on  this  colonial 
question."  2  Not  the  United  States,  but  England,  was  the 
real  barrier  to  allied  intervention  in  Spanish  America.  Her 
possession  of  the  largest  navy  in  the  world  gave  practical 
effectiveness  to  her  own  opposition  as  expressed  in  the 
Canning-Polignac  agreement,  as  well  as  to  that  of  the  United 
States  as  expressed  in  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

Now,  suppose,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  interests  of 
Great  Britain  had  been  of  a  nature  to  identify  her  policy 
with  that  of  the  continental  powers,  no  stretch  of  the 
imagination  is  necessary  to  conceive  of  the  consequences.3 
The  new  states  of  South  America  would  have  been  des- 
troyed, and  probably  the  southern  continent  would  have  been 
parcelled  out  among  its  conquerors,4  against  which  an  in- 
dependent protest  by  the  United  States  would  have  been 
conspicuously  ineffective.5  It  is  greatly  to  the  credit  of 
Secretary  Adams  that  American  liberties,  for  the  preserva- 
tion of  which  Jefferson  and  Madison  had  advised  concurrent 
action,  were  protected  through  Anglo-American  cooperation 
without  entering  into  any  entangling  alliances.6 
v'  To  the  extent  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  constituted  a  re- 
enforcement  of  British  policy  it  was  well  received  in  Great 
Britain;  while  its  prohibition  against  European  colonization 
not  only  failed  of  immediate  recognition,  but  met  with  severe 
criticism.7  In  prohibiting  European  colonization  on  the 

1  Quoted  by  Perkins,  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  vol.  xxvii,  p.  215. 
1  Chateaubriand,  op.  cit.,  vol.  ii,  p.  304. 

*  The  London  Times,  22  November,  1906. 

4Kraus  (H.),  "What  the  European  Countries  Think  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,"  Annals  of  the  Am.  Acad.  of  Pol.  and  Soc.  Science,  vol. 
liv,  p.  107.  I 

•  Henderson,  American  Diplomatic  Questions,  pp.  321,  340. 
•Reddaway,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  pp.  96,  98. 

7  Stapleton,  Some  Correspondence  of  George  Canning,  vol.  ii,  pp.  79-80, 
Canning  to  the  British  Commissioners,  31  May,  1824;  Annual  Reg., 
vol.  Ixv,  p.  239. 


I44         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [144 

American  continents,  the  Monroe  Doctrine  went  far  beyond 
Canning's  expectations;  and  it  has  been  that  part  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  over  which  Anglo-American  relations 
have  occasionally  become  much  disturbed.  But  circum- 
stances of  American  expansion  have  served  to  reduce  the 
chances  of  renewed  antagonism  on  account  of  that  principle. 
The  political  principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  has  not  been 
seriously  questioned  by  Great  Britain.1  It  was  to  that  prin- 
ciple that  Canning  referred  when  he  said  that  "  the  Spanish- 
American  question  is,  essentially,  settled.  There  will  be 
no  Congress  upon  it;  and  things  will  take  their  own  course 
on  the  continent,  which  cannot  be  otherwise  but  favorable 
to  us."  2  The  same  opinion  was  expressed  by  other  British 
statesmen  who  saw  in  the  political  principle  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  the  hope  of  Anglo-American  cooperation  in  the 
future.  Said  Lord  Brougham,  a  member  of  Parliament : 

The  question  in  regard  to  Spanish  America  is  now,  I  believe, 
disposed  of,  or  nearly  so ;  for  an  event  has  happened  than  which 
none  has  ever  dispersed  greater  joy,  exultation,  and  gratitude 
over  all  the  freemen  of  Europe:  that  event  which  is  decisive 
on  the  subject  is  the  language  held  with  respect  to  Spanish 
America  in  the  Message  of  the  President  of  the  United  States.3 

Sir  James  Mackintosh,  another  member  of  Parliament, 
delighted  in  contemplating  the  two  great  English  common- 
wealths uniting  their  forces  in  the  interest  of  justice  and 
liberty.4 

The  official  opinion  of  British  statesmen  was  echoed  in 

1  Johnson,  America's  Foreign  Relations,  vol.  i,  p.  349. 

2  Stapleton,  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  p.  394,  Canning  to  William 
a  Court,  31  December,  1823. 

8  Parliamentary  Papers,  (1882),  vol.  Ixxx,  p.  88,  quoted  by  Freling- 
huysen  to  Lowell,  8  May,  1882. 
4  Ibid. 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

the  public  press,  in  which  the  President's  Message  was  con- 
sidered as  "  plain  speaking  and  just  thinking."  The 
British  press  was  almost  unanimous  in  its  enthusiastic  wel- 
come of  the  Monroe  Message.2  It  was  an  additional  evi- 
dence of  the  harmony  of  British  and  American  policies  re- 
lative to  South  America : 

With  what  satisfaction  .  .  .  must  we  receive  the  tidings, 
when  they  announce  the  intended  prosecution  of  a  policy  so 
directly  British  ?  From  the  similarity  of  the  position  occupied 
by  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States,  in  reference  to  what  was 
Spanish  America,  it  is  difficult  to  calculate  on  any  but  an 
identity  of  measures,  and  an  equal  hostility  to  the  machinations 
of  the  Holy  Alliance.3 

Similar  expressions  of  approval  of  the  Message  were  many. 
It  was  considered  as  a  decisive  force  in  the  settlement  of 
the  most  important  of  the  political  questions  then  pending,4 
and  as  an  effective  instrument  in  placing  South  America 
beyond  the  grasp  of  the  Alliance.5  But  recognition  of  the 
part  played  by  the  British  government  was  not  lacking: 
'  The  project  of  reuniting  South  America  to  Spain  has 
been  defeated  by  the  decided  tone  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  and  the  no  less  manly,  though  more  temperate 
and  cautious,  proceedings  of  our  Ministers."  6  It  was  re- 
cognized that  no  expedition  by  the  members  of  the  Alliance 
could  possibly  be  hazarded  in  the  face  of  the  resistance  both 

1  The  London  Times,  27  December,  1823. 
1  Ibid.,  6  January,  1824. 

3  Ibid.,  6  January,  1824. 

4  Bell's  Weekly  Register,  28  December,  1823. 

6  The  Examiner,  28  December,  18123 ;  The  Morning  Post,  27  December, 
1823. 

6  Bell's  Weekly  Register,  29  February,  1824. 


I46         BRITISH  POLICY  AND  MONROE  DOCTRINE        [I46 

of  Great  Britain  and  of  the  United  States.1  That  the  British 
public  felt  confident  that  the  Spanish- American  problem  had 
been  definitely  settled  was  evidenced  by  the  immediate  rise 
of  Spanish-American  securities.2 

Though  the  Monroe  Doctrine  derived  most  of  its  effec-  , 
tiveness  from  its  relation  to  British  Policy,  its  promulgation  \ 
in  1823  as  the  policy  of  the  United  States  marks  the  end  ' 
of  one  period  and  the  beginning  of  another  in  the  history  of 
America.  It  was  a  public  announcement  that  the  states  of 
the  western  hemisphere,  where  Europeans  had  long  and 
greedily  rivalled  one  another  for  supremacy,  had  reached 
a  stage  in  their  development  where  such  rivalry  must  cease, 
and  their  political  maturity  and  right  to  independence  must 
be  recognized  on  the  basis  of  equality  with  the  states  of  the 
Old  World.  For  the  United  States  it  marks,  more  parti- 
cularly, the  rise  of  its  political  primacy  among  the  republics 
of  America,  a  position  by  which  it  has  often  reduced  the 
chances  of  war  in  the  New  World,  and  contributed  as  well 
to  the  maintenance  of  peaceful  relations  between  the  two 
hemispheres. 

xThe  Examiner,  25  January,  1824;  Cobbett's  Pol.  Reg.,  vol.  xlix,  p.  14. 
8  Reddaway,  op.  cit.,  pp.  94-95. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

SOURCES 

Adams  (J.  Q.),  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams  (ed.  by  C.  F.  Adams), 

12  volumes,  Philadelphia,  1874-1877. 

,  Writings  (ed.  by  W.  C.  Ford),  12  volumes,  New  York,  1913-1917. 

American   State   Papers,   Foreign   Relations,   6   volumes,    Washington, 

1833-1859- 
Annals  of  Congress:  Debates  and  Proceedings  in  Congress,  Washington, 

1834-1856. 

Annual  Register,  104  volumes,  London,  1762-1863. 
British  and  Foreign  State  Papers,  London,  1841- 
Canning  (George),  Memoirs  (ed.  by  John  Styles),  2  volumes,  London, 

1828. 

,  Speeches  (ed.  by  R.  Therry),  6  volumes,  London,  1828. 

Castlereagh    ('Robert    Stewart,    Lord    Castlereagh,    2nd    Marquess    of 

Londonderry),  Correspondence,  12  volumes,  London,  1853. 
Ford   (W.  C),  John  Quincy  Adams,  his  connection  with  the  Monroe 

Doctrine  (1823),  Cambridge,  1902. 
Hall   (Basil),  Extracts  from  a  Journal  written  on  the  coasts  of  Chili, 

Peru,  and  Mexico  in  the  years  1820,  1821,  1822,  Philadelphia,  1824. 
Hertslet  (Edward),  The  Map  of  Europe  by  Treaty,  4  volumes,  London, 

1875-1891- 
Jefferson   (Thomas),   Works    (ed.  by   P.  L.  Ford),   12  volumes,   New 

York,  1904. 
Madison  (James),  Writings  (ed.  by  G.  Hunt),  9  volumes,  New  York, 

1900-1910. 
Marshall    (J.),  A   Digest   of  all   the  accounts   diffused   through  more 

than  600  volumes  of  Journals,  Reports,  and  Papers  presented   to 

Parliament  since  1799,  London,  1833. 
Monroe  (James),  Writings  (ed.  by  S.  M.  Hamilton),  8  volumes,  New 

York,  1902. 

Parliamentary  Debates  (ed.  by  T.  C.  Hansard),  London,  1812- 
Parliamentary  Papers,  London,  1801- 
Public  Record  Office,  London, 

Foreign    Office    Records — America,    South    America,    Continent, 
Austria,  France,  Russia  and  'Spain. 
Richardson  (J.  D.),  Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  10  volumes, 

Washington,  1896-18199. 

147]  147 


148  BIBLIOGRAPHY  [I48 

Rush  (Richard),  The  Court  of  London  from  1819  to  1825,  London,  1873. 
Stapleton   (E.  J.),  Some  Official  Correspondence  of  George  Canning, 

2  volumes,  London,  1887. 
Washington   (George),   Writings   (ed.  by  Jared  .Sparks),   12  volumes, 

Boston,  1839. 
Wellington   (Arthur  Wellesley,  Duke  of  Wellington),   Supplementary 

Despatches,  15  volumes,  London,  1858-1872. 

SECONDARY  WORKS 

Abbott   (W.  C.),   The  Expansion  of  Europe,  including  Asia,  Africa, 

and  Latin  America,  2  volumes,  New  York,  1918. 
Adams  (Henry),  History  of  the  United  States  of  America,  9  volumes, 

New  York,  1891. 

Reaumarchais  (M.  P.  J.  D.),  La  Doctrine  de  Monroe,  Paris,  1898. 
Beer   (G.  L.),   The  English- Speaking  Peoples;   their  future  relations 

and  joint  international  obligations,  New  York,  1918. 
Bigelow  (John),  American  Policy:  the  western  hemisphere  in  its  rela- 
tion to  the  eastern,  New  York,  1914. 
Bogart   (E.  L.),   The  Economic  History  of  the   United  States,   New 

York,  1913. 
Broderick  (G.  C.)  and  Fotheringham  (J.  K.),  A  History  of  England, 

1801-1837,  London,  1906. 

Cambridge  Modern  History,  12  volumes,  New  York,  1902-1910. 
Ohanning  (Edward),  A  History  of  the  United  States,  5  volumes,  New 

York,  1912- 

Chapman  (C.  E.),  A  History  of  Spain,  New  York,  1918. 
Chateaubriand  (M.  de),  The  Congress  of  Verona,  2  volumes,  London, 

1838. 
Cheyney    (E,    P.),   Industrial   and   Social   History   of   England,    New 

York,  1920. 
Cunningham    (William),   The  Growth  of  English  Industry  and   Com- 

merce  in  Modern  Times,  Cambridge,  1892. 
Day  (dive),  A  History  of  Commerce,  New  York,  1917. 
Dewey   (D.  R,),  Financial  History  of  the   United  States,  New  York, 

1903. 
Dunning   (W.  A.),   The  British  Empire  and  the   United  States,   New 

York,  1914. 

Everett  (E.),  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  New  York,  1863. 
Fish  (C.  R.),  American  Diplomacy,  New  York,  1916. 
Foster  (J.  W.),  A  Century  of  American  Diplomacy,  Boston,  1901. 
Hart    (A.   B.),    The  Foundations   of  American   Foreign  Policy,    Near 

York,  1901. 

— ,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  Boston,  1915. 
Hassall  (Arthur),  Viscount  Castlereagh,  'London,  1908. 


I49] 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Hayes  (C.  J.  H.),  A  Political  and  Social  History  of  Modern  Europt, 

2  volumes,  New  York,  1916. 

Henderson  (J.  B.)>  American  Diplomatic  Questions,  New  York,  1901. 
Hill  (D.  J.),  A  History  of  European  Diplomacy,  3  volumes,  New  York, 

1914. 
Johnson  (W.  F.),  America's  Foreign  Relations,  2  volumes,  New  York, 

1916. 
Kasson  (J.  A.),  The  Evolution  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 

of  America  and  History  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  Boston,  1914. 
Kraus   (H.),  Die  Monroedoktrin  in  ihren  Beziehungen  zur  Amerikan- 

ischen  Diplomatic  und  zum  Volkerrecht,  Berlin,  1913. 
Latane  (J.  H.),  The  United  States  and  Latin  America,  Garden  City,  1920. 
Levi  (Leone),  History  of  Commerce,  London,  1880. 
Lipson  (iEphraim),  An  Introduction  to  the  Economic  History  of  England, 

London,  1920. 

McLaughlin  (A.  C.),  America  and  Britain,  New  York,  1919. 
McMaster    (J.   B.),  A   History   of  the  People   of  the    United  States, 

7  volumes,  New  York,  1885-1910. 

Mahan  (A.  T.),  The  Influence  of  Sea-Power  upon  History,  Boston,  1893. 
Marriott  (J.  A.  R.),  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  .London,  1903. 
Moore  (J.  B.),  The  Principles  of  American  Diplomacy,  New  York,  1918. 
Ogg   (F.  A.),   The  Economic  Development  of  Modern  Europe,   New 

York,  1917. 
Page  (William),  Commerce  and  Industry:  A  Historical  Review  of  the 

Economic   Conditions   of   the   British  Empire   from   the  Peace   of 

Paris  in  1815  to  the  Declaration  of  War  in  1914,  based  on  Parlia- 

mentary Debates,  London,  1919. 
Paxson    (Frederic    L.),    The    Independence    of    the    South   American 

Republics,  Philadelphia,  1916. 

Phillips  (W.  A.),  The  Confederation  of  Europe,  New  York,  1914. 
Porter  (G.  R.),  The  Progress  of  the  Nation,  3  volumes,  London,  1838. 
Reddaway  (W.  F.),  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  New  York,  1905. 
Schurz  (Carl),  Henry  Clay,  Boston,  1887. 

Semple  (E.  C.),  Influence  of  Geographic  Environment,  New  York,  1911. 
Shepherd   (W.  R.),   The  Hispanic  Nations  of  the  New  World,  New 

Haven,  1920. 

Smith  (Frederick),  International  Law,  London,  1918. 
Snow  (Freeman),  Treaties  and  Topics  in  American  Diplomacy,  Boston, 

1894. 

Stapleton  (A.  G.),  George  Canning  and  His  Times,  London,  1859. 
-  •,    The  Political  Life   of   the  Right   Honourable   George   Canning, 

3  volumes,  'London,  1831. 

Temperley  (H.  W.  V.),  George  Canning,  London,  1905. 
Tower   (Charlemagne),  Essays,  Political  and  Historical,   Philadelphia, 
1914. 


I50  BIBLIOGRAPHY  [150 

Turner  (F.  J.),  Rise  of  the  New  West,  1819-1829,  New  York,  1906. 
Villele    (Comte  de),  Memoires  et  Correspondence,  4  volumes,   Paris, 

1888-1890. 

Walpole  (Spencer),  History  of  England,  6  volumes,  London,  1890. 
Wilson  (G.  G.)  and  Tucker  (G.  F.),  International  Law,  Boston,  1915. 
Woolsey    (T.  S.),   America's  Foreign  Policy,  Essays  and  Addresses, 

New  York,  1898. 

REVIEWS  AND  NEWSPAPERS 

The  American  Historical  Review,  volumes,  vii,  viii,  ix  and  xxvii. 

The  Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science, 

volume  liv. 

Edinburgh  Review,  volume  ccxxix. 
North  American  Review,  volumes  clxii  and  clxxvi. 
Bell's  Weekly  Messenger. 
Cobbett's  Political  Register. 
The  Examiner. 
The  London  Times. 
The  Morning  Chronicle. 
The  Morning  Post. 


INDEX 


Adams,  John,  20;  Message  of 
1797,  20 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  on  Canning's 
propositions,  129 ;  reply  to  Rush, 
133-135 ;  significance  of  his  diplo- 
macy, 136 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Congress  of,  36 

Alexander,  Tsar  of  Russia,  33; 
Memorandum,  37;  plan  for 
European  peace,  37-39;  pro- 
poses Holy  Alliance,  32 

Allies,  policy  of  intervention,  14; 
notes  to  Madrid,  55-56;  recall 
of  Ministers,  56 

American  colonies,  12 

American  policy,  scope  of,  129- 
133 ;  in  Monroe  Doctrine,  133 

American  System,  28 

Amiens,  peace  of,  77 

Anglo-American  cooperation,  13, 
15;  conditions  favoring,  15; 
sought,  26-27,  32,  109-112,  117; 
obstacles,  109-119;  Canning's  ar- 
guments, 117-118 

Anglo-French  rivalry,  57,  11-14, 
89-90,  92 

Argentine  Confederation,  22 

Asientp,  81 

Austria,  intervention  in  Naples  and 
Piedmont,  46 

Balance  of  power,  66 

Bathurst,  38 ;  on  intervention,  38 

Bell's  Weekly  Register,  87;  on 
economic  motives,  94 

Bolivia,  22 

Bouchier,  128 

Bourbon  monarchies,  58 

British  government,  friendly  feel- 
ing of,  108-109 

British  policy,  76 ;  economic  basis, 
77,  80,  82-100,  102-103;  means, 
103 ;  compared  with  that  of  the 
U.  S.,  119 

Buenos  Ayres,  22 
Canada,  16 


Canning,  George,  15;  opposed  to 
congresses,  40,  51 ;  Sec.  of  For. 
Affairs,  46-47 ;  foreign  policy, 
51-52 ;  political  principles,  52-53, 
63,  68;  on  Congress  of  Verona, 
59 ;  on  King's  speech,  60-61 ; 
efforts  to  maintain  peace,  62; 
Memorandum,  69;  opposed  to 
intervention  in  <South  America, 
69-70;  letter  to  Stuart,  76,  no; 
Cabinet  Circular,  104 ;  on  Anglo- 
American  relations,  108-109;  in- 
terviews with  Rush,  109-112;  on 
recognition,  113;  propositions  to 
Rush,  114;  warning  of  new 
congress,  115;  conference  with 
Polignac,  121-124;  motives,  136- 
137;  American  influence,  138; 
on  Congress  of  Paris,  141-142 

Canning,  Stratford,  128 

Canning  -  Polignac  agreement, 
Memorandum  of,  121 ;  reasons 
for,  122;  terms,  122-123;  sig- 
nificance of,  123-124;  substitute 
for  joint  declaration,  137-138; 
comment  of  Rush,  138;  relation 
to  Monroe  Doctrine,  138 

Castlereagh,  35;  at  Aix-la-Cha- 
pelle, 37;  on  treaties  of  Paris 
and  Vienna,  38;  opposed  to  in- 
tervention, 43;  on  Troppau 
Protocol,  45;  Memorandum,  47; 
instructions  on  South  America, 
82 

Chateaubriand,  61 ;  on  interven^ 
tion  in  Spain,  61-62;  justifica- 
tion of  war,  64-65 ;  on  Family 
Compact,  67;  fear  of  British 
naval  power,  143 

Chaumont,  treaty  of,  35,  38-39 

Chile,  22 

Clay,  27 ;  on  recognition  of  Latiii- 
American  republics,  27-28;  and 
American  System,  28 


152 


INDEX 


[152 


Cobbett's  Political  Register,  criti- 
cism of  merchants,  95 

Colombia,  22 

Common  Council,  74 

Congress  (United  States),  reso- 
lution!, 24 ;  acts  of  neutrality,  25 ; 
on  recognition,  28 

Constitutionalists,  54;  conduct  of, 
64 

Consuls,  105 

Cuba,  128 

Declaration,  Anglo-American,  in- 
112,  115;  obstacles,  109,  119,  124; 
dependent  on  recognition,  119; 
and  Canning- Polignac  agree- 
ment, 124;  opposed  in  the  U.  S., 
125-126;  attitude  of  Jefferson 
and)  Madison,  126-127 

Embargo,  78 

England,  foreign  policy,  1 1 ;  rela- 
tions with  France,  n,  12;  effects 
of  Industrial  Revolution,  13; 
commercial  interest,  12;  indus- 
try, 13;  exports,  13;  colonial 
trade,  14;  opposed  to  interven- 
tion, 14,  38-40,  43,  46;  maritime 
power,  15 ;  public  opinion  on  in- 
tervention, 61 ;  neutrality,  66-68, 
70 ;  neutrality  limited,  69-71 ; 
break  with  Alliance,  48;  com- 
mercial agents,  95  ;  naval  power, 
143 ;  views  on  Monroe  Doctrine, 
143-146 

Exports,  British,  to  continent,  77- 
78 ;  to  the  U.  S.,  78-79;  to  South 
America,  83-86 

Family  Compact,  67 

Ferdinand  VII,  46,  48 ;  restored,  75 

Florida  treaty,  26;  ratified,  28; 
provisions  of,  130 

France,  exports  of,  14;  trade  with 
continent  14;  policy,  54-60;  war 
with  Spain,  64 

General  Alliance,  37 

Geography,  influence  of,  15-16 

Great  Britain  (see  England) 

Grey,  66 

Hobhouse,  66 

Holy  Alliance.  10;  origin  of,  32; 
and  England,  33;  purpose,  33- 
34;  danger  of,  34;  hyran  to,  74 

Intervention,  in  Latin  America,  9; 
danger  of,  9;  opposed  by  Eng- 
land, 14,  28;  relation  to  Monroe 


Doctrine,  18;  'doctrine  of,  28, 
44 ;  in  Spain,  54,  65,  72-73 

Interviews,  Canning  -  Rush,  109- 
112;  sudden  termination  of,  120 

Isolation,  policy  of,  18-21 ;  rela- 
tion to  Napoleonic  wars,  21 

Jefferson,  20;  policy  of  isolation, 
20;  First  Inaugural  Address, 
21 ;  advice  to  Monroe,  126-127; 
on  Cuba,  128 

Laibach,  Congress  of,  60 ;  declara- 
tion of,  60 

Latin  America,  independence  of, 
22  (see  Spanish  colonies) 

Legitimacy,  56 

Legitimists,  58 

Liverpool,  109 

Loans,  94 

"  Lord  Colingwood,"  96 

London,  Lord  Mayor  of,  74 

London  Times,  anticipates  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  93 

Louis  XVIII,  56;  speech  of,  59-60 

Mackintosh,  139 

Madison,  Message  of  1811,  23-24; 
proclamation  of  neutrality,  25; 
advice  to  Monroe,  127 

Mediation,  54;  declined,  55 

Metternich,  28 

Mexico,  22 

Middleton,     131 

Monroe,  28;  recommends  recogni- 
tion, 28;  Message,  133,  142 

Monroe  Doctrine,  in  foreign  rela- 
tions, 9;  relation  to  British 
policy,  10;  roots  of,  18;  as 
policy  of  isolation,  igf  and 
transfer  of  territory,  22 ;  prin- 
ciples of,  93 ;  editorial  comment 
upon,  1 08;  scope  of,  133-134; 
British  influence,  139-140,  142; 
British  attitude,  135,  143-146; 
effects  of,  146 

Montmorency,  55 

Naples,  _  revolution  in,  40 ;  Aus- 
trian intervention,  46 

Napoleonic  wars,  effects  of,  86 

Non-Intercourse  Act,  78 

Non-intervention,  British  policy 
of,  29;  relation  to  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 29;  source  of,  49-50 

Northwest  claims,  130-132 

Orders  in  Council,  78 

Oregon,  131 

Paine,  21 


153] 


INDEX 


153 


Paraguy,  22 

Paris,  Congress  of,  35;  failed  to 
meet,  140-141 ;  purpose,  141 ; 
views  of  Canning,  141-142 

Paris,  treaty  of  (1763),  12; 
(1815),  39 

Parliament,  committee  of,  87 

Peru,  22 

Petitions,  86-89 

Piedmont,  revolution,  40 

Polignac,  conference  with  Can- 
ning, 121-124 

Porto  Bello,  81 

Portugal,  revolution,  41 ;  Austrian 
intervention,  46;  treaty,  66 

Propositions  relative  to  South 
America,  Canning's,  114;  sent  by 
Rush,  115;  reply  of  Rush,  115- 
116,  119;  views  of  Rush,  119; 
views  of  Adams,  129 

Public  opinion,  British,  61 ;  on  in- 
tervention in  Spain,  66,  72-74 

Quadruple  Alliance,  10;  policy  of, 
14;  treaty  of,  35,  46;  views  of 
Castlereagh,  35  ;  treaty  modified, 
35-36;  purpose,  37-38;  authority 
limited,  39-40;  Congress  of 
Troppau,  43;  intervenes.  48; 
withdrawal  of  England,  48; 
plans  reduced  to  Anglo-French 
rivalry,  59 

Quintuple  Alliance,  10 

Recognition  of  South  American 
republics,  question  of,  104-108; 
attitude  of  England,  100-102; 
advocated  by  Rush,  112-113, 
120;  obstacles,  119-121;  Can- 
ning's refusal,  121 

Republicanism,  relation  to  recog- 
nitions 23,  27-28,  72,  121 

Republics  of  South  America,  100- 
108 

Revolution,  American,  16;  attitude 
of  English,  16;  French,  13,  30; 
Industrial,  12,  13,  30 

Rush,  102;  on  British  motives, 
102-103;  despatch  to  Monroe, 
109;  interviews  with  Canning, 
109-112;  insists  upon  recogni- 
tion, 112-113,  119;  warned  of 
new  congress,  115  ;  reply  to  Can- 
ning, 115-116;  report  of  inter- 
views, 120 ;  on  Canning-Polignac 
conference,  138 

"Russian  circular,  41 ;  contents  of, 


41-42;  British  attitude,  42; 
Northwest  claims,  130 

Russo-American  treaty  (1824), 
131-132 

Sea  power,  British,  14,  143;  and 
trade,  13-14 

Shipping,  British,  attacks  upon, 
96-98 

South-American  question,  solution 
of,  103;  new  congress  on,  115 

Spain,  revolution,  40,  46;  allied 
intervention,  46,  48,  51-76;  Brit- 
ish interest,  48;  colonial  trade, 
81 ;  trade  agreements,  82-83 

Spanish  colonies,  revolt  of,  22; 
recognition  of,  71 ;  recognition 
withheld  by  England,  72;  Brit- 
ish interest,  80,  92;  commercial 
agents,  95 

Spanish  Succession,  War  of,  n 

Stewart,  43 

Stuart,  69;  Canning's  letter  to,  76, 
1 10,  137 

Subscription,  public,  74 

Territory,  American,  transfer  of, 
21 ;  Madison's  recommendation, 
122 

Trade,  British,  with  South  Amer- 
ica, 83-86 

Troppau,  Congress  of,  41,  43; 
Protocol  of,  44;  British  attitude, 
45 

Tuyll,  131 

Ukase,  Russian,  130 

United  States,  independence  and 
foreign  policy  of,  13 ;  British 
background,  16 ;  'Latin-American 
policy  of,  23-24,  29;  opposed  to 
alliances,  17-18;  policy  of  isola- 
tion, 18,  20-21 ;  considered  as 
rival,  08-100;  favors  separate 
declaration,  128 

Utrecht,  treaty  of,  IT 

Verona,  Congress  of,  47 ;  British 
triumph,  53-54:  Canning's  com- 
ment 59 ;  British  commercial  in- 
terest, 82-83 

Vienna,  Congress  of,  30;  purpose, 
31 ;  treaties  of,  31 

Villele,  55;  policy  toward  Spain, 
55,  63-64 

Washington,  advice  of,  19;  neu- 
trality proclamation,  19 

Wellington,  at  Congress  of  Ve- 
rona, 47;  withdrawal,  48 


VITA 


LEONARD  A.  LAWSON  was  born  on  2  August,  1884,  in 
Bjornhofda,  Sweden.  He  received  the  degree  of  Bachelor 
of  Arts  from  Upsala  College  in  1909,  and  in  the  same  year 
matriculated  at  Columbia  University,  receiving  the  degree 
of  Master  of  Arts  in  1911.  His  graduate  studies  at 
Columbia  University  were  resumed  in  1913  and  continued 
until  1915.  While  at  Columbia  he  attended  courses  given 
by  Professors  Botsf  ord,  Giddings,  Robinson  and  Shotwell  3 
and  he  also  participated  in  the  seminars  conducted  by  Pro- 
fessors Botsford  and  Robinson.  From  1909  to  1916  he 
was  a  member  of  the  faculty  of  Upsala  College.  During 
the  academic  year  1916-1917  he  was  Associate  Professor 
of  History  in  Hobart  College,  and  since  1917  Professor  of 
History  in  the  same  institution. 

i55 


14  DAY  USE 

RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


LD  21A-50m-4,'59 
(A1724slO)476B 


General  Library     . 
University  of  California 
Berkeley 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


